Harvey (Fire Bird) Gibson v. Bruce Babbitt ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                                         [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    _________________________________________
    AUGUST 21, 2000
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    No. 99-13200
    _________________________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 95-08049-CV-DTKH
    HARVEY (FIRE BIRD) GIBSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BRUCE BABBITT, as Secretary of the United States Department of Interior,
    B.D. OTT, Area Director, as Acting Area Director of the Eastern Area Office
    of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ___________________________________________
    (August 21, 2000)
    Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and SMITH*, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    *
    Honorable Edward S. Smith, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    Harvey (Fire Bird) Gibson applied to the United States Fish and Wildlife
    Service for five bald or golden eagle feathers to use in religious ceremonies. Gibson's
    application was denied because he is not a member of a federally recognized Indian
    tribe, and thus did not qualify for the exemption to the Bald and Golden Eagle
    Protection Act ("BGEPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1994), which provides:
    Whenever, after investigation, the Secretary of the Interior shall
    determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or
    the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession, and transportation of
    specimens thereof for . . . the religious purposes of Indian tribes . . . [the
    Secretary of the Interior] may authorize the taking of such eagles
    pursuant to regulations which he is hereby authorized to prescribe . . .
    Provided further, That bald eagles may not be taken for any purpose
    unless, prior to such taking, a permit to do so is procured from the
    Secretary of the Interior . . . .
    Pursuant to 
    50 C.F.R. § 22.22
    , the exemption to the BGEPA is limited to Indians who
    are members of federally recognized tribes. See 
    id.
     § 22.22(a)(5) (requiring that an
    applicant for a permit "attach a certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is
    federally recognized under the Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994, 25
    U.S.C. 479a-1").
    After the denial of his application, Gibson filed suit in the United States District
    Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that the United States'
    ("Government's") refusal to provide him with eagle feathers violates his rights under
    the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Religious Freedom
    Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ("RFRA"). The district court issued a
    2
    final judgment order holding that the requirement of membership in a federally
    recognized Indian tribe is a permissible agency policy which does not violate the
    RFRA. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 
    72 F. Supp. 2d 1356
     (S.D. Fla. 1999). The district
    court did not directly address the issue whether the requirement violated the Free
    Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Gibson now appeals to this court. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    The test under the RFRA is the compelling interest test, which requires that all
    laws that substantially burden a person's exercise of religion be (1) in furtherance of
    a compelling governmental interest; and (2) the least restrictive means of furthering
    that compelling governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
    The district court found, and the parties do not dispute, that the regulation
    restricting the exemption to members of a federally recognized Indian tribe constitutes
    a substantial burden on Gibson's free exercise of his religion. See Gibson, 
    72 F. Supp. 2d at 1360
    . The trial court then correctly shifted the burden to the Government to
    demonstrate that the regulation was in furtherance of a compelling governmental
    interest, and that the regulation furthers that compelling interest using the least
    restrictive means. See 
    id.
    The Government contended that it had three compelling governmental interests
    that it sought to achieve by requiring an applicant to be a member of a federally
    recognized Indian tribe, consisting of the following: (1) the compelling governmental
    3
    interest that led to the enactment of the BGEPA: the preservation of two endangered
    species of eagles; (2) the preservation of Native American religions; and (3) the
    obligation of the United States to fulfill pre-existing treaty commitments to federally
    recognized Indian tribes. See 
    id.
     The district court reasoned that in light of the
    Constitution's grant of authority in the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, §
    8, cl. 3, the BGEPA's religious purpose clause preserves and protects Native American
    religions, and is a compelling governmental interest. See Gibson, 
    72 F. Supp. 2d at 1360
    . In addition, the district court reasoned that "by providing bald and golden eagle
    parts to federally recognized Indian tribes, the United States . . . is fulfilling a pre-
    existing treaty obligation to the tribes." 
    Id.
     Thus, the district court found "that the
    [Government] has met its burden of establishing compelling governmental interests."
    
    Id. at 1361
    .
    We agree with the district court's finding that the Government has met its
    evidentiary burden of proving that it has a compelling governmental interest in
    fulfilling its treaty obligations with federally recognized Indian tribes. Because we
    have determined that the Government has met its burden of proving at least one
    compelling governmental interest, we need not address the issue whether the
    preservation of Native American religions is a compelling governmental interest, and
    save that discussion for another day. Therefore, the issue on appeal narrows to
    whether the regulation limiting applicants for eagle parts to members of federally
    4
    recognized Indian tribes is the least restrictive means of furthering the United States'
    treaty obligations with the federally recognized Indian tribes.
    The record before us indicates that the demand for eagle parts exceed the
    supply, and applicants for permits who are members of federally recognized Indian
    tribes experience prolonged delays in receiving eagle parts. Further, the record
    indicates, and the district court found, that there is a sizeable pool of individuals who
    are similarly situated to Gibson. See Gibson, 
    72 F. Supp. 2d at 1361
    . Thus, it is clear
    from the record that without the exemption the limited supply of bald and golden
    eagle parts will be distributed to a wider population and the delays will increase in
    providing eagle parts to members of federally recognized Indian Tribes, thereby
    vitiating the governments efforts to fulfill its treaty obligations to federally recognized
    Indian tribes. Therefore, we agree with the district court that the Government has met
    its evidentiary burden of proving that the requirement restricting the exemption to the
    BGEPA to members of a federally recognized Indian tribe is the least restrictive
    means of furthering that compelling governmental interest, and we affirm the district
    court's decision. By the same test, we hold that the membership requirement does not
    violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-13200

Filed Date: 8/21/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014