Wingfield v. Secretary, Department of Corrections , 203 F. App'x 276 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 17, 2006
No. 04-16437 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-02428-CV-T-24-MAP
REGINALD WINGFIELD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 17, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On November 3, 2004, Reginald Wingfield, who is serving a 30-year
sentence, filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Seven days later, on November 10,
2004, the district court sua sponte dismissed without prejudice Wingfield’s habeas
petition for failure to comply with Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases.
The district court stated that pursuant to Rule 4, it had conducted a
preliminary review of Wingfield’s petition and determined that “only part of the
document is written on the court-required form” and that Wingfield’s petition is a
“rambling, disjointed, and confusing document.” According to the district court,
Wingfield “will need to use the required form and commence a new action to
pursue a challenge to his conviction.” The district court further directed the Clerk
“to enter judgment against Petitioner and to close this case.”
On December 6, 2004, Wingfield timely filed a notice of appeal, and on
February 25, 2005, we granted a certificate of appealability on one issue:
Whether the district court erred in dismissing, without prejudice,
appellant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for failure to comply with Rule
2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, in light of the fact
that any subsequent petitions may now be time-barred. See Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129, 150 L.Ed.2d 251(2001) (holding that a § 2254 petition does not toll 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)’s one-year statute of limitations).
As a general matter, dismissals of habeas petitions are governed by Rule 4 of
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the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See Prather v. Norman, 901 F.2d 915,
918 (11th Cir. 1990) (determining that the district court erred where it dismissed a
petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the basis that the petition was frivolous due
to petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies). Under Rule 4, district courts are
required summarily to dismiss any § 2254 petition “if it plainly appears from the
face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” While we have
not published a case interpreting this specific language of Rule 4, other courts of
appeals have found that Rule 4 serves as authority for the dismissal of plainly
frivolous appeals. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2nd Cir. 1983)
(concluding that “Rule 4 does not confer unbridled discretion” to dispose of habeas
petitions, but rather provides for summary dismissal “only in those cases where
pleadings indicate that petitioner can prove no set of facts to support a claim
entitling him to relief”).1
Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 sets forth the
standard for the form of a § 2254 petition and states, in relevant part, “[the petition]
shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the petitioner . . . and
1
See also Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 98 F.3d 1102,
1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (Schroeder, J., concurring) (determining that “a habeas court reviewing a
petition under Rule 4 reviews only to see if it plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to
relief . . . Rule 4 is entitled to screen out plainly frivolous appeals”) (emphasis in original).
2
Rule 2 was amended on December 1, 2004. The former Rule 2 was still in effect at the
time of the dismissal in this case.
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shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus
specified.” Rule 2(e) authorizes the court to return a petition to the petitioner if it
fails to “substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 2.” 3 Rule 2 does not,
however, expressly authorize the sua sponte dismissal of a petition for the
petitioner’s failure substantially to comply with the rule. Commenting on the
interplay between the liberal pleading rules under Rule 2 and the allowance of sua
sponte dismissal under Rule 4, the Second Circuit held that Rule 2(e) serves as the
middle ground, allowing the district court to “return an insufficient petition to the
petitioner, together with a statement of a reason for its return.” Williams, 722 F.2d
at 1051. The Eighth Circuit explained that “Rule 2(e) clearly contemplates that a
returned petition may be refiled, so long as deficiencies are corrected and the
petition substantially complies with the Section 2254 Rules.” Adams v.
Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990).
We have not published a decision covering the factual situation presented
here. However, in an analogous civil case, we held that where a dismissal “has
the effect of precluding [plaintiff] from refiling his claim due to the running of the
3
In December 2004, Rule 2 was amended to eliminate any reference in Rule 2(e) to a
district court’s authority or responsibility to return a habeas petition that failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 2. Because we are applying the version of Rule 2(e) in effect prior to
December 2004, we make no judgment as to what actions a district court is now required or
authorized to undertake once a habeas petition is demeaned to be in violation of the requirements
of Rule 2.
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statute of limitations . . . [t]he dismissal [is] tantamount to a dismissal with
prejudice.” Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1482 n. 15 (11th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). A dismissal
with prejudice is a sanction of last resort and should be used “only in those
situations where a lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice.”
Justice, 6 F.3d at 1482 n.15 (quotations omitted).
In the case at hand, the court dismissed the November 3, 2004 petition
without prejudice on November 10, 2004. Given the one-year limitations period
governing the filing of section 2254 petitions, though, the dismissal of the
petitioner’s § 2254 petition, when combined with the appeal period from December
6, 2004, to the present, has rendered any subsequent petition untimely. See
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001) (holding
that a § 2254 petition does not toll 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year statute of
limitations).4 Under this circumstance and given the district court’s authority in
Rule 2(e) to return an insufficient petition for refiling, we would be remiss if we
4
According to the government, Wingfield’s conviction did not become final until March
27, 2003. The government also indicates that Wingfield filed his Rule 3.850 motion in Florida
on July 22, 2003, and that the statute of limitations was tolled from July 22, 2003, until October
21, 2004, when Wingfield’s Rule 3.850 motion was denied. Assuming these dates are correct,
Wingfield’s § 2254 petition appears to have been timely filed on November 3, 2004, but almost
five months had already elapsed on his one-year limitations period when Wingfield filed his
§ 2254 petition. Thus, he had seven months left on the limitations period, which expired during
this appeal.
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did not vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings.
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the district court with instructions to
give the petitioner a specified time period to submit a revised § 2254 petition on
the proper form that complies with the requirements of Rule 2. If Wingfield
submits a revised § 2254 petition within the specified time period that meets the
requirements of Rule 2, the district court shall treat the revised petition as having
been filed on November 3, 2004.
However, should Wingfield fail to submit a proper § 2254 petition within
the specified time period, the district court is expressly authorized to dismiss
Wingfield’s § 2254 petition with prejudice. We further note that this opinion in no
way comments on the merits of Wingfield’s § 2254 petition.
VACATED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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