Derrick Jackson v. State of Georgia , 273 F. App'x 812 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________   ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    APRIL 9, 2008
    No. 07-15550          THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 07-00333-CV-CAR-5
    DERRICK JACKSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE OF GEORGIA,
    Defendant,
    GREGORY L. BUSHWAY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (April 9, 2008)
    Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Derrick Jackson appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal
    of his amended complaint seeking an injunction to halt state court criminal
    proceedings. On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court erred because there
    is precedent establishing that, when necessary for the protection of constitutional
    rights, the federal courts have the power to issue injunctions enjoining state
    prosecutions. Jackson argues that the Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 746
     (1971), abstention doctrine does not apply because there are no legitimate
    state activities at issue.
    We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
    for failure to state a claim, Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 
    254 F.3d 1276
    , 1279 (11th
    Cir. 2001), and review dismissal of a complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915A for abuse of discretion. Bilal v. Driver, 
    251 F.3d 1346
    , 1349 (11th Cir.
    2001). In addressing whether abstention is appropriate in a given case, we review
    the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. Boyes v. Shell Oil
    Prod. Co., 
    199 F.3d 1260
    , 1265 (11th Cir. 2000).
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to dismiss a
    complaint against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
    entity at any time if the court determines that the action “(1) is frivolous,
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    malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
    monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
    1915A.
    A claim is frivolous when, on the face of the complaint, the factual
    allegations are “clearly baseless,” or the legal allegations are “indisputably
    meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 
    984 F.2d 392
    , 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation
    omitted). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when it
    appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
    claim that would entitle him to relief. Brower v. County of Inyo, 
    489 U.S. 593
    ,
    598, 
    109 S.Ct. 1378
    , 1382 (1989).
    Attentive to the principles of equity, comity, and federalism, the Supreme
    Court has recognized that federal courts should abstain from exercising
    jurisdiction in suits aimed at restraining pending state criminal prosecutions.
    Younger, 
    401 U.S. at 41
    , 
    91 S.Ct. at 749
    ; For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of
    Columbus, Ga., 
    281 F.3d 1209
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Jackson’s state criminal prosecution was pending at the time he filed his
    federal complaint. Thus, if the district court granted relief to Jackson, it would be
    restraining a pending state criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the district court
    did not err when it found that Jackson’s complaint failed to state a claim upon
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    which relief could be granted. Since the standard of review for failure to state a
    claim is more stringent than that of dismissal for frivolity, the district court
    likewise did not err, if it dismissed the complaint for frivolity. Furthermore,
    because the criminal proceedings were ongoing at the time of the complaint, the
    application of the abstention doctrine by the district court was not an abuse of
    discretion.
    For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
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