John Quintin Shuler v. Betty Meredith , 144 F. App'x 24 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-13251 July 28, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 04-00068-CV-4-RH-WCS
JOHN QUINTIN SHULER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BETTY MEREDITH,
JANN TUCKER PETTWAY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 28, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Quintin Shuler, a pro se prisoner, appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986 violations.
Because (1) Shuler conceded that there were ongoing state court proceedings, and
the state court has an important interest in child custody matters, (2) Shuler failed
to demonstrate that the state court could not adequately address his constitutional
claims, and (3) the district court has broad discretion to manage its cases, the
district court did not err in dismissing Shuler’s complaint and denying his motion
for a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Shuler, a state court prisoner, filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The record also indicates that Shuler did not request
to proceed in forma pauperis and paid the filing fee for filing his complaint. The
district court then conducted a frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The
district court instructed Shuler to file an amended complaint that (1) indicated
whether the state court proceedings were ongoing and whether he had been able to
present his constitutional claims in those proceedings, (2) alleged facts that the
defendant’s acts, under color of state law, deprived him of a right, privilege, or
immunity protected by the Constitution or federal law, and (3) clearly identified
the constitutional right he believed was violated and the facts supporting his
assertion.
2
Shuler subsequently filed an amended complaint against the defendants.
Specifically, Shuler claimed that the Department of Family and Children Services
(“DCF”) and certain individual defendants, denied him due process when they
failed to notify him and allow him to participate in, several state court
proceedings, shelter placements, case plans, and judicial review hearings related to
the placement of his three minor children in foster case after their mother died, in
addition to the proceedings to terminate his parental rights. Shuler also claimed
that certain government caseworkers knowingly and voluntarily gave materially
false information in the above official proceedings, which violated his due process
rights.
The district court determined that, under the doctrine set forth in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971), the federal district court should abstain
from considering Shuler’s contentions that his, and his three minor children’s,
constitutional rights were violated in the state court child placement and
dependency proceedings because (1) the state proceedings in Shuler’s case were
ongoing, (2) the State of Florida had an interest in dependency proceedings,
protecting children in foster care, and terminating parental rights where
appropriate, and (3) Shuler had the opportunity to bring all of his claims in state
court. Shuler timely appealed.
3
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Shuler asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
(1) dismissing his complaint without considering and addressing the merits of his
claims or allowing him to conduct discovery on his issues, and (2) dismissing his
complaint before it ruled on his pending motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction relating to the state-court dependency proceedings.1
A. Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion by Dismissing
Shuler’s Complaint Without Addressing the Merits of his Claim
Shuler maintains that, although his claims met the first and second prongs of
Younger, they do not meet the third prong because he brought his constitutional
deprivations before the state court, and the state court allowed the custody
proceedings to continue despite their knowledge of the constitutional deprivations.
Shuler further contends that the district court erred in not allowing him the
opportunity to conduct discovery in order to prove his claims against DCF. The
1
Although the district court erred in dismissing Shuler’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) because (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) concerns a district court’s review of complaints
filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis, and (2) Shuler paid the filing fee for filing his
complaint and is not proceeding in forma pauperis, Shuler never raised this argument in district court
or on appeal; thus, he has waived this claim. See Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1382 n.1 (11th
Cir. 1998) (holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed waived). Even if Shuler had not
waived this claim, because the standards set forth in § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1) are the same,
we would still affirm. See Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1433 n.9 (11th Cir.
1998) (recognizing that we may affirm the district court’s decision for reasons other than those noted
by the district court).
4
remainder of Shuler’s brief concerns the merits of his claims as he set forth in his
complaint. Shuler never argued that the district judge erred in denying his
complaint under § 1915(e)(2), and not under § 1915A,which he should have done.
We review a district court’s abstention decision for abuse of discretion. 31
Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
984, 124 S. Ct. 483 (2003). Under the Younger doctrine, a federal court should
abstain from hearing a case when (1) the proceedings constitute an ongoing state
judicial proceeding, (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3)
the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges in
the state-court proceedings. Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521 (1982). Regarding the third
prong of the Younger analysis, a federal court “‘should assume that state
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous
authority to the contrary.’” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279 (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs can overcome this initial presumption only by demonstrating
that the state court remedies are inadequate. Id. We have observed that a state
court in dependency proceedings can act to protect children within its jurisdiction,
thus, the state court remedies are generally adequate. Id. at 1279-80. We have
also found that state courts can generally adequately address federal constitutional
5
claims. Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th
Cir. 2001).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Shuler’s
complaint under the Younger doctrine. Because Shuler conceded in his brief on
appeal that the first two prongs of the Younger analysis are met, the only issue
before us is whether Shuler had an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims in the state-court proceedings. Although Shuler claims that the state courts
cannot and did not adequately address his claims, the only evidence that he cites is
an order from the state court. According to Shuler, the order states that the state
court denied his constitutional claims and required him to seek relief from the
federal court. However, the part of the order that Shuler provided only states that
the state court would proceed with the termination proceedings until it heard
otherwise from the federal court. The order does not indicate that (1) it denied
Shuler any relief, (2) Shuler ever raised constitutional claims in the state court, or
(3) it was denying Shuler’s constitutional claims and ordering him to proceed to
federal court. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Shuler ever
asserted his constitutional claims in the state court or that the state court either
refused to hear his constitutional claims or that it denied his constitutional claims.
Therefore, Shuler failed to demonstrate that he did not have an adequate
6
opportunity to raise his claims in the state court or that the state court’s remedies
were inadequate. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521; 31 Foster
Children, 329 F.3d at 1279-80; Butler, 261 F.3d at 1159.
Before the district court allows discovery to proceed or ultimately reaches a
determination on the merits of a prisoner’s claim, it conducts a frivolity review. If
the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, it can dismiss the complaint. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1). Therefore, because the district court determined that Shuler’s
claim was frivolous or that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, the district court did not err in dismissing Shuler’s complaint without
allowing discovery or considering the merits of his claims.
B. Whether the District Court Abused its Discretion by Dismissing
Shuler’s Complaint While a Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction was Pending
We have stated that district courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how
best to manage the cases before them. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123
F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997). An abuse of that discretion occurs only when
the litigant’s rights are materially prejudiced by the court’s mismanagement of a
case. Id. at 1367.
7
Despite his contentions, Shuler’s argument that the district court improperly
denied his motion for a temporary restraining order after it dismissed his case is
without merit. First, Shuler does not dispute the district court’s decision to deny
his motion, but only argues that the court denied it in the improper order.
However, a district court has broad discretion in deciding how to manage its cases.
See Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1366. Moreover, Shuler never arguably
demonstrated in his brief how his rights were materially prejudiced by the district
court’s denying the motion after dismissing the case. Although he claims that, had
the district court reviewed his motion, it would have seen the state court order
denying “the [p]laintiff relief and required him to seek relief in the form of a
[f]ederal [c]ourt order,” the document he provided with his motion does not
indicate that the state court denied him any sort of relief. Appellant’s Br. at 4. The
portion of the state court order only indicates that the termination proceeding
against Shuler would continue unless the state court received an order from the
federal court requiring otherwise. Therefore, Shuler failed to demonstrate how his
rights were materially prejudiced by the district court denying his motion after
dismissing his complaint.
8
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we find that the district court properly dismissed
Shuler’s complaint, albeit for reasons other than those stated, in part, by that court.
Accordingly, the dismissal is AFFIRMED.
9