United States v. Christopher Singleton , 156 F. App'x 229 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 29, 2005
No. 05-12773 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 00-00856-CR-1-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER SINGLETON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 29, 2005)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Singleton appeals his sentence for violation of the terms of his
probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2). Singleton argues, for the first time on appeal,
that the district court erroneously imposed a sentence that exceeds the Sentencing
Guidelines range and failed to address the statutory sentencing factors. See id. §
3553(a). Because the district court did not commit plain error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2001, Singleton was convicted of transportation of stolen
goods, sentenced to five years of probation, and ordered to pay $6300 in
restitution. See id. § 2314. Two years later, the court modified the conditions of
his probation to include substance abuse treatment because Singleton was arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol, had failed to notify the probation officer
of the arrest, and had tested positive for cocaine use. By March 2005, Singleton
had been arrested again for driving under the influence of alcohol, pleaded nolo
contendere to the drunk driving charge, failed to notify the probation officer of the
arrest, and failed to make restitution payments for five months. Singleton’s
probation officer petitioned the court to order Singleton to appear and show cause
why his probation should not be revoked.
At the probation revocation hearing, Singleton admitted the allegations in
the petition, and the court revoked his probation. The Sentencing Guidelines
provided a range of three to nine months of imprisonment. The government
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recommended a one-year sentence because “in-patient treatment, out[-]patient
treatment, AA meetings, monitoring on a very regular basis[, and] two episodes of
electronic monitoring” had not prevented Singleton from abusing alcohol and
endangering the life of others. The district court imposed a sentence of twelve
months of imprisonment because Singleton posed a danger to himself and others,
Singleton did not attend treatment voluntarily, and the penalty for a DUI under the
Georgia Code was one year of imprisonment. When the court invited objections,
neither party objected to the sentence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Ordinarily, we review a sentence that exceeds the Guidelines range for
revocation of probation for abuse of discretion, United States v. Cook, 291 F.3d
1297, 1299 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002), but we review arguments first raised on appeal for
“plain error,” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). A
defendant must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial
rights.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If all three conditions are
met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,
but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Singleton argues that the district court erred by entering a sentence that
exceeds the Guidelines range and by failing to address the statutory factors when it
sentenced him. A court may revoke a defendant’s probation and impose a new
sentence “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they
are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3565; Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d). When imposing a
new sentence, a district court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense, (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, (3) the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed
treatment, (4) the kind of sentences available, and (5) the guideline range. Id. §
3553(a).
The district court did not commit plain error. First, the district court did not
plainly err because it considered the statutory sentencing factors, i.e., the protection
of the public, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), the need for rehabilitative treatment, see id. §
3553(a)(2)(D), the penalty for a DUI under Georgia law, see id. § 3553(a)(3), and
the range under the Sentencing Guidelines, see id. § 3553(a)(4). Second, the
district court did not plainly err when it imposed a sentence higher than the
Guidelines range because Singleton had repeatedly placed himself and others in
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danger and failed to benefit from supervised rehabilitation programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm Singleton’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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