United States v. Reginald Ware , 517 F. App'x 830 ( 2013 )


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  •               Case: 12-14878    Date Filed: 04/23/2013   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-14878
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:07-cr-60143-JIC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    REGINALD WARE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 23, 2013)
    Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Reginald Ware, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his post-judgment motion to withdraw his plea because the
    Case: 12-14878     Date Filed: 04/23/2013    Page: 2 of 6
    government did not file a motion recognizing his substantial assistance under
    Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) (“Rule 35(b)”), in relation to his conviction for possession
    with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s
    denial of Ware’s motion to withdraw his plea.
    I.
    In 2007, Ware pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to possession
    with intent to distribute cocaine. In 2012, Ware filed a motion requesting the
    district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the
    government breached his plea agreement by failing to make the extent of Ware’s
    cooperation known to the court at sentencing and failing to file a motion to reduce
    his sentence based on his substantial assistance to the government. The district
    court denied Ware’s motion because, as the government had the sole discretion to
    decide whether Ware had provided substantial assistance, he had to show the
    denial of a constitutional right to prevail. However, he had failed to allege that the
    government refused to move for a reduction of his sentence because of an
    unconstitutional motivation. Ware filed a motion to reconsider the court’s order
    denying his motion, which the district court denied.
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    II.
    On appeal, Ware argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
    withdraw his plea. He contends that the government breached his plea agreement
    by failing to make the extent of his cooperation known to the court at sentencing,
    by failing to file a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion prior to sentencing, and by failing to
    file a Rule 35 motion after sentencing. He claims that, as the government had
    conceded in a letter that it had begun an investigation into drug-trafficking activity
    based on information Ware had provided and had prosecuted several individuals
    based on its investigation, the government was obligated to file a
    substantial-assistance motion. Ware further argues that the district court abused its
    discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration.
    Whether the government breached a plea agreement is a question of law that
    we review de novo. United States v. De La Garza, 
    516 F.3d 1266
    , 1269 (11th Cir.
    2008). We also review de novo whether the district court has the authority to
    compel the government to file a substantial-assistance motion. See United States v.
    Forney, 
    9 F.3d 1492
    , 1498 (11th Cir. 1993) (concerning the authority of the court
    to depart downward in the absence of a substantial-assistance motion in the context
    of § 5K1.1). We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Simms, 
    385 F.3d 1347
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). Pro se
    pleadings are construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    ,
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    1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
    In Santobello v. New York, the Supreme Court held that, when a plea rests in
    any significant degree on a promise by the government, such that it can be said to
    be part of the inducement or consideration for the plea, such a promise must be
    fulfilled. 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262, 
    92 S.Ct. 495
    , 499, 
    30 L.Ed.2d 427
     (1971). Where the
    government fails to fulfill a promise that induced a guilty plea, the court that
    sentenced the defendant has the discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy, such
    as allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or ordering specific
    performance. 
    Id. at 262-63
    , 
    92 S.Ct. at 499
    . However, where a plea agreement
    requires the government only to “consider” filing a substantial-assistance motion
    and places the decision “solely” in the hands of the government, the government
    has not failed to fulfill any promise. See Forney, 
    9 F.3d at 1499-1500
     (addressing
    government’s refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion). Under these circumstances, the
    Supreme Court has held that federal courts only have authority to review a
    prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if
    they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive. United States v.
    Wade, 
    504 U.S. 181
    , 185-86, 
    112 S.Ct. 1840
    , 1843-44, 
    118 L.Ed.2d 524
     (1992)
    (addressing government’s refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion). Thus, judicial review
    is appropriate only where there is an allegation and a substantial showing that the
    government refused to file a substantial-assistance motion because of a
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    constitutionally impermissible motivation. Forney, 
    9 F.3d at 1502
    . Otherwise,
    courts are precluded from intruding into prosecutorial discretion. 
    Id. at 1501
    .
    Here, the district court properly denied Ware’s 2012 motion. In his plea
    agreement the government reserved the right to make his cooperation known to the
    court at the time of sentencing, and the government did not agree to inform the
    court as to Ware’s cooperation at sentencing. The government also did not agree
    to file a § 5K1.1 or Rule 35(b) motion in his plea agreement, but rather indicated
    that its decision concerning the motion was in its sole and unreviewable discretion.
    At his plea hearing, Ware indicated that he had discussed the terms of his plea
    agreement with his counsel and understood the agreement’s terms. Thus, Ware
    failed to show that the government failed to fulfill a promise that induced his guilty
    plea, and he is not entitled to any relief under Santobello. See Santobello, 
    404 U.S. at 262-63
    , 
    92 S.Ct. at 499
    ; Forney, 
    9 F.3d at 1499-1500
    . Moreover, Ware did not
    make any allegation in the instant motion or on appeal that the government refused
    to file a substantial-assistance motion on the basis of a constitutionally
    impermissible motivation. Thus, the district court lacked the authority to review
    the government’s decision not to file a substantial-assistance motion, and the court
    did not err in denying his motion. Forney, 
    9 F.3d at 1502
    . As the court did not err
    in denying his motion, the court also did not abuse its discretion in denying his
    motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion.
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    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ware’s
    motion to withdraw his plea.
    AFFIRMED.
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