United States v. Ronald C. Acklin , 156 F. App'x 147 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 04-12975 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 22, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
-------------------------------------------- CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-00103-CR-7-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONALD C. ACKLIN,
a. k. a. John Doe I,
a. k. a. Tarr O. Sutton,
a. k. a. Tarr Sutton,
a. k. a. Antonio S. Robinson,
a. k. a. James D. Mosley,
a. k. a. Robert F. King, Jr.,
a. k. a. Andreous Dozier,
a. k. a. Charlie Davis, III,
a. k. a. Charlie J. Davis,
a. k. a. Michun B. Anderson,
a. k. a. Michun Anderson,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 22, 2005)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald C. Acklin appeals his 18-month sentence, pursuant to his guilty
plea, for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1344.1
No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Acklin specifically argues (1) that the district court erred in calculating loss
under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, (2) that the district court improperly shifted to him the
burden of disproving conduct supporting the denial of a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, (3) that the district court violated his due
process and confrontation rights by relying on evidence presented at a prior
sentencing hearing at which he was not present, and (4) that he should be
resentenced in the light of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). Our
review of the district court docket shows that Acklin now has served his full term
of imprisonment. So, these issues--challenges to the calculation and imposition of
his sentence--have become moot. See Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983
(1998) (stating that, once a defendant’s sentence has expired, “some concrete and
continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole–some
1
Acklin was recruited by codefendant Dennis Wilson to cash checks in a “hub and spoke”
counterfeit check ring. Wilson, one of the “hubs”, would supply counterfeit checks to a group of
check cashers, or “spokes.” Acklin, a “spoke”, would use false identification to cash fake checks;
and he received a portion of the proceeds as payment.
2
‘collateral consequence’ of the conviction–must exist if the suit is to be
maintained”); De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1362-63 (11th Cir.
2003) (refusing, in habeas case, to address issue that had become moot by event
occurring after filing of suit).
We are aware that Acklin also was sentenced to a three-year term of
supervised release. But Acklin violated some of the conditions of his supervised
release with conduct unrelated to the underlying offense of conviction.2 On 29
August 2005, the district court revoked Acklin’s supervised release, committed
him to Bureau of Prisons custody for seven months, and specified that no
supervised release was to remain at the end of Acklin’s custody with the BOP.
Thus, nothing remains of Acklin’s initial term of supervised release or of his
underlying sentence.
We are mindful that Acklin is to make $153,182.37 in restitution to the
victims of the check fraud scheme. And the record does not indicate that Acklin
has discharged his restitution obligations. But Acklin in his appellate brief does
not direct substantive argument to the restitution order: he, in passing, only
mentions this order twice in passing as a fact of the case. Thus, he has abandoned
2
In April 2005, Acklin began violating the conditions of his supervised release (1) by testing
positive for the use of illegal drugs and (2) by failing to report for urine screens and to attend drug
treatment sessions.
3
a challenge to the restitution order. See United States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032,
1036 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996) (deeming abandoned an argument not raised in
appellant’s briefs).3
In sum, we no longer can give meaningful relief to Acklin on the issues he
has raised on appeal: these issues now are moot. And he has abandoned a
challenge to the restitution order.
AFFIRMED.
3
In any event, the restitution amount differs from the district court’s loss calculation of
$158,910.73.
4