Robert L. Clark v. Warden Hart ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-12774 SEPTEMBER 27, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00022-JTC
ROBERT L. CLARK,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
WARDEN HART,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 27, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, FAY and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Clark, a Georgia prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust his state
administrative remedies. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
In dismissing Clark’s section 2254 petition, the district court did not specify
whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. We granted a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) on the following issue: “Whether the district court erred
when it dismissed Clark’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies by not ordering that the § 2254 petition be dismissed without
prejudice[.]”
In his opening brief on appeal, however, Clark does not address the issue set
forth in the COA. “While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues
not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Instead, Clark raised only issues
that were outside the scope of the COA.* Because our review is limited to those
issues specified in the COA, we will not consider these arguments on appeal. See
Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
*
In his brief, Clark argues that the state’s delay in processing his state habeas petition
deprived him of the opportunity to examine a key witness and impaired his ability to defend
himself if he is granted a new trial. He also contends that he should be excused from the
exhaustion requirement because the state habeas court’s delay -- and the Georgia Supreme
Court’s failure to address all of the issues raised in his application for a certificate of probable
cause -- rendered his state remedies inadequate.
2