[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12086 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar NOVEMBER 23, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-00212-MP-AK
STEVEN MARTINS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(November 23, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a income tax-refund action brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1),
I.R.C. § 7422(a). The taxpayer, Steven Martins, proceeding pro se, seeks refunds
for the years 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 totaling $38,527. The Government
moved to dismiss his amended complaint with respect to years 2005 and 2006 for
lack of jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim or for summary
judgment. Martins responded with a cross- motion for summary judgment. While
the motions were pending, Martins moved the court for leave to file a second
amended complaint. The court, in an order entered on March 2, 2010, then denied
Martins’s cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissed the refund claims for
2005 and 2006 for lack of jurisdiction, and granted the Government summary
judgment on the remaining claims.
Martins now appeals the court’s judgment in favor of the Government. He
argues that summary judgment was improper because, in his relationship with the
United Postal Service (“UPS”), he was not an “employee” and UPS is not a “trade
or business,” in order to make his renumeration from UPS taxable under the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). He also argues that the district court should have
granted his motion to file a second amended complaint because he raised no new
facts or theories of recovery.
I.
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part, that
“Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XVI; Madison v. United States,
758 F.2d
573, 574 (11th Cir. 1985). The IRC imposes a tax on the taxable income of every
individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States, with some exceptions
not applicable to Martins. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d). Taxable income includes, but is
not limited to, “[c]ompensation for labor or personal services performed in the
United States.” I.R.C. § 861(a)(3), (b).
Taxpayer arguments that we have previously described as “frivolous”
include:
that their wages are not income subject to tax but are a tax on
property such as their labor; that only public servants are subject to
tax liability; that withholding of tax from wages is a direct tax on the
source of income without apportionment in violation of the Sixteenth
Amendment; that withholding taxes violates equal protection; [and]
that they should be allowed to exclude from the amount of wages that
they receive the cost of maintaining their well-being.
Motes v. United States,
785 F.2d 928, 928 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). More
generally, we have long held as frivolous taxpayer claims that income “derived
from employment in the private sector[] is not subject to federal taxation.” United
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States v. Morse,
532 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Martins’s complaint alleged that the compensation that he received for his
services from UPS is non-taxable, based on a narrow reading of the statutory
language in the IRC and because he worked for a private sector corporation.
These arguments are frivolous. See Morse,
532 F.3d at 1132-33; Motes,
785 F.2d
at 928; I.R.C. § 7701(c). Because there was no dispute as to a genuine issue of
material fact and because Martins’s legal arguments are frivolous, the district court
did not err in granting the Government’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to file an amended complaint
for abuse of discretion. Hall v. United Ins. Co. of America,
367 F.3d 1255, 1262
(11th Cir. 2004). “Ordinarily, if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon
by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, leave to amend should be freely
given.”
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conversely, a district court
may properly deny leave to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) when such
amendment would be futile, such as when the amended complaint would
nonetheless be subject to dismissal.
Id. at 1262-63.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martins’s
request to file a second amended complaint. The proposed second amended
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complaint relied upon the same facts and legal arguments as his first amended
complaint, which as explained above, were frivolous. Because Martins’s
amendment would have been futile, the district court properly denied his request
to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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