Donald Eugene Wilson, Jr. v. United States , 395 F. App'x 610 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-13756                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket Nos. 08-00541-CV-OC-10GRJ,
    07-00026-CR-OC-10GRJ
    DONALD EUGENE WILSON, JR.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (September 7, 2010)
    Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Donald Eugene Wilson, Jr., a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion to vacate his sentence. Reversible error has
    been shown; we vacate and remand for additional proceedings.
    Wilson alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
    lawyer did not file an appeal even though Wilson wanted him to. The district court
    concluded that Wilson showed an insufficient desire to appeal because Wilson
    failed to state in his sworn affidavit a time, place, or manner in which he gave
    timely instructions to his lawyer to file an appeal.* On appeal, Wilson maintains
    that he complied with the court’s directive to show that he asked his lawyer to
    appeal.
    In a section 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo and fact
    findings for clear error. Lynn v. United States, 
    365 F.3d 1225
    , 1232 (11th Cir.
    2004). Whether counsel is ineffective is a mixed question of law and fact that we
    review de novo. Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 
    433 F.3d 788
    , 790 (11th Cir. 2005).
    *
    Wilson raised many other claims in his section 2255 motion; but the district court
    determined that these claims had no merit. To the extent Wilson raises appellate arguments
    beyond whether he sufficiently stated that he asked his lawyer to appeal, we decline to address
    them. Our review of a district court’s denial of a section 2255 motion is limited to the issues
    specified in the certificate of appealability. Murray v. United States, 
    145 F.3d 1249
    , 1250-51
    (11th Cir. 1998).
    2
    In addition, we liberally construe pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United
    States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
    demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) he suffered
    prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 2064 (1984). A lawyer acts in a professionally unreasonable manner
    when he fails to file an appeal on behalf of a client who specifically requests it.
    Gomez-Diaz, 
    433 F.3d at
    790 (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
    120 S.Ct. 1029
    , 1035
    (2000)). Even if a client did not specifically request that his lawyer file an appeal,
    a court must inquire into whether the lawyer consulted with the client about “the
    advantages and disadvantages of appealing and made a reasonable effort to
    determine the client’s wishes.” Id. at 792; see also Thompson v. United States, 
    504 F.3d 1203
    , 1206 (11th Cir. 2007) (“counsel generally has a duty to consult with the
    defendant about an appeal”). An affirmative duty to consult arises when a
    particular client reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing. Gomez-Diaz,
    
    433 F.3d at 792
    .
    Prejudice is presumed where counsel fails to file an appeal that the defendant
    wanted filed. 
    Id.
     The movant need only show that, but for the lawyer’s deficient
    performance, he would have appealed. 
    Id.
    3
    In a supporting affidavit to his section 2255 motion, Wilson stated that, after
    trying many times to reach his lawyer, he finally contacted him about 10 days after
    the district court imposed sentence. Wilson stated his concerns about his sentence
    and expressed his “desire to file an appeal to [his] sentence and conviction.” But
    his lawyer informed him that an appeal would not be meritorious. Wilson admitted
    that, on this initial contact, he “did not affirmatively tell [his lawyer] to file the
    appeal.” After further considering his sentence, Wilson again contacted his lawyer
    a few days later -- before the time for filing an appeal had expired -- and expressed
    his desire to file an appeal. His lawyer told Wilson that no grounds for appeal
    existed and that he would not file one. Wilson decided to file an appeal himself
    but, while in transit from county to state prison, the time for filing an appeal
    expired.
    We conclude that Wilson’s acts -- even if not demonstrating that he
    instructed specifically his lawyer to file an appeal after his lawyer first
    recommended against it -- did trigger his lawyer’s duty to consult with Wilson
    about the advantages and disadvantages of filing an appeal. Wilson stated that he
    expressly communicated to his lawyer that he wished to appeal; thus, Wilson’s
    lawyer had an affirmative duty to consult with Wilson about appealing and try to
    determine his wishes. And from Wilson’s statements, it is unclear whether his
    4
    lawyer engaged in proper consultation in an effort to ascertain Wilson’s informed
    decision or whether his lawyer simply expressed his disagreement with Wilson’s
    desires about an appeal and made his decision for him. See Thompson, 
    504 F.3d at 1207
     (explaining that “simply asserting the view that an appeal would not be
    successful does not constitute ‘consultation’ in any meaningful sense”).
    Importantly, if Wilson’s lawyer performed deficiently in not adequately consulting
    with him, prejudice would be presumed; and Wilson would be entitled to an
    appeal.
    On these facts, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
    Wilson’s claim and in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to develop the
    content of the communications between Wilson and his lawyer. On remand, we
    instruct the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to elucidate this
    information.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    5