Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company , 252 F.3d 1165 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                   [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    _______________                                FILED
    U.S.                 COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-12200                       MAY 25, 2001
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    _______________                          CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 01-00701-CV-CAP-1
    SUNTRUST BANK, as Trustee of the
    Stephens Mitchell trusts f.b.o. Eugene
    Muse Mitchell and Joseph Reynolds Mitchell,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ______________________________
    (May 25, 2001)
    Before BIRCH, MARCUS and WOOD*, Circuit Judges.
    *
    Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., U.S. Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    PER CURIAM:
    It is manifest that the entry of a preliminary injunction in this copyright case
    was an abuse of discretion in that it represents an unlawful prior restraint in violation
    of the First Amendment.
    While it falls within the district court’s discretion to grant a preliminary
    injunction, see Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng’g Co., Inc., 
    189 F.3d 840
    , 842 (11th
    Cir. 1999), “[t]he district court does not exercise unbridled discretion.” Canal
    Authority of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 
    489 F.2d 567
    , 572 (5th Cir. 1974); Nnadi v.
    Richter, 
    976 F.2d 682
    , 690 (11th Cir. 1992). Plainly, it must exercise that discretion
    in light of what we have termed the “four prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of
    preliminary injunction.” West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 
    689 F.2d 950
    , 956
    (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Canal Authority, 
    489 F.2d at 572
    .). The prerequisites are:
    (1) that there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) that
    there is a substantial threat plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
    not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened
    harm the injunction may do to the defendant; and (4) that granting the preliminary
    injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos
    Data Corp., 
    115 F.3d 1509
    , 1516 (11th Cir. 1997). We add that a preliminary
    injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the
    2
    movant clearly carries its burden of persuasion on each of these prerequisites. Canal
    Authority, 
    489 F.2d at 573
    .
    After thorough review of the entire record, we have concluded that Appellee
    Sun Trust has failed to make this critical showing, that the district court abused its
    discretion by granting a preliminary injunction, and that its ruling amounts to an
    unlawful prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, we
    VACATE forthwith the preliminary injunction of the district court. A comprehensive
    opinion of the court will follow.
    It is so ORDERED this 25th day of May, 2001.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-12200

Citation Numbers: 252 F.3d 1165, 58 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1800, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10802

Judges: Birch, Marcus, Per Curiam, Wood

Filed Date: 5/25/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024