Tim Aldred v. Avis Rent-A-Car Inc. , 247 F. App'x 167 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 24, 2007
No. 06-14883 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-60507-CV-UUB
TIM ALDRED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AVIS RENT-A-CAR,
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
LOCAL NO. 390/769,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 24, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Tim Aldred, a union member formerly employed by a car rental
agency, appeals from the district court’s decision to deny his motion to vacate or
modify an arbitration decision and to grant summary judgment in favor of Avis
Rent-A-Car (“Avis”) and Teamsters Local No. 390/769 (“Union”). This dispute
arose after Aldred complained unsuccessfully that certain work duties being
imposed by his employer fell outside the scope of ones set forth in a collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Aldred’s claims were originally heard by an
arbitrator, which found against Aldred, and then rejected by the district court here.
The issues on appeal are whether the district court correctly found that the
arbitration award should not be vacated or modified and whether the district court
erred in granting summary judgment based on its finding that Avis did not breach
the CBA and the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation.1
I.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration award, we review
the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000).
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As an initial matter, we conclude that appellate jurisdiction exists to review Aldred’s
claims. Even if the August 2006 order was not final because the Union had not previously
moved for summary judgment, the decision had been announced and when the district court
entered the second “final judgment” in November 2006, the earlier notice of appeal was rendered
timely pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2). We also conclude that Aldred is representing only
himself on appeal because a litigant generally cannot appear pro se on behalf of others, and
Aldred is the only “plaintiff” to have signed pleadings, motions, and the appellate brief.
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Nevertheless, a court is generally required to defer to an arbitrator’s findings of
fact, but once those facts are found, the arbitrator may not ignore the plain
language of the CBA and lacks unfettered discretion to impose a remedy contrary
to its language. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 996 F.2d 279, 280-81 (11th Cir. 1993). The party challenging the
arbitration award bears the burden of “asserting sufficient grounds to vacate the
award.” See Brown, 211 F.3d at 1223. Because Aldred is proceeding pro se, we
liberally construe his pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), enacted in 1925, was
“to place agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts.” Weeks v.
Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). The FAA applies to
“[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Act ensures that arbitration provisions in contracts
are enforced, and courts may conduct “only a very limited degree of judicial
review” after the resulting arbitration. Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co., 172
F.3d 771, 774 (11th Cir. 1999). “[T]here is no reason to assume at the outset that
arbitrators will not follow the law; although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards
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necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply
with the requirements of the statute.” Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128
F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotations marks and citation omitted).
Generally, an arbitration award may not be vacated based on errors of law or
interpretation. Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1014 (11th Cir. 1998).
This court’s review of arbitration awards under the FAA is very limited and
confirming awards is presumed. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d
775, 778-79 (11th Cir. 1993).
Under the Act, four narrow statutory bases exist for vacating an arbitrator’s
award, including “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means” and “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002); B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v.
Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909-10 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2006). Three non-
statutory grounds also exist for vacating an award: (1) if the award was arbitrary
and capricious; (2) if enforcing the award contravenes public policy; or (3) “if the
award was made in manifest disregard for the law.” B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC, 441
F.3d at 910 (internal citations omitted). An award is not arbitrary and capricious
“unless no ground for the decision can be inferred from the facts.” Brown, 211
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F.3d at 1223. An arbitrator manifestly disregards the law if he was conscious of
the law and deliberately ignored it; merely misinterpreting, misstating, or
misapplying the law does not suffice. B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC, 441 F.3d at 910.
Even if an arbitration award clearly contradicts an express term of the
contract at issue and the arbitrator clearly erred, the award will not be set aside
unless the “arbitration loser” establishes that the arbitrator recognized a clear rule
of law and deliberately ignored it. Id. at 911-12.
“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has decided whether collective
bargaining agreements are subject to the FAA.” Brisentine v. Stone & Webster
Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a mandatory
arbitration clause does not preclude litigating a federal statutory claim).
Nevertheless, federal courts have jurisdiction to review decisions of labor
arbitrators, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509, 121 S. Ct. 1724, 1728 (2001). The LMRA applies to
agreements between an employer and a labor organization. Id.In Osram Sylvania, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union 528, 87 F.3d 1261, 1263
(11th Cir. 1996), a case involving a CBA where the FAA was not discussed, we
held that “[t]he proper standard in reviewing an arbitrator’s decision is one of
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considerable deference.” We added that “review of a labor arbitration award is
limited to a determination of whether an award is irrational, whether it fails to draw
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or whether it exceeds the
scope of the arbitrator’s authority.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
“as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Id. (quoting United
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S. Ct. 364, 371 (1987)) “It is
only when the arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement
and effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may
be unenforceable.” Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509, 121 S. Ct. at 1728 (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Furthermore, public policy considerations may be
grounds for vacating an award in rare cases. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass’n, Int’l, 861 F.2d 665, 670-71, 674 (11th Cir. 1988) (pilot operating passenger
aircraft while intoxicated).
Aldred has not demonstrated that the arbitrator was corrupt or that the award
was arbitrary or made in manifest disregard of the law. The arbitrator ruled in
favor of Avis and the Union after finding that the plain language of the CBA
precluded any other result because Avis had the right to assign a range of duties to
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courtesy bus drivers.
We find it is unnecessary to decide whether the FAA applies here because
Aldred cannot prevail in either case. If the FAA applies, Aldred has not met his
burden of establishing sufficient grounds to vacate the award. See B.L. Harbert
Int’l, LLC, 441 F.3d at 909-10; Brown, 211 F.3d at 1223. If the FAA does not
apply, Aldred also has not shown that the arbitrator “dispense[d] his own brand of
industrial justice” or rendered an irrational award. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509, 121 S.
Ct. at 1728; Osram Sylvania, Inc., 87 F.3d at 1263. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s refusal to vacate or modify the arbitrator’s award in this respect.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Drago v. Jenne,
453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when
“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000)
(quotation marks omitted). “The sufficiency of a hybrid Section 301 plaintiff’s
[duty of fair representation] allegations is a question of law that is also reviewed de
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novo.” Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 397 (2006).
“It has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit
against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.” DelCostello
v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2290, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 476 (1983). Nevertheless, an employee is typically required to exhaust any
grievance or arbitration remedies first. Id. at 163, 103 S. Ct. at 2290. “Subject to
very limited judicial review, he will be bound by the result according to the finality
provisions of the agreement.” Id. at 164, 103 S.Ct. at 2290.
A labor union has a statutory duty of fair representation “to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise
its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S. Ct. 903, 910 (1967). Thus, a
union breaches its duty of fair representation only if its actions toward a member
are “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. at 190, 87 S. Ct. at 916. “[A]
union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at
the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range
of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499
U.S. 65, 67, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1991) (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless,
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“[a] union’s broad discretion in prosecuting grievance complaints includes not
only the right to settle the dispute short of arbitration but also to refuse to initiate
the first steps in the appeal procedure when it believes the grievance to be without
merit.” See Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 468 F.2d 297, 300 (5th
Cir. 1972). If the union representing the employee “acts in such a discriminatory,
dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair
representation,” an employee may sue both the employer and the union, regardless
of the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding. DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 164, 103 S. Ct. at 2290.
Such a suit consists of two causes of action. Id. “The suit against the
employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union’s
duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act.” Id. This type of interdependent lawsuit, which consists of
two causes of action, is known as a “hybrid § 301/fair representation claim.”2 Id.
at 165, 103 S. Ct. at 2291. To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that the
CBA was breached and that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
2
A straightforward Section 301 claim occurs where a union sues an employer for breach
of a CBA. United Paperworks Int’l, Local # 395 v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 931 F.2d 832, 834 n.7
(11th Cir. 1991).
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DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S. Ct. at 2291.
In the present case, the plain language of the CBA refutes Aldred’s claims
that the sole duty that could be assigned to courtesy bus drivers was to drive
courtesy buses. Accordingly, we conclude that Aldred has not demonstrated that
the CBA was breached, and he cannot prevail on his hybrid claim. See
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. Even assuming, arguendo, that
Aldred demonstrated that Avis violated the CBA, we conclude that he has failed to
establish that the Union’s decision not to prosecute his grievance was so far outside
a “wide range of reasonableness” as to be irrational. See O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67,
111 S. Ct. at 1130.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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