Battle v. Secretary, Department of Corrections , 339 F. App'x 950 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 31, 2009
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 06-15823 CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-01137 CV-T-27-TGW
WILLIAM BATTLE, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
(July 31, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and WALTER,* District
Judge.
*
Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
William Battle, Jr., a pro se Florida prisoner serving a ten-year sentence
pursuant to a guilty plea to possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, on a certificate of appealability (“COA”), appeals the district
court’s denial of his federal habeas petition. He contends that his sentence
violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We vacate and
remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Battle was convicted in February 2004 of possession of cocaine and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Florida state court. In June 2006,
Battle filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 He asserted
that his conviction and sentence were unconstitutional under Blakely.
Specifically, Battle argued that his conviction, after a guilty plea, violated Blakely
because he had not admitted to being in actual or constructive possession of a
firearm, which improperly enhanced his offense in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. Battle further argued that, based on this non-
1
Because Battle filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the provisions of that act apply.
2
jury finding, to which he did not admit, the state court increased his maximum
penalty in violation of Apprendi. Battle concluded that his conviction violated
Apprendi and Blakely because the finding of whether he possessed a firearm
changed his offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.
The district court sua sponte dismissed Battle’s petition. The court
determined that Battle had sought relief only on the issue of whether his
conviction and sentence were constitutional under Blakely. The district court
noted that Battle’s conviction had become final on March 10, 2004. The court
recognized that Blakely reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi that “any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The court concluded that, because Blakely did
not apply retroactively on collateral review Battle had failed to present a
cognizable claim under § 2254 and denied his claim.
Battle moved for rehearing and argued that the district court had failed to
consider his Apprendi claim. While Battle’s conviction was final in 2004, the
Supreme Court had decided Apprendi in 2000. Therefore, he argued that Apprendi
did not have the same retroactivity implications as Blakely.
3
The district court denied Battle’s motion for rehearing. The court initially
construed Battle’s motion as a motion for reconsideration, filed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), because Battle filed his motion within ten
days of the dismissal order. The court dismissed Battle’s habeas petition as time-
barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The court determined that Battle had failed to
argue that there had been an intervening change in controlling law or that it was
imperative that the judgment be amended to correct a clear error relating to the
timeliness of Battle’s petition. The court further concluded that Battle had failed
to present convincing facts or law concerning why it should reverse its
determination that Battle’s petition was time-barred.
Battle filed a notice of appeal, which the district court construed as an
application for a COA, and denied it. We granted a COA on two issues:
Whether the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion for
rehearing, construed as a tolling Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, based
on a conclusion that it had dismissed appellant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as
time-barred when the district court actually denied the § 2254 petition
based on a retroactivity analysis.
Whether the district court failed to address appellant’s argument in
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition that his sentence was unconstitutional
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L.
Ed. 2d 435 (2000), in violation of Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936
(11th Cir. 1992).
We now address both issues.
4
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of the Motion for Rehearing
Battle argues that his petition was not time-barred and that he timely filed
his petition at the conclusion of his state habeas proceedings. Battle asserts that
the district court erred by finding that his petition was time-barred because the
court had dismissed it on retroactivity grounds.
The district court erred by denying Battle’s construed Rule 59(e) motion
based on an erroneous finding that it had dismissed Battle’s § 2254 petition as
time-barred and that Battle had not demonstrated that such an analysis was
incorrect. The court actually denied Battle’s § 2254 petition based on its
conclusion that Blakely did not apply retroactively to his convictions and
sentences and not because Battle’s petition was untimely. Consequently, the
district court’s order denying the construed Rule 59(e) motion inaccurately stated
the reasons for its denial of the underlying order dismissing the § 2254 petition.
Additionally, the district court did not have all of the information before it
to determine whether the petition was timely. Battle’s § 2254 petition did not
specify the dates that his state post-conviction motion was filed or denied, and he
did not attach the relevant state documents as exhibits. Because this was a sua
5
sponte dismissal, the state had not responded or filed the record of the state
proceedings. Significantly, the district court did not give Battle the opportunity to
respond to the limitations periods or to offer an equitable tolling argument. We
reject the state’s suggestion that we should affirm on the alternate ground of
retroactivity, because the retroactivity analysis is flawed. Accordingly, we vacate
the district court’s order denying Battle’s motion for reconsideration.
B. Unconstitutional Arguments Relating to Sentence
Battle argues that the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925(11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), because the court failed to consider his Apprendi
claim. He claims that, construing his petition liberally, he preserved his Apprendi
argument, and the district court should have addressed it under Clisby.
We review an appeal from a district court’s denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus de novo. Nelson v. Schofeld, 371 F.3d 768, 769 (11th Cir. 2004)
(per curiam). In Clisby, we expressed concern over the “growing number of cases
in which we are forced to remand for consideration of issues the district court
chose not to resolve.” Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935-36. We acknowledged the
disruptive effect that such “piecemeal litigation” has on a state’s criminal justice
system and reasoned that its federal habeas corpus procedures should be designed
to minimize such disruption. Id. at 935. Accordingly, in an effort to streamline
6
habeas corpus procedure, we instructed district courts to resolve all claims raised
in § 2254 petitions, regardless of whether relief is ultimately denied. We further
ensured compliance with this instruction by holding that, when the district court
does not address each claim raised, the judgment will be vacated and the case will
be remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 938. In determining whether a claim
has been raised adequately, we have determined that “[p]ro se pleadings are held
to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore,
be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. After examining the
state of Washington’s sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court held in Blakely
that the imposition of a sentencing enhancement, based solely on the sentencing
judge’s factual findings, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because
the facts supporting the findings neither were admitted by the defendant nor found
by a jury. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
7
The state argues that the district court addressed Battle’s Apprendi claim
and that any Clisby error was harmless. The district court stated that Blakely
reaffirmed the Apprendi decision, and, therefore, incorporated any Apprendi claim
to a Blakely claim. Because Blakely clarified and extended Apprendi to state
sentencing guidelines, it generally would be possible to consider arguments under
these cases as being the same. The court denied the claim, however, on a basis
applicable only to Blakely, retroactivity, and decided that Battle’s state petition
was final a few months before the Supreme Court decided Blakely in 2004.
Because Apprendi was decided in 2000, the district court either did not address the
Apprendi claim with the retroactivity analysis or, if it did address the claim, it
erred. The COA question was not whether there was any error in this regard, but
rather whether the court failed to address the Apprendi claim. In the interest of
judicial economy, we conclude that the district court failed to consider the
Apprendi claim and to apply the Clisby analysis.
The state also contends that we should not remand Battle’s case because,
even if the district court erred, Battle’s claims would have failed on the merits.
The state essentially urges us to apply a harmless-error analysis. Despite the
state’s argument, nothing in Clisby indicates that harmless-error analysis should
8
apply when the district court has erred under Clisby. Although the respondent in
Clisby urged us to consider the claims not addressed by the district court, we
concluded that “[w]e c[ould] do no more than remand the case to the district court
to consider all remaining claims.” 960 F.2d at 935. Thus, the state’s argument is
unavailing, because, under Clisby, when a district court fails to address a
defendant’s claim, we will vacate the judgment without prejudice and remand with
instructions for the court to consider that claim. 960 F.2d at 938.
We conclude that the district court erred by failing to address Battle’s
Apprendi claim. In Battle’s petition and in his motion for reconsideration, he
adequately raised the constitutional claim of whether his sentence violated
Apprendi. Under Clisby, we have required that district courts address all claims
raised in a § 2254 petition, regardless of whether relief will be denied ultimately.
960 F.2d at 935-36. The court failed to make any mention of Battle’s Apprendi
claim and denied his other claim based on a retroactivity analysis. Therefore,
because the court’s order violated Clisby by failing to address one of the claims
asserted in Battle’s § 2254 petition, we vacate the judgment without prejudice and
remand the remaining claim for consideration by the district court.
III. CONCLUSION
9
We hold that the district court erred when it dismissed Battle’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his § 2254 petition as time-barred, because it
denied Battle’s petition using a retroactivity analysis. We also hold that the
district court erred under Clisby by failing to address Battle’s Apprendi claim.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s orders and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED.
10