PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
_______________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
07/13/99
THOMAS K. KAHN
Nos. 97-8838, 97-9086 & 97-9269 CLERK
_______________
D. C. Docket No. 1:94-CV-1666-WBH
JOHN D. CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AI TRANSPORT;
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
______________________________
(July 13, 1999)
Before HATCHETT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges,* and KEITH**, Senior Circuit
Judge.
_________________
*This decision is rendered by a quorum due to the retirement of then-Chief Judge Hatchett on
May 14, 1999. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
**Honorable Damon J. Keith, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal arising from an employment discrimination lawsuit, John D.
Chapman asks that we vacate a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, AIG Claim
Services (“AIGCS”), AI Transport, and AIG Aviation, with respect to Chapman’s
claims filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-17. In addition, Chapman asserts that the district court erred both in
granting summary judgment prior to trial on his age discrimination claim filed
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34, and in failing to reconsider its summary judgment decision after hearing the
evidence offered at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the jury’s verdict
on Chapman’s ADA claim, but reverse the district court’s summary judgment
order on Chapman’s ADEA claim and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
BACKGROUND
Chapman began working as a senior claims representative for AI Transport,
a division of AIG Aviation, in 1988, and was promoted to claims supervisor
shortly thereafter. In 1992, AI Transport initiated a restructuring and reduction of
its workforce and, as a result, Chapman‘s job title changed from claims supervisor
to manager of self-insured retention accounts (“SIR Manager”). As SIR Manager,
2
Chapman was responsible, in part, for auditing self-insured retention accounts and
processing claims made on these accounts. It is undisputed that the nature of
claims operations changed under the leadership of Bill O’Brien, who became vice
president in charge of claims operations at AI Transport beginning in 1989, to
necessitate more travel than had previously been required.
Chapman suffers from tachycardia, a chronic condition that affects the
heart’s ability to control its electrical impulses. During his tenure with AI
Transport, Chapman’s tachycardia did not manifest itself until the spring of 1992,
during which Chapman experienced blackouts and a loss of consciousness.
Chapman saw Dr. Cole Wolford, an internist, several times from April through
July 1992, for treatment of his heart condition. In July 1992, Wolford placed
Chapman on a holter monitor in an effort to determine the cause of his irregular
heartbeat. AI Transport and Chapman strongly dispute the extent to which
Wolford expressly advised Chapman to restrict or eliminate work-related travel
due to his tachycardia; it appears, however, that Wolford’s internal office notes do
not explicitly reflect a determination that Chapman should desist from travelling.
In August 1992, Wolford referred Chapman to a cardiologist, Dr. Ted Monitz, who
found that, notwithstanding his diagnosis of tachycardia, Chapman did not suffer
from any structural heart defects.
3
In September 1992, Chapman notified O’Brien, Valerie Zaleski, Human
Resources Manager, and Bob Spann, Chapman’s immediate supervisor, that he was
experiencing stress related to business travel. According to the defendants,
Chapman neither informed O’Brien, Zaleski, or Spann that this stress might be
related to a heart condition, nor did he request that they speak to his physicians.
The defendants also contend that O’Brien suggested during that conversation that
AI Transport would make all of Chapman’s travel arrangements for him, thereby
alleviating some of his travel-related stress, but that travel would continue to be a
requirement of his job. In November 1992, Chapman received nine accounts to
audit, and was advised that he needed to complete as many of these audits as
possible by the end of the calendar year. On December 17, 1992, Chapman
advised O’Brien, Zaleski, and Spann that he would no longer travel in relation to
his job. According to Chapman, O’Brien responded that Chapman could “travel,
resign, or be fired.” R5-71 at 9. One day later, after Chapman maintained that he
could not travel anymore, O’Brien fired him.
During the fall of 1992, Chapman submitted his resume to James Wogsland,
the vice president of AIGSC, AI Transport’s sister company. According to
Chapman, his request for transfer to AIGSC was not limited to a particular job.
Chapman also contends that his supervisor, Spann, supported his transfer request
4
and specifically told Wogsland that Chapman had experienced difficulty with the
extensive travel required under O’Brien’s leadership at AI Transport. Wogsland
and Ward Turnquist, another AIGCS vice-president, interviewed Chapman for the
position of claims manager but offered the position to an AI Transport employee
who was younger than Chapman. According to AIGCS, Wogsland and Turnquist
believed that Chapman had not interviewed well and were concerned about his
alleged “job-skipping” history. Chapman avers that, in addition to the claims
manager position for which he was not selected, AIGCS transferred three other
younger, less-qualified AI Transport employees to available positions at AIGCS
for which Chapman was not considered.
Chapman subsequently filed this action against the defendants and alleged,
inter alia, that AI Transport had discriminated against him due to his disabling
heart condition by both terminating him and failing to accommodate his disability.
Chapman further alleged that AIGCS had discriminated against him on the basis of
age by failing to hire him or transfer him to available positions for which he
applied and was qualified. In a report and recommendation, the magistrate judge
determined that Chapman had established triable issues of fact with respect to his
claims of disability discrimination in relation to AI Transport and age
discrimination in relation to AIGCS. See R9-95 at 34, 40. The district court
5
adopted in part the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but found that Chapman
had set forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment with respect to all
defendants on his disability claims. The district court further found, however, that
Chapman had failed to demonstrate that AIGCS’s stated reasons for failing to hire
or transfer him to available positions was a pretext for age discrimination.
Consistent with this determination, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of AIGCS on Chapman’s ADEA claim, leaving only his ADA claims to be
tried before a jury. See R12-109 at 20-22.
Following a jury trial that lasted approximately nine days, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants, and found both that travel was an essential
function of Chapman’s job as SIR Manager and that his refusal to travel was not
based on a disability that was known or should have been known to the defendants.
See R16-185; R27-143. In this consolidated appeal, Chapman appeals the jury’s
verdict on his disability claims; the district court’s refusal to order a new trial on
these claims; the court’s award of costs to the defendants; the court’s exclusion of
certain evidence that Chapman sought to introduce at trial; and the court’s order
granting summary judgment on his age discrimination claims. We address in turn
each of these contentions.
6
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment,
viewing the record and all its inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See
Arrington v. Cobb County,
139 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 1998). We review the
district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See
Montgomery v. Noga,
168 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999). We also review for
abuse of discretion whether the district court properly excluded evidence, see
Walker v. NationsBank of Florida,
53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995), and
awarded attorney’s fees, see Turner v. Sungard Business Systems, Inc.,
91 F.3d
1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1996).
A. ADEA Claim
In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must produce sufficient
evidence to support an inference that the defendant-employer based its
employment decision on an illegal criterion. See Alphin v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
683 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1982)). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie
case and has shown sufficient evidence to allow a fact-finder to disbelieve an
employer’s proffered explanation for its actions, that alone is enough to preclude
7
entry of judgment as a matter of law. Combs v. Plantation Patterns,
106 F.3d 1519,
1532 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
118 S. Ct. 685,
139 L. Ed. 2d 632
(1998).
This circuit has adopted a variation of the test for Title VII claims articulated
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
Ct. 1817,
36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), for cases arising under the ADEA. Mitchell v.
Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co.,
967 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1992). In order to
make out a prima facie case for an ADEA violation, the plaintiff must show that he
(1) was a member of the protected age group, (2) was subject to adverse
employment action, (3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by a
younger individual. See Benson v. Tocco, Inc.,
113 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (11th Cir
1997).
Here, it is undisputed that Chapman, who was sixty-one years old at the time
that he applied – but was not hired – for a position at AIGCS, established a prima
facie case under the ADEA. AIGCS then proffered as a legitimate, non-
discriminatory justification for refusing to hire Chapman, that he did not interview
well and had exhibited a recent history of “job-skipping.” The district court
determined that Chapman failed to specifically rebut or demonstrate to be
pretextual the defendant’s subjective evaluation of Chapman’s interview skills.
8
Having reviewed the record, however, we conclude that, in light of our
precedent, the district court did not properly evaluate Chapman’s effort to
demonstrate the pretextual nature of AIGCS’s reason for its employment decision,
nor did the court adequately explain its reasons for granting summary judgment on
this claim. We previously have noted that, although a defendant’s burden of
persuasion in rebutting the inference created by the prima facie case is
“exceedingly light,” Perryman v. Johnson Products Co.,
698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th
Cir. 1983), the defendant’s explanation must be “clear and reasonably specific.”
Connor v. Fort Gordon Bus Co.,
761 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, we
have found that, while not necessarily precluding summary judgment in every
instance, a proffer of purely subjective reasons for a termination or failure-to-hire
decision leaves an employee without any objective criteria to point to in order to
show competence, see Miles v. M.N.C. Corporation,
750 F.2d 867, 871 (11th Cir.
1985), and leaves the court without any objective, ascertainable criteria to evaluate.
See
id. at 872 (“What the court is left with as M.N.C.’s legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for failure to rehire Mary Miles is the subjective
evaluation, without more, that she was not a good worker and Lavelle Parmer
was.”). Recently, in Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment,
132 F.3d 635
(11th Cir. 1998), we determined that an employer-defendant’s reliance on the
9
plaintiff’s lack of “special knowledge and skills” in assessing her qualifications in
comparison to another individual was “too subjective to allow for any meaningful
comparison between [the two applicants.]”
Id. at 644. We further noted that
[R]equirements such as the possession of ‘initiative and
judgment capabilities’ and the ability ‘to relate to people
in a manner to win confidence and establish support’ are
incapable of objective evaluation. They cannot be relied
upon by an employer seeking to defeat the plaintiff’s
prima facie case by showing that the plaintiff is less
qualified than the applicant chosen for the promotion.
Id.
Here, the district court noted that AIGCS set forth as its reasons for not
hiring Chapman that he had interviewed poorly and had a relatively unstable job
history. The court went on to find that
plaintiff points to no specific facts which could be used
to counter AIGCS’s nondiscriminatory reason. None of
the facts regarding the employment record of the other
employees, his relative constant employment, or lengthy
employment relationships counters the nondiscriminatory
reason that Chapman did not interview well.
R12-109 at 21. In basing its decision solely on Chapman’s failure to disprove
specifically AIGCS’s entirely subjective assertion that he interviewed poorly,
however, the court required the plaintiff to meet an insurmountable standard that
runs contrary to our circuit’s cautious treatment of purely subjective justifications
for adverse employment decisions. In summarily dismissing Chapman’s attempt to
10
respond to AIGCS’s proffered justification as wholly unrelated to the “poor
interview” excuse, the court failed to analyze whether--or the extent to which--
Chapman had cast doubt on the overall credibility of AIGCS’s explanation.
In response to AIGCS’s contention that Chapman had a history of “job-
skipping,” Chapman presented evidence that his employment history was relatively
stable. Specifically, Chapman pointed out that he worked for six different
companies over a thirty-five year period. Chapman further noted that a three-year
period during which he worked for three employers primarily represented work for
only one client. At the very least, Chapman cast some doubt on AIGCS’s
contention that his unstable job history constituted a legitimate explanation for the
decision not to hire him. Although this evidence does not rebut directly AIGCS’s
allegations regarding Chapman’s interviewing skills, the plaintiff’s ability to call
into question the credibility of the defendant’s stated objective criteria presented to
explain its business decision is, at the summary judgment stage, sufficient to cast
doubt on the defendant’s subjective justifications as well. See
Combs, 106 F.3d at
1537 (“A defendant who puts forward only reasons that are subject to reasonable
disbelief in light of the evidence faces having its true motive determined by a
jury.”).
11
Our decision in this case is not intended to connote that an employer cannot
make hiring decisions based in large part on subjective factors, or that an employer
is prohibited from adducing these subjective criteria as a non-discriminatory
justification for its employment actions. Indeed, as a practical matter, individual
and personal perceptions of a candidate’s potential to “fit” or function well within
the employer’s organization often figure prominently in the decision to hire or
promote; we do not intend to second-guess employers’ legitimate business
decisions in this regard. Nonetheless, where, as here, the employee has established
a prima facie case and cast sufficient doubt on the credibility of subjective
explanations that are not susceptible to evidentiary support or capable of objective
evaluation by this court, we believe that summary judgment is not appropriate.
We acknowledge that this determination may, in some instances, present the
employer-defendant with the seemingly higher burden of supporting its
subjectively-based business decision with some objective evidence or, perhaps,
outlining the reasons why the subjective factors relied on were directly related to
the job function for which the plaintiff was rejected. We have already observed,
however, that such an increased burden is appropriate where the defendant’s
proffered justification is highly subjective. See
Connor, 761 F.2d at 1499 (“[A]
defendant relying on a purely subjective reason for discharge will face a heavier
12
burden of production than it otherwise would.”). Moreover, we are mindful that
the “poor interview” justification, without more, can provide a defendant-employer
with a convenient smokescreen for precisely the type of discrimination that the
ADEA was intended to eradicate, with virtually no provable recourse for the
plaintiff. In sum, we believe that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on Chapman’s ADEA claim, and reverse on this issue for further
proceedings.
B. ADA Claims
Chapman also avers that, in finding in favor of the defendants, the jury
effectively nullified the provisions of the ADA. Chapman contends that the district
court abused its discretion in failing to find that the verdict was contrary to the
great weight of the evidence, see Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
166 F.3d 1317,
1320 (11th Cir. 1999), and asks that we set aside the jury’s determinations that
travel was an essential part of his job and that his termination was not based on a
disability of which his employer knew or should have known.
Title I of the ADA provides that no covered employer shall discriminate
against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual" in any of the "terms, conditions, [or] privileges of employment." 42
13
U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA imposes upon employers the duty to provide
reasonable accommodations for known disabilities unless doing so would result in
undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Morisky v. Broward
County,
80 F.3d 445, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). In order to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination in violation of the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he has a
disability; (2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful
discrimination because of his disability.
Id. A "qualified individual with a
disability" is an "individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Following a nearly two-week trial, the jury found both that travel constituted
an essential function of Chapman’s job as SIR Manager and that his refusal to
engage in business travel was not based on a disability that was known or should
have been known to his employer. R16-185. Significantly, the jury did not reach
the question of whether Chapman was, under the parameters of the ADA, in fact
disabled by his heart condition; we therefore decline to address Chapman’s
contention that the jury nullified the ADA by failing to find that tachycardia
constitutes a disabling chronic condition. Moreover, having reviewed the record of
the trial, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
14
could have found in favor of the defendants on these ADA claims. We recognize
that there was also strong evidence to support the plaintiff’s case, but our task at
this point in the proceedings is not to reweigh the evidence. We note that the
jury’s findings regarding whether travel was an essential function and whether the
defendants knew or should have known about Chapman’s heart problems were
credibility determinations derived from the conflicting testimony of numerous
witnesses. Where the jury’s decision is grounded ultimately in the choice of whose
testimony to credit, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finders.
See Hewitt v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
732 F.2d 1554, 1558-9 (11th Cir. 1984) (“When
the resolution of the case boils down to credibility, the trial judge must allow the
jury to function . . . . The right to trial by jury would be substantially impaired if a
jury’s verdict could be set aside because it is based on evidence that the trial judge
weighed differently.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Chapman’s motion for a new trial on his
ADA claims against all the defendants. See
id. at 1556 (“[N]ew trials should not
be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the
great – not merely the greater – weight of the evidence.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
15
C. Evidentiary ruling
Prior to the lawsuit in this case, an AIG employee prepared a statement for
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as part of that agency’s
conciliation process. In the statement, AIG referred to Chapman’s transfer to the
SIR Manager position as a promotion rather than a lateral move (or, in Chapman’s
view, a demotion). The magistrate judge noted that AIG’s characterization of
Chapman’s transfer had been verified by another AIG employee; that employee,
however, later conceded at a deposition that the transfer was not a promotion at
all.1 See R9-95 at 3 n.3. The magistrate judge expressed concern regarding AIG’s
“falsehood as well as the distasteful, cavalier attitude towards the judicial process.”
Id. Before trial on Chapman’s ADA claims commenced, the defendants sought to
exclude this erroneous statement from evidence on the grounds that the description
of Chapman’s transfer as a “promotion” was merely a mistake and, thus, not
probative of any discriminatory animus. The district court granted the defendants’
request to exclude this information and determined that, “[a]ssuming the truth of
defendants’ contention . . . the admission of the position statement that defendants
filed with the EEOC on plaintiff’s charge of discrimination would be unduly
1
For purposes of this appeal, the defendants do not dispute Chapman’s contention that his
transfer to the SIR Manager job was not a promotion.
16
prejudicial and result in confusion of the issues, particularly in light of the number
of discrimination claims plaintiff made that were resolved at summary judgment.”
R14-151 at 7.
Chapman submits that the exclusion of the defendants’ false representation
regarding the nature of his transfer deprived him of an important basis on which to
challenge the reliability of the defendants’ explanation for its decision to terminate
his employment. Although we exercise a deferential review of the district court’s
judgment on evidentiary matters, see United States v. Gilliard,
133 F.3d 809, 815
(11th Cir. 1998), we fail to discern a reasonable basis for the court’s decision to
exclude this particular piece of evidence. It is unclear why the defendants’
erroneous statement on an EEOC position statement regarding the nature of
Chapman’s transfer would be confusing to a jury; indeed, the jury could infer from
the evidence either that the defendants had made a simple mistake or that the
“mistake” was an indication of mendacity. Though this evidence might have been
somewhat prejudicial to the defendants, neither the defendants nor the district court
has explained adequately why it would have been unduly prejudicial or
unnecessarily confusing to the jury.
Having found that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the
defendants’ EEOC misstatement, we further conclude that this erroneous
17
evidentiary ruling did not undermine the verdict or deprive Chapman of a fair trial
to the extent that a retrial on his ADA claim is warranted. We recognize that the
defendants’ credibility was crucial to the outcome of this case and that the EEOC
misinformation would have been, from Chapman’s perspective, evidence of the
defendants’ lack of credibility.2 Nonetheless, we do not find that this evidence,
standing alone, was so probative of the defendants’ alleged discriminatory animus
that its exclusion from evidence requires that the case be retried. In fact, it is
precisely because the evidence was neither extraordinarily probative nor unduly
prejudicial that the district court should have admitted it at trial.
D. Award of Costs
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the defendants
submitted a bill of costs as the prevailing party. It is undisputed that the affidavit
supporting the request was prepared and signed by an attorney who was not
admitted to practice in Georgia. The district court awarded costs to the defendants,
granting the defendants’ entire request for costs in the amount of $34,504.90, see
2
It is worth noting that, to the extent that Chapman would have availed himself of the
EEOC evidence, this evidence might have been useful to impeach the defendants’ general
integrity but would not have specifically called into question the credibility of the defendants’
assertions that they did not know that Chapman’s refusal to travel was due to a disability or that
travel was an essential function of his job.
18
R16-194. The defendants subsequently submitted an amended bill of costs signed
by an attorney licensed in Georgia. The court reduced the bill to $21,855.25 to
reflect the subtraction of transcription fees that were not necessary to the litigation
of the case. R17-213 at 2. The court expressly declined to consider Chapman’s
financial status in calculating the bill of costs. See
id. at 3.
Chapman contends that (1) the initial bill of costs was invalid because it was
submitted by an attorney not licensed or admitted in Georgia; (2) the second
request for bill of costs was filed after the thirty-day deadline for submitting such a
request; and (3) the district court erred in failing to take into account Chapman’s
financial status before rendering its decision.
We are perplexed and troubled by the unrefuted assertion that the attorney
who submitted the bill of costs, and who had actively participated in this litigation,
had never been admitted pro hac vice in Georgia. Although the relevant local rules
explicitly provide procedures for non-resident attorneys to apply for permission to
appear pro hac vice, see N.D. Ga. Local Rule 83.1(B), the district court appears to
have accepted each submission by the defendants’ several lawyers, whether or not
they had complied with the local rule. Notwithstanding our concern regarding the
defendants’ lack of strict compliance with the local rule on non-resident attorneys,
we can find no case in our circuit (nor does Chapman point us to one) stating that a
19
district court’s decision to accept a pleading filed by an attorney who is not
admitted pro hac vice constitutes, per se, an abuse of discretion. Similarly, we find
no precedent to support Chapman’s contention that an attorney who is not admitted
to practice in the state is not “duly authorized” to file a motion for a bill of costs, as
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1924.
We determine, however, that the district court incorrectly concluded that it
lacked the authority to consider Chapman’s financial status as a factor in
calculating the total costs awarded to the defendants. Our circuit has not
specifically addressed the extent to which a district court may, or must, take into
account a non-prevailing party’s ability to pay before calculating costs in ADA
cases. Although we previously have held that “the only preconditions to an award
of fees is that the party receiving the fee be the ‘prevailing party’ and that the fee
be reasonable,” Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft,
684 F.2d 821,
832 (11th Cir. 1982), we have never stated that a court may not consider other
factors in deciding the amount of costs to award after litigation has ended. Rather,
in an analogous context, we specifically have held that in Title VII cases, “a district
court awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant should consider .
. . as a limiting factor, the plaintiff’s financial resources.” Durrett v. Jenkins
Brickyard, Inc.,
678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. Baker v. Alderman, 158
20
F.3d 516, 529 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] district court must consider financial ability in
the award of sanctions.”). We believe that, as in the Title VII context, the district
court does have the authority to consider the financial resources of a non-
prevailing party as a factor in the amount of costs to award. Because the district
court apparently believed that our prior decisional law precluded consideration of
Chapman’s financial status, we remand this issue for a reconsideration of the
defendants’ request for costs.
CONCLUSION
Chapman asks that we reverse the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of AIGCS on his age discrimination claim, order a new trial on
his disability discrimination claim, and vacate the district court’s decision to award
costs to all of the trial defendants. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we
REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the ADEA
claim and REMAND for further proceedings in light of this opinion. We AFFIRM
the jury’s verdict on Chapman’s ADA claim, but VACATE the district court’s
order on costs and REMAND for reconsideration of this issue.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED for further proceedings.
21
