United States v. Nathan Corley , 408 F. App'x 245 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 06, 2011
No. 09-15587 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00052-CR-HLM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NATHAN CORLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 6, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Corley appeals his conviction under 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1) for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The district court concluded correctly
that, because the deputies had probable cause to stop and to search Corley’s
vehicle, the deputies’ actions violated no constitutional rights and required no
suppression of evidence; accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
One evening in 2008, two sheriff’s deputies observed Corley’s vehicle
driving more slowly than other vehicles on the interstate and--for no apparent
reason--veering out of and back into its lane. While they followed Corley’s
vehicle, police dispatch told the deputies that Corley’s tag number was not on file,
prompting the deputies’ suspicion of an invalid tag.1 When the deputies pulled
over Corley’s vehicle, they smelled burnt marijuana and witnessed Corley
behaving nervously, failing to look them in the eye, and giggling. In a pat-down
search of Corley outside his vehicle, the deputies found a small bag of marijuana in
Corley’s pocket. Having found marijuana, the deputies’ searched Corley’s vehicle
and discovered a box of cocaine in the trunk.
Corley’s case comes to us after both the magistrate judge and the district
court judge denied Corley’s motion to suppress evidence from the deputies’ search
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The deputies later discovered that this tag search was performed incorrectly and that the
tag was legitimate. But this error raises no question about the reasonableness of the deputies’
belief at the pertinent time that Corley’s tag may not have been registered.
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and seizure.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed
question of law and fact, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear
error and the district court’s application of law to those facts de novo. United
States v. Ponce-Aldona, 579 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 2009). We afford
considerable deference to the magistrate judge’s and district court judge’s
credibility determinations because they are “in a better position than a reviewing
court to assess the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289
F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002).
Corley first contends that the deputies’ traffic stop of his vehicle was racially
motivated and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A traffic stop is
constitutional if it is either based upon probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred or justified by reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged
in criminal activity. See United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.
2008). Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion but does not require the
same “standard of conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to support
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a conviction.” United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
Here, the magistrate determined that the deputies credibly testified that a
lane violation occurred, which provided sufficient probable cause for the deputies
to stop Corley’s vehicle. See Rayo-Leon v. State, 635 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2006).2 The deputies’ incorrect but reasonable belief of a possible tag
violation provides another source of probable cause and bolsters--rather than
undermines as Corley contends--the deputies’ belief that they had probable cause
for a stop. See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.
2003). Because the deputies had probable cause for the stop, we need not consider
Corley’s claim about a racially motivated pretext for the stop. See Whren v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774-77 (1996).
Corley next contends that his constitutional rights were violated during his
detention and pat down after the deputies had stopped him.
An officer’s investigation after a traffic stop “must be reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,” and
the stop “must be limited to the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
2
Regardless of the motive, if any, behind the deputies’ alleged thirty-minute delay in
telling Corley that they pulled him over because of the improper lane change, the controlling fact
remains that the deputies objectively possessed probable cause for the stop. See
Harris, 526 F.3d at 1337; United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206,
1210 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (disregarding subjective intentions).
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stop.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But an officer may detain a person for investigation
unrelated to the stop’s initial purpose where, under the totality of the
circumstances, the officer “has objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion
that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.
Ct. 744, 750 (2002); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991).
Here, supported by the magistrate judge’s credibility determinations, the
deputies possessed reasonable suspicion to justify their further investigation into
possible criminal activity because the deputies smelled marijuana when they
approached Corley’s vehicle. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1203
(11th Cir. 2010). Given this reasonable suspicion, the duration of the stop--less
than five minutes between the stop’s beginning and the deputies’ discovery of
cocaine--was constitutionally permissible. See United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d
1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the totality of the circumstances, we also see
no error in the deputies’ instruction for Corley to exit the vehicle, for the pat down
of Corley, or for the seizure of marijuana from Corley’s pocket. See Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 n.6 (1977); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130,
2137 (1993); United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009).
Last, Corley contends that the deputies’ search of Corley’s trunk violated his
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Fourth Amendment rights. A warrantless search and seizure of a vehicle is
permissible, even without consent, when officers have appropriate probable cause:
in this context, “when under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle.”
United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). Because the
deputies smelled marijuana and found Corley in possession of marijuana, the
totality of the circumstances supported the warrantless search of the trunk here.
See United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982).
AFFIRMED.
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