Aretha M. Edwards v. National Vision, Inc. , 568 F. App'x 854 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12876
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-01449-WMA
ARETHA M. EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NATIONAL VISION INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
AMERICA'S BEST CONTACTS & EYEGLASSES,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(June 12, 2014)
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Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I.
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Aretha Edwards
against her former employer, National Vision, Inc. (“NVI”). 1 Her complaint,
framed in seven counts, alleged the following. Count One, entitled “Race
Discrimination and Harassment Claims” and brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleged that
Edwards, who is black, was qualified to perform her job duties and for the
promotion she sought, the Assistant Contact Lens Manager (“Assistant Manager”)
position, and that NVI denied the promotion, filling it with a less-qualified white
person. Count One also alleged subjected her to a hostile work environment due to
her race.
Count Two, entitled “Retaliation,” brought under § 1981 and Title VII,
alleged that NVI retaliated against her after she complained about promotion and
hiring practices based on race and age.
Count Three, entitled “Negligent and Wanton, Hiring, Training, Supervision,
and Retention” and brought under Alabama law, alleged that NVI knew about
1
NVI, a national retail firm, acquired America’s Best Contacts & Eyeglasses. We refer
to the two firms as NVI.
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Edwards’s complaints and failed to discipline the employees who were
discriminating and retaliating against her.
Count Four, entitled “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” and
brought under Alabama law, alleged that the NVI employees discriminatory and
retaliatory conduct caused her emotional distress.
Count Five, entitled “Family and Medical Leave Act” (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a), alleged that NIV opposed her leave under the Act and then retaliated
against her for taking leave.
Count Six, entitled “Invasion of Privacy and brought under Alabama law,
alleged that NIV’s employees’ conduct invaded her privacy, and
Count Seven, entitled “Constructive Discharge” and brought under Alabama
law, alleged that NIV’s employees’ conduct effectively caused the termination of
her employment.
II.
Following extensive discovery, NIV filed a motion for summary judgment
on all claims, and the District Court granted the motion. Edwards appeals, arguing
that the summary judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for trial
because the district court (1) abused its discretion by concluding that statements
made to her by her supervisor, Louise Moore, concerning a racial motive for
promoting Victoria Alberson rather than her to the position of Assistant Manager,
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were inadmissible hearsay; (2) abused its discretion by striking Victoria Alberson’s
declaration; (3) erred by relying on NVI’s argument that she could not establish
that Alberson was equally or less-qualified for the Assistant Manager position,
despite the fact that the District Manager indicated that she was not promoted
because she did not apply for a promotion; (4) erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of NVI on her Title VII race discrimination claims for NVI’s
failure to promote her in December 2007 and February 2008 because she failed to
timely file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); (5)
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her race discrimination
claims, pursuant to U.S.C. § 1981, because she failed to file within the statute of
limitations; (6) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her FMLA
claim; (7) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her retaliation
claim; (8) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her racial
harassment claim; (9) erred by granting summary judgment in favor of NVI on her
state law claims of negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision, and claim
of invasion of privacy.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence and factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Rojas v.
Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2002). We can affirm a district court’s
decision on any adequate ground. Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F.3d
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1198, 1203 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Cuddeback v. Florida Bd. Of Educ., 381
F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that we may affirm a district court’s
grant of summary judgment based on a failure to establish pretext even where the
district court only addressed the issue of establishment of a prima facie case).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party meets its burden
of production, demonstrating that no genuine issue of any material fact exists, and
the non-moving party fails to present evidence showing that a reasonable jury
could find in its favor. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008).
“[M]ere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to
defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2005). With these standards in hand, we address the arguments listed above
by number.
(1) Statements made by Moore to Edwards concerning a racial motive for
failing to promote Edwards
A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Proctor v. Fluor Enter., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). As a
general matter, the court should not consider inadmissible hearsay in passing on a
motion for summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-25 (11th
Cir. 1999). The court may consider a hearsay statement, though, if the statement
could be “reduced to admissible evidence at trial.” Id. at 1323. Hearsay is “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing,
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offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in
these rules.” Fed. R. Evid. 805.
Under Rule 801(d)(2), admissions of a party opponent are admissible. Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2). “[A] statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of
the relationship [ ] is deemed an admission by a party opponent.” Zaben v. Air
Products & Chemical, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). “[S]tatements made by a supervisory official who plays some
role in the decision making process are generally admissible.” Zaben, 129 F.3d at
1456.
The statements in question here constitute hearsay within hearsay. Edwards
offered statements in her deposition and declaration that were made by Moore.
Moore’s statements referred to unidentified third parties who said they wanted to
hire someone white for the Assistant Manager position. These third-party
statements were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. Because
Moore’s statement (based on what the third parties said) and the third parties’
statement did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rules, the statements were
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not admissible, and the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the statements
as inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to this issue.
(2) Striking Victoria Alberson’s declaration
We review a district court’s ruling regarding discovery for abuse of
discretion. Benson v. Tocco, 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), a party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)
or who has responded to a request for admission must supplement or correct its
disclosure in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the
disclosure is incomplete, and if the additional information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(e). “If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as
required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure
was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
Edwards concedes that she did not produce Alberson’s declaration and does
not offer any explanation for her failure to produce it. The declaration was not
harmless because it contained significant information that was relevant to whether
NVI discriminated and retaliated against Edwards. We find no abuse of discretion
in the court’s decision to strike the declaration and therefore affirm with respect to
this issue.
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(3) Reliance on NVI’s Argument that Edwards cannot establish that
Alberson was equally or less-qualified for the Assistant Manager position
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on
the basis of that individual’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where a Title VII
claim relies on circumstantial evidence, courts often apply the framework set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
See Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2006). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Brooks, 446 F.3d
at 1162. In the failure-to-promote context, the prima facie case consists of
showing the following elements: (1) that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class;
(2) that she applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3) that she was rejected
despite her qualifications; and (4) that another equally or less- qualified employee
outside her class was promoted. Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160,
1174 (11th Cir. 2010).
Edwards misunderstands the nature of NVI’s arguments on appeal and the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. She
bore the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Brown, 597 F.3d at 1174.
In the failure-to-promote context, she had to establish four elements, including that
another equally or less-qualified employee outside her class was promoted. Id.She failed to establish that NVI promoted an equally or less-qualified employee
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outside of her class, and therefore, did not meet her burden. See Brown, 597 F.3d
at 1174. The fact that NVI had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not
promoting Edwards, does not preclude NVI from arguing on appeal that she failed
to establish a prima facie case. Thus, to the extent the district court based its
summary judgment decision on her failure to show that Alberson was equally or
less qualified, it did not err in doing so. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to
this issue.
(4) Failure to timely file with the EEOC
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual on
the basis of that individual’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to file a
claim for discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must first exhaust her
administrative remedies, beginning with the filing of a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC. Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.
2001). For a charge to be timely in a non-deferral state, such as Alabama, a
plaintiff must file an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180
days after the date of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), see
Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317; Hipp v. Liberty National Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d
1208, 1214 n.2, 1220 (11th Cir. 2001).
With respect to Edwards’s claim of NVI’s failure to promote her in
December 2007 and February 2008, the district court properly concluded that these
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claims were time-barred because they occurred more than 180 days before she
filed her EEOC charge in November 2008. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to
this issue.
(5) The § 1981 claims are time-barred
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1990) (amended 1991). In 1981, the Supreme Court concluded that
§ 1981 “cover[ed] only conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct
which impairs the right to enforce contact obligations through legal process.” See
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2374, 105
L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (articulating the pre-1991 standard under § 1981). A
promotion claim was actionable under § 1981 only where a promotion rose “to the
level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and
the employer . . . .” See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185, 109 S.Ct. at 2377 (articulating
the pre-1991 standard for an failure-to-promote claim to be cognizable under
§1981), superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541
U.S. 369, 383, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 1846, 158 L.Ed.2d. 546 (2004). In 1991,
Congress amended § 1981 to provide for “the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (b).
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Section 1981 does not contain an express statute of limitations. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Prior to 1990, federal courts applied the most analogous state
statute of limitations. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S.C. 656, 660, 107
S.Ct. 2617, 2620, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (partially superseded by the enactment of
42 U.S.C. § 1658); see also Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209,
1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations to a
§ 1981 claim). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, a four-year statute of limitations is
provided for claims arising under an act of Congress enacted after December 1,
1990, that did not include a statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; see Jones,
541 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. at 1839. For causes of action existing before the 1990
enactment, the practice of borrowing the state statute of limitations applies. See 28
U.S.C. § 1658; Jones, 541 U.S. at 371, 124 S.Ct. at 1839. If the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment, the cause of
action is governed by § 1658’s four-year statute of limitations. Jones, 541 U.S. at
382, 124 S.Ct. at 1845.
Edwards’s § 1981 claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
She filed her claims outside of that time period. Moore, 267 F.3d at 1219.
Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that Edwards’s § 1981 claims
were time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to this issue.
(6) FMLA claim
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Under the FMLA, “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12
work weeks of leave during any 12-month period” for any one of several reasons,
including “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform
the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). To be
“eligible,” an employee must have worked for the employer for at least 12 months
and 1,250 hours during the previous 12-month period. Id. § 2611(2)(A). The
FMLA “creates a private right of action to seek equitable relief and money
damages against employers who ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise’ FMLA rights.” Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys.,
Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).
There are two types of claims under the FMLA: interference claims, in which an
employee asserts that her employer denied or otherwise interfered with her
substantive rights under the Act, and retaliation claims, in which an employee
asserts that her employer discriminated against her because she engaged in activity
protected by the Act. Id.To establish an interference claim, an employee need only demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to the benefit denied. Id.“[T]he FMLA scheme intends that a determination as to FMLA eligibility be made
as of the date the FMLS leave is to start.” See Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living
Comm., Inc., 666 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2012). “[B]ecause the FMLA
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requires notice in advance of future leave, employees are protected from
interference prior to the occurrence of a triggering event.” Id. at 1275. In Pereda,
we concluded that, because the statute contemplates notice of leave in advance of
becoming eligible, the FMLA regulatory scheme must necessarily protect
pre-eligible employees . . . who put their employers on notice of a post-eligibility
leave request.” “[A] pre-eligible employee has a cause of action if an employer
terminates her in order to avoid having to accommodate that employee with
rightful FMLA rights once that employee become eligible.” Id. To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action;
and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action. Id. at 1297.
Edwards failed to show that she worked the number of hours required to be
entitled for FMLA leave. Furthermore, she failed to show that NVI reduced her
hours in order to avoid having to accommodate her with rightful FMLA rights by
keeping her from becoming eligible for these rights. See Perada, 666 F.3d at
1275; Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1293. Her retaliation claim failed because she could
not show a causal connection between the reduction of her hours and her protected
activity. Based on these considerations, the district court did not err in granting
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summary judgment to NVI on Edwards’s FMLA claim. Accordingly, we affirm
with respect to this issue.
(7) Retaliation
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), an employer may not discriminate against
any employee because she has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because she has made a charge or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
When considering a motion for summary judgment based on retaliation that
involves circumstantial evidence, we analyze the case using the shifting framework
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see Wright v.
Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
McDonnell Douglas analytic framework applies to retaliation claims). A plaintiff
may establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII by proving that: (1) she
engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse
action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action. See Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th
Cir. 2008).
In a retaliation case, a materially adverse action is one that “might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
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discrimination.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). The acts must be significant
rather than trivial. Id., 126 S.Ct. at 2415. “An employee’s decision to report
discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or
minor annoyances that often take place at work.” Id., 126 S.Ct. at 2415. In
Crawford, we concluded that an employee, who received an unfavorable
performance review that deprived her of receiving a merit pay increase, suffered an
adverse action. 529 F.3d at 974.
A plaintiff may satisfy the causation element by showing that the protected
activity and the adverse action were not “completely unrelated.” Higdon v.
Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). This element is satisfied if the
plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker was aware of the protected activity and that
there is “a close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse . . .
action.” Id. “The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an
employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as
sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that
the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (citing with
approval decisions holding that a three to four month disparity is insufficient to
establish a causal connection). “[I]n the absence of any other evidence of
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causation,” a three-month proximity “between a protected activity and an adverse
employment action is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation.” Drago v.
Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Higdon, 393 F.3d at
1220-21 (holding that, by itself, three months was insufficient to prove causation,
but noting a previous holding that one month is “not too protracted”).
Edwards engaged in protected activity when she complained to Human
Resources and when she filed her EEOC charge. The following actions Edwards
cited were not materially adverse: (1) Moore assigning her cleaning duties; (2)
Moore assigning her more patients than other employees; (3) Moore telling other
employees not to talk to her; (4) denial of her request for leave; (5) Moore and the
District Manager writing her up; and (2) Moore placing her on the first
Performance Improvement Plan. Edwards did not present evidence that she was
materially and adversely affected; for example, she did not indicate that she
suffered a decrease in salary. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974; Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
Although the district court concluded that none of the actions cited by
Edwards were materially adverse, the following actions may be materially adverse
because of the effect on her job, including that: (1) the District Manager and Moore
gave her lower scores on her Performance Appraisal, which resulted in a smaller
raise; (2) Moore placed her on a second Performance Improvement Plan, which
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resulted in the suspension of incentives; (3) her hours were reduced, which resulted
in less pay; and (4) she was asked not to return to work until further notice, which
affected her ability to earn a living. See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415; Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974. However, each
of these actions occurred several months after Edwards’s protected activity; hence,
she could not rely on temporal proximity to show a causal connection. Because
she presented no other evidence to show a causal connection between her protected
activity and the actions, she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on her
retaliation claim. Wright, 320 F.3d at 1203 n.3; see also Cuddeback v. Florida Bd.
Of Educ., 381 F.3d at 1235-36 (holding that we may affirm a district court’s grant
of summary judgment based on a failure to establish pretext even where the district
court only addressed the issue of establishment of a prima facie case).
(8) Racial Harassment
Although Title VII does not expressly mention racial harassment, the
statutory phrases, “terms, conditions, or privileges” and “unlawful employment
practices” have been interpreted to include discriminatorily hostile or abusive
environment claims. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (11th
Cir. 1999) (en banc); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2073-74, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In order to establish a
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hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff may show that (1) she belongs to a
protected group, (2) she has been subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the
harassment was based on a protected characteristic, such as race, (4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment and create a discriminatory abusive working environment, and (5) the
employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or
of direct liability. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11th Cir. 2002).
There was no admissible evidence to support Edwards’s assertion that she
was harassed based on her race; thus, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to NVI on Edwards’s racial harassment claim. Miller, 277
F.3d at 1275. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to this issue.
(9) State Law Claims
Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training, and Supervision
“[I]mplicit in the tort of negligent hiring, retention, training and supervision
is the concept that, as a consequence of the employee’s incompetence, the
employee committed some sort of act, wrongdoing or tort that caused the
plaintiff’s injury.” Jones Exp., Inc. v. Jackson, 86 So.3d 298, 305 (Ala. 2010); see
also Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So.2d 820, 825 (Ala. 1999)
(declining to recognize a cause of action based on an employer’s negligence or
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wantonness in investigating a claim, independent of proof of wrongful conduct of
an employee). Edwards failed to that an employee committed a wrongdoing or tort
that caused her injury. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to NVI on Edwards’s claim of negligent hiring, retention, training and
supervision. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to this issue.
Invasion of Privacy
Alabama state law recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy. Ex parte
Birmingham New, Inc., 778 So.2d 814, 818 (Ala. 2000). Invasion of privacy
includes giving publicity to private information about the plaintiff that violates
ordinary decency. Id. A person is subject to liability for giving publicity to a
matter concerning the private life of another, if the matter publicized “would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the
public.” Id. Invasion of privacy also includes putting the plaintiff in a false, but
not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye. Id. For a false light claim,
“the false light in which the other was placed [must] be highly offensive to a
reasonable person,” and “the actor [must have] had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter.” Butler v. Town of
Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 12 (Ala. 2003) (false light). For both types of claims, publicity
is defined as “making a matter . . . public, by communicating it to the public at
large or to so many persons that the matter must be substantially certain to become
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one of public knowledge. Ex parte Birmingham New, Inc., 778 So.2d at 818
(publicity to private information); see Butler, 871 So.2d at 12-13 (false light).
None of the actions Edwards cited, including: (1) the recording of
information in her personnel file; (2) NVI’s contesting of her petition for
unemployment benefits; (3) a comment made by a store employee to the District
Manager; and (4) other employees being told not to talk to her constitute an
invasion of privacy. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to NVI on Edwards’s invasion of privacy claim. Accordingly, we affirm
with respect to this issue.
III.
Edwards brief has raised points that we have not addressed in this opinion.
We have not addressed them because the district court’s dispositive order correctly
dealt them. The district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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