United States v. Sheldon Dean Christopher Watt , 243 F. App'x 512 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 25, 2007
No. 07-10123 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00032-CR-OC-10-GRJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SHELDON DEAN CHRISTOPHER WATT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 25, 2007)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Sheldon Dean Christopher Watt appeals his conviction for
conspiracy to assault with intent to rob a United States Post Office employee and to
receive, possess, or dispose of unlawfully obtained property of the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. A superseding indictment alleged that Watt, in
furtherance of a conspiracy, robbed the Sorrento and Tangerine, Florida post
offices. In addition to the conspiracy, Watt was indicted on six additional counts,
including the substantive offenses of robbing the Sorrento and Tangerine post
offices. The jury found Watt not guilty of the Sorrento robbery substantive
offenses, but found him guilty on all remaining counts, including the conspiracy
count. The district court then acquitted Watt of the Sorrento robbery counts.
Watt argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his
conspiracy conviction, and his conviction cannot stand on mere conjecture. Watt
points out that two witnesses testified that a single man robbed the Tangerine post
office, and, although another witness testified that he saw one man get out of a car
in front of the Tangerine post office before the robbery, the witness did not see
anyone else in the car. Watt argues that the assumption that someone else was in
the car because he exited from the passenger’s side is pure speculation. Watt also
argues that, although Jillian Rodriguez was caught trying to cash a stolen money
order, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that she was a co-conspirator,
as the government did not present any evidence to show that Rodriguez knew that
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she was engaged in a criminal enterprise. Watt concludes that, because there was
insufficient evidence to link Rodriguez to the conspiracy, his conviction for
conspiracy should be reversed. Watt also argues that evidence regarding the
Sorrento robbery is not relevant to his appeal because he was acquitted of the
Sorrento robbery.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United
States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, the inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In so
doing, we resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the
jury’s verdict. United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000).
“It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,
provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th
Cir. 1997), modified on other grounds by United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423,
1427 (11th Cir. 1998). This review is “‘independent of the jury’s determination
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that evidence on another count was insufficient.’” United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d
1233, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67, 105
S. Ct. 471, 478, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984)).
“The elements of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 are (1) an agreement
among two or more persons to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and
voluntary participation in the agreement; and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in
furtherance of the agreement.” United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270
(11th Cir. 2003). “To prove knowing and voluntary participation, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants had a specific intent to join
the conspiracy.” Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1326. “The existence of a conspiracy may
be demonstrated by direct or circumstantial proof, including inferences from
statements or conduct of the participants.” United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030,
1042 (11th Cir. 1991). “Similarly, the defendant’s knowledge of and membership
in the conspiracy may be proven by acts on his part which furthered the goal of the
conspiracy.” Id. “The government, however, must show circumstances from
which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a meeting of the
minds to commit an unlawful act.” United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147,
1154 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “[A] common
purpose and plan with the other coconspirators may be inferred from a
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development and collocation of circumstances.” Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1326
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
As an initial matter, we conclude from the record that Watt errs in assuming
that the evidence regarding the Sorrento post office robbery is not relevant to his
appeal. All evidence adduced at trial is reviewed to determine whether or not
sufficient evidence exists to support Watt’s conviction. See Veal, 153 F.3d at
1253. Further, being acquitted of the Sorrento robbery does not foreclose Watt
from being convicted of conspiracy, even if the Sorrento post office robbery were
the only underlying offense. See United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1052
(11th Cir. 1998) (“Conspiracy and the substantive offense that is the object of the
conspiracy are separate and distinct crimes . . . . It is well established that acquittal
on the substantive count does not foreclose conviction on the related conspiracy
count.”); United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 989 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ecause
the crime of conspiracy is a separate offense, a conviction for conspiracy will stand
even if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for the substantive
offense also pled as an object of the conspiracy.”). The jury could have credited
Watt’s involvement in the Sorrento conspiracy while doubting he was the masked
man who robbed the Sorrento post office. Accordingly, evidence regarding the
Sorrento post office robbery is relevant to whether Watt conspired with another to
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rob both the Sorrento and Tangerine post offices.
As to the substance of Watt’s appeal, we conclude from the record that
sufficient evidence exists to support his conviction for conspiracy because the
circumstantial evidence introduced at trial would allow a jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Rodriguez, or at the very least an unidentified co-conspirator,
conspired with Watt to commit the robberies. While Watt was the only person
seen during the robbery of the Tangerine post office, he was seen exiting from the
passenger side of a car with darkly tinted windows, thus indicating another
individual had driven him there. The car was similar to a car registered to
Rodriguez, and she was apprehended later while trying to cash a money order
stolen by Watt during the Tangerine robbery, in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
Cross, 928 F.2d at 1042.
As to the Sorrento robbery, an unknown person, driving a car with the
headlights off, picked up the robber once he had abandoned a mail truck stolen
from the Sorrento post office and then sped off. The jury could have inferred that
the car had its headlights off and sped away because it was the getaway car.
Further, Rodriguez deposited cash into her bank account hours after the Sorrento
post office robbery in an amount about $130 more than the amount stolen. Finally,
stolen post office property and other evidence from both the Sorrento and
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Tangerine robberies were found in the bedroom shared by Watt and Rodriguez.
Thus, we conclude that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support
Watt’s conspiracy conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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