United States v. Veronica R. Kirk Scott , 517 F. App'x 729 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-12723 Date Filed: 04/22/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-12723
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00014-CDL-MSH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VERONICA R. KIRK SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(April 22, 2013)
Before BARKETT, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-12723 Date Filed: 04/22/2013 Page: 2 of 4
Veronica Scott was convicted of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347(a)(2). On appeal, Scott argues the evidence was insufficient to prove she
knew fraudulent claims were filed on her behalf. After careful review of the record
and the parties’ briefs, we affirm. 1
To support a conviction for health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, the
government must prove the defendant: (1) knowingly and willfully executed, or
attempted to execute, a scheme to (2) defraud a health care program or to obtain by
false or fraudulent pretenses money or property under the custody or control of a
health care program, (3) “in connection with the delivery of or payment for health
care benefits, items, or services.” The government must show the defendant knew
the submitted claims were false, United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1297
(11th Cir. 2007), which may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence,
United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2008).
Scott claims the testimony of the government’s witnesses did not sufficiently
prove she “had knowledge that false claims were being submitted.” First, she
claims the jury should not have believed her friend Danielle Mahone—a witness
the jury knew was a cooperating defendant—who testified Scott knew the claims
1
This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d
1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). Jury verdicts are upheld unless no trier of fact could have found
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence in the record. Id.2
Case: 12-12723 Date Filed: 04/22/2013 Page: 3 of 4
were false. 2 Second, Scott claims the jury should not have believed her roommate
T’Nesha Pruitt—a witness the jury knew was a convicted felon—who also testified
Scott knew the claims were false. Instead, Scott argues the jury should have
believed her testimony that she was unaware the claims Mahone submitted on her
behalf were false.
Scott’s claims are meritless. The credibility of a witness is the “sole
province of the jury.” United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1334 (11th Cir.
2006). Unless a witness’s testimony is “so inherently incredible” or “so contrary
to the teachings of basic human experience,” the jury’s credibility determination
must stand. United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 546 (11th Cir. 1983).
In this case, neither Mahone’s nor Pruitt’s testimony lacked credibility.
Mahone and Pruitt testified: (1) Scott knew Mahone submitted false insurance
claims on behalf of others; (2) Scott was upset Mahone procured money for other
people while living at her home rent-free; (3) Scott implored Mahone to file false
claims on her behalf; (4) Scott supplied Mahone with the documents needed to
falsify health insurance claims; (5) Scott instructed Mahone as to the precise
amount of money she desired from the scheme; and (6) Scott paid Mahone several
thousand dollars of the fraudulently-obtained money in return for her assistance in
2
Mahone was also charged with health care fraud, and pleaded guilty to a conspiracy
charge related to the fraudulent filings. She was held accountable for helping eleven individuals
submit fraudulent claims, including Scott.
3
Case: 12-12723 Date Filed: 04/22/2013 Page: 4 of 4
the scheme. Based on this testimony, it was not “contrary to the teachings of basic
human experience” for the jury to find that Scott knew the submitted claims were
false.
Also meritless is Scott’s argument that the evidence was insufficient because
the jury should have believed her testimony instead of the Government’s
witnesses. When a defendant takes the stand in her defense, she “runs a substantial
risk of bolstering the Government’s case.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312,
314 (11th Cir. 1995). Given the corroborative evidence of guilt in this case, when
Scott took the stand and denied knowledge of the fraudulent claims, the jury was
entitled not only to disbelieve her but also to consider the opposite of her testimony
as true. See United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2002).
The verdict finding Scott guilty shows the jury did just what it was entitled to do;
nothing more, nothing less. See id.In sum, because a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Scott knew the submitted claims were false, the evidence was sufficient
to convict her of health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)(2).
AFFIRMED.
4