United States v. Jonathan Everett Gibson , 615 F. App'x 619 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 13-15620   Date Filed: 07/07/2015   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-15620
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cr-00011-RS-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JONATHAN EVERETT GIBSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 7, 2015)
    Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 13-15620      Date Filed: 07/07/2015    Page: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Jonathan Gibson appeals his conviction after pleading guilty to one count of
    being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and
    924(e). For the first time, Gibson -- on appeal -- argues that § 922(g)(1) is facially
    unconstitutional; he says it violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
    Amendment.
    We generally review constitutional challenges de novo, but because Gibson
    failed to raise these arguments below, we review only for plain error. See United
    States v. Peters, 
    403 F.3d 1263
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Gibson must
    demonstrate that error occurred, the error was plain, the error affects his substantial
    rights, and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the
    judicial proceedings. See United States v. Rodriguez, 
    398 F.3d 1291
    , 1298 (11th
    Cir. 2005). An error cannot be “plain” unless it is “obvious” and “clear under
    current law.” United States v. Humphrey, 
    164 F.3d 585
    , 588 (11th Cir. 1999). In
    addition, “only the Supreme Court or this [C]ourt sitting en banc can judicially
    overrule a prior panel decision” of our Court. United States v. Dean, 
    604 F.3d 1275
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2010).
    We have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a valid
    exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., United States v.
    2
    Case: 13-15620     Date Filed: 07/07/2015   Page: 3 of 4
    Jordan, 
    635 F.3d 1181
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dupree, 
    258 F.3d 1258
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. McAllister, 
    77 F.3d 387
    , 391 (11th
    Cir. 1996). None of the recent Supreme Court decisions relied on by Gibson
    abrogated or reversed our prior decisions on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).
    Furthermore, considering § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce
    Clause power, the statute does not violate the Tenth Amendment. See Cheffer v.
    Reno, 
    55 F.3d 1517
    , 1521 (11th Cir. 1995).
    In this case, no plain error occurred. And Gibson’s arguments are squarely
    foreclosed by binding precedent.
    Next, Gibson argues, for the first time, that the “minimal nexus” test set out
    in Scarborough v. United States, 
    431 U.S. 563
    , 575, 
    97 S.Ct. 1963
    , 1969, 
    52 L.Ed.2d 582
     (1977), is no longer sufficient for establishing the required connection
    to interstate commerce under § 922(g). He points to the Supreme Court’s
    decisions in Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct 2077, 
    189 L.Ed.2d 1
    (2014), and Jones v. United States, 
    529 U.S. 848
    , 
    120 S.Ct. 1904
    , 
    146 L.Ed.2d 902
    (2000). Gibson maintains that a more significant connection to interstate
    commerce is now required for § 922(g) to cover intrastate possession and says that
    his conviction cannot stand because no significant connection to interstate
    commerce exists. As this claim is also raised for the first time on appeal, we
    review only for plain error. See Peters, 
    403 F.3d at 1270
    .
    3
    Case: 13-15620     Date Filed: 07/07/2015   Page: 4 of 4
    Neither Bond nor Jones involved § 922(g) or the “minimal nexus” test set
    forth in Scarborough. Thus, Scarborough remains binding precedent; and the
    “minimal nexus” test is the applicable standard for establishing a connection with
    interstate commerce.
    We reject Gibson’s argument. And it is squarely foreclosed by binding
    precedent. Thus, the district court did not plainly err when it convicted Gibson of
    being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of § 922(g)(1), where the
    Government established (and Gibson acknowledged) that the pertinent firearm
    previously traveled in interstate commerce.
    AFFIRMED.
    4