United States v. Charles Marvin Watkins ( 2014 )


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  •                Case: 12-12549       Date Filed: 07/28/2014       Page: 1 of 28
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    _________________________
    No. 12-12549
    _________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cr-00073-TJC-JBT-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHARLES MARVIN WATKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 28, 2014)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.
    *
    Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit,
    sitting by designation.
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    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge:
    Charles Marvin Watkins agreed to assist law enforcement in a murder
    investigation after the body of a seven-year-old girl, with whom he was
    acquainted, was found in a landfill. When questioned by an investigating officer,
    he admitted to having downloaded and viewed child pornography. A detective
    then asked Mr. Watkins for permission to search his computers for information
    relevant to the murder investigation. After being assured that the officer was not
    searching for his child pornography but only for clues to the girl’s murder from
    sites she had visited on the computers while visiting his home, Mr. Watkins agreed
    to a search. His wife later independently consented to a general search of the
    computers.
    Evidence of child pornography from the search was used subsequently to
    charge Mr. Watkins under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for receipt of child pornography by
    computer over the internet. Mr. Watkins moved to suppress the evidence from the
    computers. A magistrate judge held a hearing and recommended denial of the
    motion. After reviewing the record, the district court denied the motion. It
    reasoned that the detective’s assurances about the scope of the search had limited
    Mr. Watkins’s consent to evidence relevant to the murder investigation, but that
    2
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    Mrs. Watkins’s consent authorized a general search and therefore permitted
    discovery of the child pornography evidence. The district court held that the
    search was not invalid under Georgia v. Randolph, 
    547 U.S. 103
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1515
    ,
    
    164 L. Ed. 2d 208
    (2006), because Mr. Watkins had not expressed an objection
    when his wife consented to an unlimited search. Mr. Watkins moved for
    reconsideration of the suppression order and to reopen the suppression hearing; his
    motion was denied. After a bench trial on the charged offense, Mr. Watkins was
    found guilty based on stipulated facts and was sentenced to 60 months’
    imprisonment. He timely appealed.
    We now determine that the search was valid because, despite the infirmities
    that the district court detected in Mr. Watkins’s consent to search the computers,
    Mrs. Watkins consented to a full search of the computers, and Mr. Watkins failed
    to show that the search violated his rights under Randolph. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
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    I
    BACKGROUND
    A.
    1.
    Somer Thompson, a seven-year-old girl, was murdered after she
    disappeared while walking home from school on October 19, 2009.1 She
    frequently had played with Mr. Watkins’s grandchildren and other children at his
    home. Following her disappearance, Mr. Watkins was questioned by several local
    law enforcement officers as well as agents from the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (“FBI”).
    On October 24, 2009, three days after Thompson’s body was found in a
    Georgia landfill, FBI Special Agent Jonathan MacDonald and Florida Department
    of Law Enforcement Special Agent Keesha Woessner visited Mr. Watkins’s home
    to talk to him about the murder. Agent MacDonald asked Mr. Watkins for
    permission to search his computer; he agreed. The agent looked at the internet
    search history and desktop items on the computer and unsuccessfully tried to run
    an FBI program to isolate images and videos. The agent also noted that
    1
    A person with no connection to this case was later charged with the murder.
    4
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    LimeWire, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program, was running on the computer. The
    agent wrote down the computer’s internet protocol address for later use because he
    knew that LimeWire was sometimes used to trade child pornography.
    Later that day, an investigator from the Clay County Sheriff’s Office asked
    Mr. Watkins to visit the office, and Mr. Watkins agreed. At the office,
    Mr. Watkins was interviewed by Detective Charlie Sharman. The interview was
    recorded on video. The detective told Mr. Watkins that he was being questioned
    about the disappearance of Somer Thompson. Mr. Watkins expressed a
    willingness to help in any way he could.
    As the interview progressed, Mr. Watkins stated that his grandchildren and
    their friends, including Somer Thompson, had visited his house regularly. The
    children would use the internet to play online computer games, including Webkinz
    and Club Penguin. When questioned about who might have preyed on
    Somer Thompson, Mr. Watkins, “speculating about who might [have] be[en]
    responsible for Somer’s abduction and murder, admitted he had previously
    downloaded and[] viewed child pornography on his computer.”2 He “stated that
    he had knowledge of predators because he had viewed child pornography in the
    2
    R.22 at 4, para. 20.
    5
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    past.”3 Upon further questioning, Mr. Watkins admitted that he had used
    LimeWire to download and view child pornography approximately one hundred
    times.
    The detective then questioned Mr. Watkins about his child pornography
    activities and acknowledged that the questions might be “embarrassing . . . but . . .
    we’re trying to get to the bottom of it.”4 While Detective Sharman was briefly out
    of the room, but while the video recording continued, Mr. Watkins received a
    phone call from his wife. During the course of the call, he told his wife that he
    was being questioned about the children’s computer use. He also related that he
    had told investigators about looking at some “pretty nasty stuff”5 accessible
    through LimeWire.6
    When Detective Sharman returned to the interview room, Mr. Watkins told
    the detective that the questioning was difficult for him because “some things . . .
    3
    R.48 at 5.
    4
    R.22 at 4, para. 22 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    5
    R.48 at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    6
    Neither Mr. Watkins nor Mrs. Watkins made an objection to the admission or use of
    this communication on the ground of marital privilege. Therefore, we have no occasion to
    express an opinion as to its admissibility.
    6
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    might put [him] in a bad light,” but that he had “to be honest” with the detective.7
    Mr. Watkins stated that he was “more concerned” about Somer Thompson.8 The
    detective replied, “[t]hat is why we are here. We are not interested in . . . what’s
    on the computer unless there is something on the computer . . . .”9 The detective
    did not finish his sentence because Mr. Watkins interrupted, saying, “[i]f it’s
    relevant, you know.”10
    Detective Sharman then asked Mr. Watkins for access to the three
    computers in his home because they “may hold something about this, and they
    may not, you know.”11 Mr. Watkins agreed to help the detective with “whatever
    [he] need[ed]” from the computers.12 The detective then stated:
    What I want to do is just get – just get a consent to look
    and see what – now you told me a couple of programs
    [Mr. Watkins’s computers] got, and just see if anyone
    has been trying to pe[ek] in there or talk in there, if these
    people on the other end are who they say they are. I am
    7
    R.22 at 5, para. 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    8
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    9
    
    Id. at 5,
    para. 27 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    10
    
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    11
    
    Id. at 5,
    para. 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    12
    
    Id. at 5,
    para. 30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    7
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    not worried about your files and all that kind of stuff.
    That’s what you – I’ve got my own private stuff on my
    computer, you know what I am saying?[13]
    Mr. Watkins replied affirmatively. The detective later asked to introduce
    Mr. Watkins to his “computer guy,” Detective Fred Eckert, so that investigators
    could examine the programs on his computer.14
    Mr. Watkins subsequently read and signed a voluntary consent form
    authorizing a full search of his computers. Parts of the form were read aloud to
    Mr. Watkins by Detective Eckert, although the paragraph stating that he had been
    advised of his right to refuse consent and that he gave consent freely and
    voluntarily was not read aloud.
    2.
    Around the time that Mr. Watkins finished his interview at the sheriff’s
    office, Detective Eckert, Sergeant Wayne McKinney and an evidence technician
    went to Mr. Watkins’s home. Detective Eckert met Mrs. Watkins, explained that
    Mr. Watkins had signed a form consenting to a search of the computers in the
    13
    
    Id. at 5-6,
    para. 31.
    14
    
    Id. at 6,
    para. 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    8
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    home15 and asked for her consent to search the computers as well. She agreed,
    although she later claimed that she did so with the understanding that the search
    was limited to the murder investigation and the websites the children had visited.
    After Mrs. Watkins had consented verbally to a search of the computers,
    Mr. Watkins arrived. The couple spoke for a few minutes while Detective Eckert
    stood nearby. The detective later testified that he could not hear what they said;
    Mrs. Watkins testified that the detective could have heard and that Mr. Watkins
    had informed his wife that the officers were searching the computers only for
    information related to the children and the murder investigation.
    Mrs. Watkins, the detective and Mr. Watkins then sat at a table together.
    The detective read aloud to Mrs. Watkins a form consenting to a complete search
    of the computers; Mrs. Watkins also read and signed the form. This consent form
    was identical to the one Mr. Watkins had signed at the sheriff’s office.
    Mr. Watkins did not register any objection or reservation while officers sought and
    obtained Mrs. Watkins’s consent to an unlimited search of the computers.
    15
    Neither Detective Eckert nor Mrs. Watkins testified about the exact phrasing of this
    statement. See R.45 at 68, 132-33, 152-53.
    9
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    Mr. Watkins then led investigators to the computers in the home, and the
    technician removed them.
    Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement Special Agent James Greenmun performed a forensic analysis of an
    imaged copy of the hard drive on Mr. Watkins’s personal computer.16 He
    discovered child pornography files that had been deleted. The Government then
    initiated a child pornography case against Mr. Watkins. Mr. Watkins subsequently
    withdrew his consent to the search of his computers, but Agent MacDonald
    obtained a search warrant for Mr. Watkins’s computer.
    B.
    A grand jury charged Mr. Watkins with receipt of child pornography in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). Mr. Watkins moved to suppress
    the child pornography because, he urged, it was obtained through an unlawful
    search of his computer. After an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate judge issued a
    Report and Recommendation. He concluded that the search had exceeded the
    16
    Of the three computers in Mr. Watkins’s home, one was used primarily by
    Mr. Watkins, one was used primarily by Mrs. Watkins, and one was used primarily by the
    children.
    10
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    scope of Mr. Watkins’s consent but that it was within the scope of Mrs. Watkins’s
    consent. In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge first examined the false
    assurances that Detective Sharman had given to Mr. Watkins about the purpose of
    the search and determined that Mr. Watkins’s consent to the search therefore was
    limited to evidence relevant to the murder investigation. With respect to
    Mrs. Watkins’s consent, the magistrate judge credited Detective Eckert’s
    testimony over Mrs. Watkins’s testimony about the scope of her consent. The
    magistrate judge found Mrs. Watkins less credible than the detective because her
    assertions were “unclear and inconsistent.”17 He also noted Mrs. Watkins’s
    interest in the outcome of the case due to her love for her husband.
    The magistrate judge also identified several inconsistencies in
    Mrs. Watkins’s testimony: Mrs. Watkins had testified inconsistently about her
    recollection of her phone call with her husband while he was being questioned at
    the sheriff’s office. She testified on cross-examination that they had discussed that
    the police were coming to the house to check the websites that the children had
    visited. The recorded interview contradicted that testimony. She then testified
    that she did not recall the substance of the conversation. Mrs. Watkins also
    17
    R.48 at 18.
    11
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    testified inconsistently about when she had learned that her husband had
    downloaded and viewed child pornography. She first testified repeatedly that it
    was the night before her husband was questioned at the sheriff’s office and the
    officers removed the computers. Later, at the suppression hearing, she stated that
    she did not learn about his child pornography until after the computers were taken.
    The magistrate judge found her inconsistent recollections about that conversation
    particularly suspicious.
    Mr. Watkins objected to the magistrate’s Report and Recommendation. The
    district court held oral argument to consider the magistrate judge’s credibility
    determination about the scope of Mrs. Watkins’s consent, but ultimately adopted
    the finding in the Report and Recommendation that she had consented to an
    unlimited search of the computers. The district court noted that neither
    Mrs. Watkins nor the officers had stated the object of the search or otherwise
    expressed any limitations to it. The district court also rejected Mr. Watkins’s
    argument that the search was invalid under Randolph because he had not
    consented to the search even if Mrs. Watkins had. The district court concluded
    that Mr. Watkins had “not actually express[ed] a refusal to consent to an unlimited
    search of the computers” as Randolph required; instead, “he consented to the
    12
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    detective’s request for a search that was implicitly limited . . . to certain content of
    the computers.”18
    After the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and
    Recommendation, Mr. Watkins moved for reconsideration and sought a new
    evidentiary hearing before the district court. His motion was denied. The district
    court subsequently conducted a bench trial on stipulated facts and found
    Mr. Watkins guilty of the charged offense. It sentenced Mr. Watkins to 60
    months’ imprisonment. He timely appealed.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    A.
    Mr. Watkins now asks us to review the district court’s denial of his motion
    to suppress the evidence obtained by the Government as a result of the searches of
    his computers and its denial of his motion for reconsideration and to reopen the
    evidentiary hearing.19 As he did in the district court, Mr. Watkins contends that
    18
    R.52 at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    19
    The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This court has jurisdiction
    over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    13
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    the search was invalid because it was conducted without a warrant and without his
    consent. Noting that the district court found that he had consented only to a search
    of the children’s programs on his computers, he submits that his wife’s consent
    was not sufficient, as a matter of law, to overcome the limited scope of his own
    permission. He relies principally on the decision of the Supreme Court of the
    United States in Randolph as support for his view. Therefore, our resolution of
    this appeal requires that we explore the contours of that decision and ascertain the
    correct application of its holding to the facts set forth in the record before us.
    We begin our task by placing Randolph in the existing doctrinal mosaic of
    Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of
    the people to be secure in their . . . houses, papers, and effects, against
    unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. “In the absence of a
    warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
    warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 
    134 S. Ct. 2473
    , 2482 (2014); see also
    Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
    489 U.S. 602
    , 619, 
    109 S. Ct. 1402
    , 1414, 
    103 L. Ed. 2d 639
    (1989); Payton v. New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    , 586, 
    100 S. Ct. 1371
    ,
    1380, 
    63 L. Ed. 2d 639
    (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 
    437 U.S. 385
    , 390, 
    98 S. Ct. 2408
    , 2412, 
    57 L. Ed. 2d 290
    (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
    403 U.S. 443
    ,
    14
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    454-55, 
    91 S. Ct. 2022
    , 2032, 
    29 L. Ed. 2d 564
    (1971); Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
    of Children & Families, 
    710 F.3d 1202
    , 1206 (11th Cir. 2013). The exceptions to
    the warrant requirement are firmly established but “jealously and carefully drawn.”
    Jones v. United States, 
    357 U.S. 493
    , 499, 
    78 S. Ct. 1253
    , 1257, 
    2 L. Ed. 2d 1514
    (1958). One of those exceptions is that a warrantless search is permissible if it is
    preceded by a valid consent. Fernandez v. California, 
    134 S. Ct. 1126
    , 1132, 
    188 L. Ed. 2d 25
    (2014); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 230-31, 
    93 S. Ct. 2041
    , 2049, 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 854
    (1973). Valid consent may be granted by a person
    with actual or apparent authority to give permission to search. See Illinois v.
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 186-89, 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    , 2800-01, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 148
    (1990).
    Whether a person consented to a search is, as a general proposition, a matter
    of fact, and therefore is reviewed for clear error. 
    Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227
    , 93
    S. Ct. at 2047-48; United States v. Zapata, 
    180 F.3d 1237
    , 1240-41 (11th Cir.
    1999); see also United States v. Blake, 
    888 F.2d 795
    , 798 (11th Cir. 1989) (listing
    factors to consider when assessing voluntariness of consent to a warrantless
    search, including the coerciveness of police procedures as well as the defendant’s
    custodial status, education, intelligence, cooperation with police, awareness of his
    15
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    right to refuse consent and belief that no incriminating evidence will be found).
    “In conducting a search pursuant to a properly obtained, voluntary consent, . . . the
    extent of the search must be confined to the terms of its authorization.” 
    Blake, 888 F.2d at 798
    .
    In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we must take
    the facts in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Goddard,
    
    312 F.3d 1360
    , 1362 (11th Cir. 2002). Finally, the scope of a search based on
    consent may not exceed the scope of the given consent. Florida v. Jimeno, 
    500 U.S. 248
    , 251, 
    111 S. Ct. 1801
    , 1803-04, 
    114 L. Ed. 2d 297
    (1991). “The standard
    for measuring the scope of . . . consent . . . is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness–
    what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
    between the officer and the [individual giving the consent]?” Id.; 
    Zapata, 180 F.3d at 1242
    .
    Obtaining valid consent when the property to be searched is controlled by
    more than one person is hardly a new situation for the Supreme Court or for the
    lower federal courts. In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court, after
    reviewing the long-established practice of the circuits, confirmed that “the consent
    of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as
    16
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    against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”
    
    415 U.S. 164
    , 170, 
    94 S. Ct. 988
    , 993, 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 242
    (1974). Notably, in
    addressing how courts ought to determine whether an individual has common
    authority over the object of the search, the Court expressed its impatience with
    “metaphysical subtleties” in earlier cases and specifically eschewed any reliance
    on the “historical and legal refinements” in the law of property. 
    Id. at 171
    & 
    n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993
    & n.7 (quoting Frazier v. Cupp, 
    394 U.S. 731
    , 740, 
    89 S. Ct. 1420
    ,
    1425, 
    22 L. Ed. 2d 684
    (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, held
    the Court:
    The [common] authority which justifies the third-party consent rests
    . . . on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
    access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
    recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
    inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk
    that one of their number might permit the common area to be
    searched.
    
    Id. at 171
    n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 
    n.7. With this legal landscape before us, we turn to
    an examination of Randolph.
    Randolph presented the Supreme Court with a variance of the situation
    earlier presented in Matlock–whether the contemporaneous objection of a person
    who shared common authority over a home prevented a search when one person
    17
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    with authority had consented. The Court concluded that “a physically present
    inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search [of his home] is
    dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” 
    Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122-23
    , 126 S. Ct. at 1528.
    In reaching its conclusion, the Court made clear that it did not intend to
    effect either a drastic dilution of or a dramatic shift away from its holding in
    Matlock. It simply reasoned that, because “[t]he constant element in assessing
    Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the great
    significance given to widely shared social expectations,”
    it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared
    premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s
    invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a
    fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without
    some very good reason, no sensible person would go
    inside under those conditions.
    
    Id. at 111,
    113, 126 S. Ct. at 1521-23
    . The Court noted that its holding recognized
    the “centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home” and the
    “special protection” that the home deserves as “the center of the private lives of
    our people.” 
    Id. at 115,
    126 S. Ct. at 1523 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The Court not only specifically noted the narrowness of its holding to “the
    circumstances here at issue,” but it also carefully circumscribed its holding:
    18
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    We therefore hold that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for
    evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present
    resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of
    consent given to the police by another resident.
    
    Id. at 106,
    120, 126 S. Ct. at 1519
    , 1526. Indeed, after stating its specific holding,
    it pointedly addressed the continued vitality of the broad rule that it had
    established in Matlock. 
    Id. at 120-22,
    126 S. Ct. at 1527-28. The Court clearly
    emphasized the contemporaneous presence and action required of an objector to
    prevent a search: “[I]f a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact
    at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a
    reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take
    part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.” 
    Id. at 121,
    126 S. Ct. at 1527 (emphasis
    added).20 The Court admitted to drawing a “fine line” in reaching its
    “formalis[tic]” holding. 
    Id. In doing
    so, it noted that “it would needlessly limit
    20
    The Court did recognize an exception could be made to its presence requirement when
    evidence suggests that the police removed the potentially objecting tenant for the purpose of
    avoiding a possible objection. Georgia v. Randolph, 
    547 U.S. 103
    , 121-22, 
    126 S. Ct. 1515
    ,
    1527-28, 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 208
    (2006). But see Fernandez v. California, 
    134 S. Ct. 1126
    , 1134, 
    188 L. Ed. 2d 25
    (2014) (noting that a possible improper motive in removing a suspect does not
    invalidate the search if the removal was objectively justified). Such an exception to Randolph’s
    presence requirement is clearly not applicable here. Mr. Watkins was not held at the sheriff’s
    office, though he did arrive at his home after investigators. Notably, he admits to being present
    when Mrs. Watkins signed the written consent form and even sat alongside her in their home
    when she signed it. There is no evidence that police removed Mr. Watkins in order to avoid a
    possible objection from him.
    19
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    the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities . . . if
    we were to hold that reasonableness required the police to take affirmative steps to
    find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had
    already received.” 
    Id. at 122,
    126 S. Ct. at 1527.
    In our previous cases, we have interpreted Randolph narrowly. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Harris, 
    526 F.3d 1334
    , 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that taxi
    passenger who did not “actually express a refusal” to search when driver
    consented was not covered by Randolph); United States v. Delancy, 
    502 F.3d 1297
    , 1307-08 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (determining that defendant who did not
    object was not covered by Randolph even though the defendant possibly
    considered objection futile).21 Our sister circuits have read Randolph in similar
    fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Shrader, 
    675 F.3d 300
    , 306-07 (4th Cir. 2012)
    (noting that Randolph set forth a “clearly drawn rule” that a defendant must be
    21
    Our unpublished decisions also stringently apply the requirements of Randolph. See
    United States v. Weeks, 442 F. App’x 447, 454 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1858
    ,
    
    182 L. Ed. 2d 648
    (2012) (holding that district court did not clearly err in determining that a
    woman’s oral consent was valid; potentially objecting party was within earshot of the home but
    did not voice any objection to the search); United States v. Sanders, 315 F. App’x 819, 824 (11th
    Cir. 2009) (holding Randolph did not apply where a defendant refused to sign a consent form but
    gave verbal consent to the search and did not object to a cotenant’s consent); United States v.
    Diaz, 279 F. App’x 739, 742 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing a search of a business from a
    search of a home because of the “significantly diminished expectation of privacy in comparison
    to a home”).
    20
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    both present and objecting), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 757
    , 
    184 L. Ed. 2d 500
    (2012),
    reh’g denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 1320
    , 
    185 L. Ed. 2d 236
    (2013); United States v. Cooke,
    
    674 F.3d 491
    , 499 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the “objection of an absent
    cotenant does not vitiate the consent of a physically present cotenant” and noting
    that the Supreme Court seemed to have structured Randolph as “an exception to
    the general rule” of Matlock), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 756
    , 
    184 L. Ed. 2d 498
    (2012); United States v. King, 
    604 F.3d 125
    , 137 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that
    Randolph “does not extend beyond the home” to personal property), cert. denied,
    
    131 S. Ct. 1467
    , 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 311
    (2011); United States v. Henderson, 
    536 F.3d 776
    , 783 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the contemporaneous presence of the
    objecting and consenting cotenants [w]as indispensable to the decision in
    Randolph”); United States v. Hudspeth, 
    518 F.3d 954
    , 960 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
    banc) (holding that child pornography defendant who earlier had refused consent
    to search computers did not meet Randolph exception because he “was not at the
    door and objecting” when his wife consented).22
    22
    The Ninth Circuit once interpreted the Randolph exception more broadly. See United
    States v. Murphy, 
    516 F.3d 1117
    , 1125 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[o]nce a co-tenant has
    registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective barring some objective
    manifestation that he has changed his position”). That interpretation was abrogated by the
    Supreme Court’s opinion in 
    Fernandez. 134 S. Ct. at 1135-36
    ; infra note 25.
    21
    Case: 12-12549       Date Filed: 07/28/2014      Page: 22 of 28
    Just as Matlock confirmed the previous consensus of the courts of appeals
    with respect to the general rule, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in
    Fernandez confirmed the present understanding of the circuits that Randolph set
    forth a specific, narrow exception. 
    Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134-37
    (holding that
    an objector must be present and contemporaneously objecting). With this
    understanding of the scope of Randolph, we turn to an examination of the case
    before us.23
    B.
    1.
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence for
    clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to its application of the law.
    23
    In Randolph, which involved a search of a home, the Court based its reasoning on
    “‘widely shared social expectations’” and “‘customary social usage’” about privacy in homes.
    
    Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135
    (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 
    121, 126 S. Ct. at 1527
    ). The
    Supreme Court has not established whether the rule in Randolph applies to privacy interests in
    computers or other personal effects. Cf. 
    Randolph, 547 U.S. at 131
    , 126 S. Ct. at 1531-33
    (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If two roommates share a computer and one keeps pirated software
    on a shared drive, he . . . has given up his privacy with respect to his roommate by saving the
    software on their shared computer.”); United States v. Lumpkins, 
    687 F.3d 1011
    , 1014 (8th Cir.
    2012) (“It is not clear that Randolph, which involved a search of a residence, applies in the
    context of a vehicle search.”), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 1612
    , 
    185 L. Ed. 2d 599
    (2013). But see
    United States v. King, 
    604 F.3d 125
    , 137 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Randolph does not apply to
    searches of personal effects), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 1467
    , 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 311
    (2011). For the
    reasons discussed in the following analysis, we need not decide whether Randolph applies to
    computers or other personal effects.
    22
    Case: 12-12549     Date Filed: 07/28/2014    Page: 23 of 28
    United States v. Yeary, 
    740 F.3d 569
    , 579 n.25 (11th Cir. 2014). We may affirm
    the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record, and we
    consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s judgment.
    
    Id. Here, Mr.
    Watkins consented in writing to an unlimited search of the
    computers, but that consent followed repeated assurances by Detective Sharman
    that officers were interested in the computers only for the ongoing murder
    investigation. The district court found that Detective Sharman’s false statements
    misled Mr. Watkins about the purpose and the scope of the proposed search. The
    district court therefore concluded that the scope of Mr. Watkins’s consent was
    limited to information relevant to the murder investigation. The parties do not
    contest this finding by the district court, and therefore, for purposes of this appeal,
    we shall accept that finding. 
    Yeary, 740 F.3d at 579
    n.25.
    The parties do not dispute that Mrs. Watkins had the authority to consent to
    a search of the computers. Nor do they dispute that Mrs. Watkins signed a consent
    form–after having the consent form read to her and after discussing it with
    Detective Eckert while she sat with her husband at a table in their home. The
    parties also do not dispute that the consent form’s terms clearly set forth the
    23
    Case: 12-12549     Date Filed: 07/28/2014   Page: 24 of 28
    unlimited scope of the search. More precisely, the record reflects that the officers
    followed a formal process in seeking Mrs. Watkins’s independent consent to a full
    search of the computers. Detective Eckert first sought and obtained verbal consent
    from Mrs. Watkins to search the computers. After Mr. Watkins arrived,
    Detective Eckert read the consent form aloud to Mrs. Watkins while all three were
    together at a table. Mrs. Watkins also read the form herself before signing it.
    Even accepting Mrs. Watkins’s various assertions at face value–which the district
    court declined to do because of its assessment of her credibility–she consented to
    the search. Moreover, the district court’s finding that Mrs. Watkins gave
    unlimited consent to a search of the computers was not clear error.
    Mrs. Watkins’s consent to a plenary search is not vitiated by the Randolph
    exception to the general rule of Matlock. Randolph’s stringent requirements
    simply are not met here. Mr. Watkins was present when Detective Eckert read the
    form to his wife; she read the form, and she signed the form. The formality of the
    process made crystal clear that her consent was independent of his and was for a
    full search of the computers. Declining to credit the testimony of Mrs. Watkins,
    the district court did not find that Mr. Watkins passed on to his wife any of the
    assurances that had been made to him and that, in the view of the district court,
    24
    Case: 12-12549      Date Filed: 07/28/2014       Page: 25 of 28
    caused his consent to be limited. Moreover, Mr. Watkins sat through the entire
    formal process conducted by Detective Eckert to obtain Mrs. Watkins’s full,
    independent consent. The record is devoid of any indication that, during the
    process, Mr. Watkins interposed any objection or suggested to his wife at any time
    that the consent documents were in any way limited by another understanding.24
    His silence and acquiescence hardly qualify as the type of objection required by
    Randolph. He was not, by any stretch of the phrase, “at the door and object[ing]”
    within the meaning of Randolph. 547 U.S. at 
    121, 126 S. Ct. at 1527
    .
    As we have noted earlier, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals,
    including this court, have defined Randolph as a narrow exception with specific
    requirements. To obtain the protections of Randolph, a defendant, while present
    with his cotenant, must object to the search. Mr. Watkins’s actions fall well
    24
    Mrs. Watkins did sign a consent form with wording identical to the form signed by
    Mr. Watkins. The identical forms could not have impliedly limited her consent to the scope of
    his, however. She had not seen his form when she signed hers and nothing in the record
    indicates that Mr. Watkins told her that the forms were the same.
    25
    Case: 12-12549        Date Filed: 07/28/2014         Page: 26 of 28
    outside Randolph’s conception of an objection.25 The district court therefore did
    not err in concluding that the search was valid under Randolph.
    2.
    Mr. Watkins also requests that we review the district court’s denial of
    Mr. Watkins’s motion for reconsideration and to reopen the suppression hearing.
    Such a review is governed by the abuse of discretion standard.26
    25
    Mr. Watkins’s consent to a limited search at the sheriff’s office does not qualify under
    Randolph as a present objection to his wife’s later consent to a wider search. Even if his consent
    to a limited search were construed as an objection to a wider search, the Supreme Court clearly
    held in Fernandez that a previous objection to a search does not meet Randolph’s requirements.
    The Court flatly rejected an argument that a previous objection “remained effective until [the
    objector] changed his mind and withdrew his objection.” 
    Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1135
    . It
    reasoned that the objector’s position was inconsistent with Randolph for two reasons. First,
    recognizing a standing objection “cannot be squared with the ‘widely shared social expectations’
    or ‘customary social usage’ upon which the Randolph holding was based” because when “the
    objector is not on the scene . . . the friend or visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to
    enter.” 
    Id. Second, recognizing
    a continuing or standing objection “would create the very sort of
    practical complications that Randolph sought to avoid.” 
    Id. The Court
    explicitly stated that a
    rule that “an objection, once made, should last until it is withdrawn by the objector . . . would be
    unreasonable.” 
    Id. It further
    rejected any argument that an objection “lasts for a ‘reasonable’
    time.” 
    Id. at 1136.
    Mr. Watkins’s limited consent to search is therefore not an objection within
    the ambit of Randolph.
    26
    See United States v. Simms, 
    385 F.3d 1347
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 2004) (motion to reopen
    suppression hearing); see also Farris v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2003)
    (Rule 60(b)); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 
    243 F.3d 1282
    , 1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (Rule
    59(e)).
    26
    Case: 12-12549   Date Filed: 07/28/2014   Page: 27 of 28
    After the suppression motion was denied, Mr. Watkins sought
    reconsideration and reopening of the suppression hearing so that the district court
    could make its own credibility determination about the conflicting testimony of
    Mrs. Watkins and Detective Eckert. However, the district court was entitled, after
    thorough review and a de novo determination, to credit the magistrate judge’s
    findings. A district court is required to make “a de novo determination, not [to
    hold] a de novo hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 
    447 U.S. 667
    , 674, 
    100 S. Ct. 2406
    , 2411, 
    65 L. Ed. 2d 424
    (1980).
    The magistrate judge provided thorough and reasonable support for his
    conclusions. The district court noted that it had conducted an independent review
    of the entire record, including the complete transcript of the evidentiary hearing,
    before it adopted the magistrate judge’s credibility determination. The fact that
    the district court characterized its determination as not an “easy call”27 does not
    mean that the district court erred in declining to reopen the hearing or to
    reconsider the denial of Mr. Watkins’s motion to suppress. The magistrate judge’s
    findings, recorded in the Report and Recommendation, were based on specific
    facts from the record that the magistrate judge articulated and analyzed. Though
    27
    R.57 at 2.
    27
    Case: 12-12549       Date Filed: 07/28/2014      Page: 28 of 28
    the details of the district court’s independent review are scant, the district court
    was permitted to credit the magistrate judge’s findings after reviewing the facts de
    novo. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Mr. Watkins’s motion.28
    Conclusion
    For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    28
    Having resolved the case on other grounds, we need not determine whether the
    “independent source” doctrine applies here. See United States v. Noriega, 
    676 F.3d 1252
    , 1260
    (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 957
    , 
    184 L. Ed. 2d 744
    (2013).
    28