United States v. Craig Cesal ( 2005 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 03-15090                   JULY 13, 2005
    Non-Argument Calendar            THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 02-00030-CR-01-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CRAIG CESAL,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (July 13, 2005)
    ON REMAND FROM THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Last year, we affirmed Cesal’s conviction for being a participant in a
    conspiracy to distribute marijuana. United States v. Cesal , 
    391 F.3d 1172
     (11th
    Cir. 2004). We dismissed Cesal’s appeal to the extent that it challenged the
    sentence imposed for that conviction, on the basis that he had validly waived his
    right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement. 
    Id. at 1182
    . The case is now
    back before us on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in
    light of Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. __, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005).
    Cesal did not raise any Apprendi/Blakely/Booker issues in his initial brief to
    this Court. (He did attempt to raise the issue in his reply brief, but we struck those
    portions of his brief.) Cesal’s failure to raise the issue in his initial brief bars him
    from doing so now. See United States v. Vanorden, __ F.3d __, No. 03-11083,
    
    2005 WL 1531151
     (11th Cir. June 30, 2005); United States v. Dockery, 
    401 F.3d 1261
    , 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. Ardley, 
    242 F.3d 989
    , 990 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The instructions in the Supreme Court’s
    remand order do not compel a different conclusion. See United States v. Ardley,
    
    273 F.3d 991
    , 994–96 (11th Cir. 2001) (Carnes, J., joined by Black, Hull, and
    Marcus, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
    Moreover, we have already concluded that Cesal knowingly and voluntarily
    waived his right to challenge his sentence by his plea agreement. Cesal, 
    391 F.3d
                                             2
    at 1182. That waiver included a waiver of the right to challenge his sentence based
    on Booker error. See United States v. Rubbo, 
    396 F.3d 1330
    , 1335 (11th Cir.
    2005) (“[T]he right to appeal a sentence based on Apprendi/Booker grounds can be
    waived in a plea agreement. Broad waiver language covers those grounds of
    appeal.”).
    Accordingly, we reinstate our previous opinion in this case affirming Cesal’s
    conviction and dismissing the portions of his appeal relating to his sentence.
    OPINION REINSTATED; AFFIRMED.
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