[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR TH E ELEV ENTH C IRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 09, 2003
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 02-11574
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-10009-CV-SH
TER RY P . MU RPH Y,
STE VEN A. M URP HY, a s co-per sonal
representatives of the Estate of Brendan
M. M urphy, a nd as pa rents and natural
guardia ns of S teven A . Murp hy, Jr., a m inor,
Plaintiffs ,
versus
FLO RIDA KEY S EL ECT RIC C OOP ERA TIVE ASS OCIA TION ,
INC.,
Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-
Coun ter-Def endant- Appe llant,
versus
RAY MOND A SHM AN, I II,
Individ ually and as paren t and natu ral guard ian,
of Raym ond A shman , IV, a m inor child ,
Third-Party-Defendant- Counter-
Claiman t-App ellee,
STE VEN A. M URP HY, S R., et al.,
Third- Party-D efendan ts.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 9, 2003)
Before BIRCH, CARNES and BRUNETTI*, Circuit Judges.
CARNE S, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this appeal is whether the defendant in an admiralty tort1 action
who settles with the plaintiff without obtaining a release from liability for other
potential defendants can then be entitled to contribution from them toward the
amoun t it paid to se ttle its own liability. Pu tting the S uprem e Cour t’s decision in
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U .S. 202 , 114 S . Ct. 146 1 (199 4), togeth er with
our decision in Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc.,
809 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1987),
we con clude tha t a settling d efendan t cannot b ring a su it for con tribution against a
nonsettling defendant who was not released from liability to the plaintiff by the
settlemen t agreem ent.
*
Honorable Melvin Brunetti, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
1
We use the term “admiralty tort” in the first part of this opinion to mean a tort asserted
under a federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Later in the opinion, we use the term “maritime
tort,” which is a species of tort which can be brought under a federal court’s admiralty
jurisdiction, although it need not be.
2
That is the simple bottom line of our decision, and it is a result that makes
good sense, but how our circuit law has gotten to that point is anything but simple.
Instead o f follow ing a straig ht path o ur decisio ns on co ntributio n in adm iralty
cases having lurched back and forth like a drunken sailor. After we set out the
facts and proced ural histo ry, we w ill explain th e propo rtionate sh are appr oach to
apportio ning liab ility amon g joint tor tfeasors a nd wh y contrib ution is n ot availab le
from nonsettling tortfeasors under that approach, and then explain why we
conclude that our Jovovich decision is once again good law. There is also an issue
in this case about the district court’s dismissal of a counterclaim brought under the
supplemental jurisdiction of the court, which we will take care of at the end of the
opinion .
The facts leading up to these legal issues began shortly after midnight on
July 25, 2000, when Raymond Ashman IV and two of his friends went out in a
boat owned by his father, Raymond Ashman III, to enjoy the start of the annual
“Sports men’s L obster M ini-Seas on.” Ra ymond Ashm an IV w as piloting the boat.
His two friends along for the ride were Brendan and Steven Murphy who w ere
brothers. The trio’s trip ended in tragedy soon after it began when the boat
collided with an “electrical pole abutment support structure” owned by Florida
Keys Electric Co-op Association, Inc. Brendan Murphy was thrown from the boat
3
and killed , and his b rother S teven w as injured . Raymond A shman IV w as also
injured.
Brendan and Steven’s parents, the Murphys, sued Florida Keys in federal
district court for the wrongful death of B rendan and for Steven ’s injuries.2 Their
complaint invoked the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The Murphys did not sue any
member of the Ashman family, and still have not done so. In response to the
Murp hy’s com plaint aga inst it, how ever, Flo rida Ke ys filed a th ird-party
complaint against the Ashmans3 which also invo ked the d istrict cour t’s admira lty
jurisdictio n. Florid a Keys c laimed th at, if it were found liable to the Murp hys, it
was entitled to contribution from the Ashmans. The Ashmans, for their part, filed
a counterclaim against Florida Keys to recover for Raymond IV’s injuries, but
they brought that as a civil action under the district court’s supplemental
jurisdictio n, not un der its adm iralty jurisd iction. Th ey later bro ught a se parate su it
against Florida Keys in state court to recover for R aymond IV’s injuries.
2
The Murphys sued as parents and natural guardians of Steven, a minor, and as co-
personal representatives of the estate of Brendan.
3
Florida Keys’ third-party complaint is against Raymond Ashman III, the father of
Raymond Ashman IV, individually, and also in his capacity as parent and natural guardian of his
son. Our references hereafter in this opinion to “the Ashmans” mean Raymond III, individually,
and Raymond IV through him as parent and natural guardian.
4
While all of the actions were pending, Florida Keys settled with the
Murphys. The settlement agreement, however, did not release the Ashmans from
liability to the Murphys, should the Mu rphys ever bring suit against them. As a
result, the A shman s move d for su mmary judgm ent on F lorida K eys’ third p arty
contribution claim, taking the position that Florida Keys’ failure to obtain a release
for them as part of the settlement agreement barred it from seeking contribution
from them. The district court agreed and granted the Ashmans’ motion for
summary judgment. The court also exercised its discretionary powers under
28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3 ) and dismiss ed withou t prejudice the A shman’ counter claim
against Florida Keys. Florida Keys appeals both the grant of summary judgment
on its contribution claim against the Ashmans and the dismissal without prejudice
of their co unterclaim against it. 4
DISCUSSION
4
Of course, parties ordinarily do not complain about the dismissal of a claim or
counterclaim against them, but the dismissal without prejudice allowed the Ashmans to pursue
their claim against Florida Keys in state court. Florida Keys’ apparent motivation in appealing
the dismissal is its preference for a federal court forum.
5
In 1994 the Supreme Court settled decades of debate over the proper method
of appo rtioning liability betw een settling and no nsettling to rtfeasors in admir alty
cases by h olding th at the “pro portion ate share a pproac h” applie s. See McD ermott,
511 U.S. at 217, 114 S. Ct. at 1470. Under the proportionate share approach
adopted in McD ermott, if at least one defendant does not settle with the plaintiff
and the c ase goes to trial, the am ount of damag es and th e percen tage of liab ility
attributable to each tortfeasor is determined at trial, and any nonsettling defendant
is responsible for only the proportion of the total damages attributed to it in the
verdict. Id. at 208-13, 114 S. Ct. at 1465-67. We must decide, under the
proportionate share approach, whether Florida Keys is now entitled to have
determined at trial the actual amount of the Mur phys’ damages and the parties’
relative degrees of fault, all for the purpose of Florida Keys recovering from the
Ashm ans any a moun t that it “over paid” fo r its share o f the dam ages in its
settlement with the Murphys.
Allowing Florida K eys to recover contribution from the A shmans in these
circumstances is incompatible with the proportionate share approach. An essential
tenet of this approach is that when a tortfeasor settles a claim against it, but does
not obta in a release for the o ther tortfe asors, it ha s settled on ly its prop ortionate
share of the total damages, no more and no less. It follows that what remains, and
6
all that remains, to be calculated is the compensation the nonsettling tortfeasors
owe the plaintiff. Once that amount is determined at trial, the nonsettling
tortfeasors are liable only to the plaintiff and only to the extent the trial verdict
determines. Their trial-determined liability is in no way affected by a settling
defend ant’s neg otiated liab ility. See id. at 220, 114 S. Ct. at 1471 (“[O]ne of the
virtues of the proportionate share rule is that, unlike the pro tanto rule, it does not
make a litigating defendant’s liability dependent on the amount of a settlement
negotiate d by oth ers with out rega rd to its inte rests.”).
Applying the propo rtionate share approach to this case, Florida Keys
resolved through the settlement only the amount of damages it owed to the
Murphys. The settlement determined between those two parties the amount of
damag es the M urphys suffered and Flo rida Ke ys’ percen tage of fa ult. Ther e is
nothing about the issue of how much Florida K eys should have paid the M urphys
that is to be litigated between Florida Keys and the Ashmans, because under the
proportionate share approach it does not matter to the Ashmans how much Florida
Keys sh ould ha ve paid th e Mur phys to d ischarge its liability to them. Th at is
Florida Keys’ b usiness, n ot a matter of conc ern for th e Ashm ans.
To come at the same thing an other way, when F lorida Keys and the M urphys
negotiated their settlement, they each assumed the risk of misjudging what a trial
7
would determine to be the amount of damage the Murphys had suffered and the
proportion of the liability for that damage that should be attributed to Florida K eys
instead of the Ashmans. 5 The Ashmans, who were not a party to the settlement
assumed no such risk, preferring instead to risk whatever verdict the Mu rphys
might obtain against them, perhaps discounted by the hope or expectation that the
Murphys would not sue them. If the Murphys got more from settling with Florida
Keys than they would have recovered from taking Florida Keys to trial, that does
not lessen the poten tial liability of th e Ashm ans. See McD ermott, at 219-20, 114 S.
Ct. at 147 1 (“[A]n y excess r ecovery is entirely attr ibutable to the fact tha t the . . .
defend ants may have made an u nwise s ettlement. . . . I t seems to us that a
plaintiff’s good fortune in striking a favorable bargain with one defendant gives
other defendants no claim to pay less than their proportionate share of the total
loss.”). Likewise, if the Murphys got less from Florida Keys than they would have
recover ed by trial, th at does n ot increas e the pote ntial liability o f the As hmans .
See id. at 221, 114 S. Ct. at 1472 (“Just as the other defendants are not entitled to a
5
Because of the multiple factors that must be taken into account when making settlement
decisions, and because predicting the result of trials is not an exact science by any means, the
settlement figure will rarely match what a trial would have determined to be actual damages
owed the plaintiff by the settling defendant. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 219-20, 114 S. Ct. at
1471 (“Because settlement amounts are based on rough estimates of liability, anticipated savings
in litigation costs, and a host of other factors, they will rarely match exactly the amounts a trier
of fact would have set.”); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.,
592 F.2d 1246, 1250 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1979) (“[S]ettlement dollars cannot be equated with dollars obtained in the trial process.”).
8
reduction in liability when the plaintiff negotiates a generous settlement . . . so they
are not required to shoulder disproportionate liability when the plaintiff negotiates
a meager one.”) No suit for contribution will lie against a nonsettling defendant
who is not releas ed from liability, beca use that d efendan t remains liable for its
proportionate share of damages regardless of the terms of the settlement the other
defend ant mad e. Id. at 209, 1 14 S. C t. at 1466 .
There a re two w ays to loo k at wh at Florid a Keys is seeking to do, an d both
are telling. O ne way is that Florida Keys is seeking to escape the bargain it struck
with the Murphys about the extent of its liability, trying to litigate with the
Ashmans the issue of how much it should have paid the Murphys and then recover
from the Ashmans any excess it did pay. That will not do, because the Ashmans
are not responsible for the bargain Florida Keys struck with the Murphys. The
other way to look at Florida Keys’ position is that it is seeking to recover from the
Ashmans the amount of the settlement it paid to the Murphys that is attributable to
the Ash mans’ liab ility. That w ill not do e ither, beca use non e of the se ttlement is
attributab le to the A shman s’ liability, w hich w as not rele ased in w hole or p art. We
hold Florida Keys to its bargain: it paid for a discharge of its liability to the
Murp hys, and that is all it go t.
9
We ha ve reach ed the ide ntical con clusion o nce befo re. See Jovovich v.
Desco Marine, Inc., 809 F .2d 152 9, 1531 (11th C ir. 1987 ) (unde r the pro portion ate
share approach contribution actions are n ot available to settling parties because
“settling pa rties assum e the finality and po tential ben efit and ris k of their
settlement decision, and . . . we will respect the aleatory nature of the settlement
process” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We are bound to follow the Jovovich
decision , see, e.g., United States v. S mith,
201 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“It is the firmly established rule of this Circuit that each succeeding panel is bound
by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of law, unless and until that
holding is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme Court.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), with which w e are in full agreement, anyway.
Florida Keys says that we should not adhere to Jovovich, but should instead
follow the later decision in Great L akes D redge & Dock Co. v. T anker R obert W att
Miller,
957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Great Lakes III”).6 That de cision he ld
that settling defendants may sue nonsettling, unreleased defendants for
contribu tion,
id. at 1584, which is exactly the opposite result from the one reached
6
The Great Lakes litigation has come before this Court four times: Ebanks v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.,
688 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Great Lakes I”); Self v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.,
832 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Great Lakes II”); Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller,
957 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Great Lakes III”);
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller,
92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Great Lakes IV”).
10
five years earlier in Jovovich. A tour of the tor tured pa th of ou r decision s in this
area is necessary to understand wh y Great Lakes III did not follow Jovovich and
why w e do.
Our predecessor circuit first confronted the overarching issue of the proper
way to apportion liability between settling and nonsettling tortfeasors in adm iralty
cases in Loffland Brothers Co. v. Huckabee,
373 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1967), and
Billiot v. Stewart Seacraft, Inc.,
382 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1967). In those two cases
the Fifth Circuit determined that a nonsettling defendant is liable for the entire
amount of the plaintiff’s damages, less a set-off for the amount of the other
tortfeasors’ settlement, regardless of the proportion of the plaintiff’s damages
attributab le to each to rtfeasor. Billiot, 382 F .2d at 66 4; Loffland, 373 F .2d at 52 8.
That m ethod, o f course , is the pro tanto app roach. McD ermott, 511 U.S. at 211-13,
212 n.14, 114 S. Ct. at 1467 & n.14.
Twelve years later, though, the Fifth Circuit overruled Loffland and Billiot
and held that the pr oportio nate shar e appro ach app lied to adm iralty tort cas es.
Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.,
592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979). The
overruling was based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397,
95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975). In Reliable Transfer
11
the Supreme Court had abandoned the “divided damages rule,” which mandated
that the parties at fault in admiralty cases each be liable for an equal portion of the
damages regardless of their degrees of fault. For example, if the plaintiff was 25%
at fault and the defen dant 75 % at fau lt, each w ould ne vertheles s be liable f or half
of the tota l damag es.
Id. at 397,
95 S. Ct. at 1709. In place of the divided damages
approach, the Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer adopted the rule that each
tortfeaso r is respo nsible fo r the pro portion of dam ages attrib utable to it.
Id. at 411,
95 S. C t. at 1715 -16.
The Suprem e Court’s Reliable Transfer decision did not in volve m ultiple
defend ants, one of wh om had settled w ith the plain tiff. Non etheless, the Fifth
Circuit concluded in Leger that the rule adopted in Reliable Transfer undermined
the pro tanto approach the circuit had been following to such a n extent th at it
overruled Loffland and Billiot and adopted the proportionate share approach
instead. Leger,
592 F.2d at 1249 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court seems to have
answered the question by holding that, where the plaintiff and the defendant in a
maritime collision case are both partly responsible for an accident, ‘liability for
such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the
comparative degree of their fault . . . .’”).
12
The proportionate share approach from Leger became part of th e law of this
circuit with this Court’s decision in Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206,
1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (adopting as binding precedent Fifth Circuit decisions issued
prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). In 1987 this Court decided
Jovovich, which confronted the precise issue we face in this case and held that
under the proportionate share approach adopted in Leger a settling defendant
cannot sue a nonsettling defendant whose liability to the plaintiff is not resolved by
the settlement under either an indemnification or contribution theory. The
Jovovich Court r easoned that Leger’s holding that “settling parties assume the
finality and potential benefit and risk of their settlement decision, and whether the
plaintiff o r any of th e defend ants are u ltimately fo und to h ave mad e a favor able
settlement, we will respect the aleatory nature of the settlement process” applies
with equal force in indemnity or con tribution actions. 809 F.2d at 1531. A s a
result, a settling defendant must live with its bargain and cannot sue a nonsettling
one for indemn ity or con tribution . Id.
Shortly after Jovovich was released, however, this Court swerved back the
other way, concluding in Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
832 F.2d 1540
(11th Cir. 1987) (“Great Lakes II”), that the Supreme Court’s decision in
13
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
443 U.S. 256,
99 S. Ct. 2753
(1979), dictated a different result. The Great Lakes II Court held that, given the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Edmonds, the pro tanto approach was actually the
approach that the Supreme Court would apply to apportion liability between
settling and nonsettling defendants, and so that approach should once again be the
law of th is circuit. Great Lakes II, 832 F.2d at 1548 (“As we are bound by the
Supreme Court’s guidance and the rule in Edmonds, we ado pt the [pr o tanto
approa ch].”).
Then came Great Lakes III in 1992 , which held that under th e pro tan to
approach adopted in Great Lakes II, a suit for contribution against a nonsettling,
unreleased defendant is available to a settling defendant, even though under
Jovovich such a su it is not ava ilable und er the pro portion ate share a pproac h. Great
Lakes III, 957 F .2d at 15 83. In so holding , Great Lakes III departed from th e well-
settled law of most jurisdictions that settling defendants may not bring a
contribution action against nonsettling, unreleased defendants, regardless of which
liability-app ortionm ent schem e is in place . McD ermott, 511 U.S. at 211 n.13, 114
S. Ct. at 1467 n.13 (“[T]he law of most jurisdictions [is] that a settling defendant
ordinarily has no right of contribution against other defendants.” (citing Unif.
14
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(d), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975); Unif.
Comparative Fault Act § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 54 (1993 Supp.); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 886A(2) & cmt. f, pp. 337, 339 (1977))).
In 1994 the Supreme Court resolved the issue of how liability between
settling and nonsettling tortfeasors in admiralty cases should be apportioned,
rejecting th e pro tan to appro ach in fav or of the propo rtionate sh are appr oach. See
McD ermott, 511 U.S. at 209-21, 114 S. Ct. at 1466-72. The McD ermott decision
authoritatively settled the dispute between our Leger and Great Lakes II decisions
about w hich app roach th e Supr eme Co urt favo red. It estab lished tha t Great Lakes
II was w rong to conclud e that Leger had been o verruled by th e Suprem e Court’s
decision in Edmonds. We recognized this in our 1996 decision in Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock C o. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller,
92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Great Lakes IV”), which announced our return to the proportionate share
approach in obedience to the S upreme Court’s McD ermott decision.
Id. at 1106.
We also held in Great Lakes IV, again in obedience to McD ermott, that under the
proportionate share approach a nonsettling defendant cannot sue a settling
defend ant for co ntributio n, the con verse of the issue w e face in th is case.
Id. at
1106-07
15
Now this circuit (along with the rest of the country) is operating under the
propo rtionate sh are appr oach in a dmiralty to rt cases, see McD ermott, 511 U.S. at
217, 11 4 S. Ct. a t 1470; Great Lakes IV,
92 F.3d at 1106-07, and sixteen years ago
we decided in the Jovovich case that under the proportionate share approach a
settling de fendan t may no t sue a no nsettling, u nreleased defend ant for co ntributio n.
Jovovich, 809 F .2d at 15 30-32 . It follow s that Jovovich controls, and Florida Keys
may not bring a suit for contribution against the Ashmans. However winding the
path to the present state of the law, once we g et here the equation is as simple as:
McD ermott and Great Lakes IV plus Jovovich equals settling defendants cannot
sue non settling, un released d efendan ts for con tribution in admir alty tort case s.
Great Lakes III is no longer relevant, at least not in admiralty tort cases. It
address ed noth ing othe r than co ntributio n rights u nder a p ro tanto a pproac h to
apportioning liability. The pro tanto approach to apportioning liability is no longer
the law in admiralty tort cases. See Smith v. GTE Corp.,
236 F.3d 1292, 1303 n.11
(11th Cir. 2001) (“Subsequent panels are not bound by prior decisions where there
has been a change in the controlling law as a result of a subsequent en banc or
Supreme Court decision or statutory change.”). The question Great Lakes III
answered is no longer the question that arises in admiralty tort cases since the
Supreme Co urt’s McD ermott decision .
16
Florida Keys says that the conclusion we reach will present parties who
wish to settle with a Catch 22: either obtain a release for all parties and have
contribution precluded by McD ermott’s rule barring contribution from settling
parties, 511 U.S. at 209, 114 S. Ct. at 1466, or do not obtain a release and have
contribution precluded by our holding in Jovovich and this c ase. Tha t specter is
based on a misreading of McD ermott. That decision’s prohibition against
contribu tion from a settling p arty does no t preclud e a contrib ution su it against a
tortfeasor who is released by the settlement even thou gh not a party to it. A release
is not the s ame as a s ettlement, a nd a relea sed party is not a settlin g party w ithin
the meaning of McD ermott, which does not purport to eliminate altogether the
“well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors.”
Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Frizt Kopke, Inc.,
417 U.S. 106, 113,
94 S. Ct. 2174,
2178 (1974). Neither does our holding today. In any event, dilemma or no, we are
bound to follow the McD ermott/Great Lakes IV/Jovovich decision s.
One other issue remains to be decided. In addition to granting summary
judgment in favor of the Ashmans on Florida Keys’ contribution claim, the district
court dismissed without prejudice the A shmans’ counterclaim against Florida K eys
under 28 U.S .C. § 1367(c). That suited the A shmans fine, but Florida K eys,
apparently preferring to stay in federal court, argues that the Ashm ans’
17
counterclaim c ould only h ave been pr operly asserted u nder the district co urt’s
admiralty jurisdiction, not its supplemental jurisdiction, and therefore dismissal
under § 1367(c) w as an abuse of discretion. We d isagree with the initial premise
of that arg ument.
The Ashmans originally could have brought their maritime tort claim against
Florida Keys in one of two ways. They could have sued in state court, a right
guaranteed them by the “savings to suitors” clause of
28 U.S.C. § 1333, or they
could h ave sued in federa l court by invokin g the distr ict court’s a dmiralty
jurisdiction.7 See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co.,
605 F.2d
1340, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979). Once Florida Keys filed a third-party complaint
against the Ashmans in federal court, however, their maritime tort claim became a
compu lsory cou nterclaim under F ederal R ule of C ivil Proc edure 1 3(a), bec ause it
arose from the same transaction or occurrence, the boating accident, as Florida
Keys’ third-party complaint against the Ashmans for contribution. A maritime tort
claim ma y be asser ted in fed eral cour t withou t invokin g the cou rt’s admir alty
jurisdictio n if the claim falls with in the cou rt’s supp lemental ju risdiction . See
7
There was no diversity of citizenship between the Ashmans and Florida Keys, so the
Ashmans could not have brought their maritime tort claim as a civil action in federal court under
the “savings to suitors” clause. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co.,
605 F.2d
1340, 1344 (5th Cir. 1979).
18
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 380-81,
79 S. Ct. 468, 484-
85 (1959) (holding that the district court had pendant jurisdiction to consider
maintenance and cure claims brought “by a complaint at law rather than by a libel
in admiralty” because the complaint also alleged a Jones Act violation, which was
within the district court’s jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331). The Ashmans w ere
thus not required to b ring their maritim e tort claim und er the district court’s
admiralty jurisdiction because as a compulsory counterclaim their maritime tort
claim was within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S .C. §
1367; Marine Trasp. Servs. Sea-Barge Group, Inc. v. Python High Performance
Marine Corp.,
16 F.3d 1133, 1139 (11th Cir. 1994), and therefore could have been
asserted as a civil action under the “savings to suitors” clause instead of as an
admiralty claim, see Romero,
358 U.S. at 380-81,
79 S. Ct. at 484-85.
Florida Keys th ird-party compla int agains t the Ash mans th us left them with
two op tions for federal co urt jurisd iction ov er their claim against F lorida K eys.
They could invoke the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction, or they could bring
their maritime tort claim as a civil action under the district court’s supplemental
jurisdiction as a compulsory counterclaim. If a claim has multiple jurisdictional
bases, one of which is admiralty, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) provides
that the pleading “may contain a statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or
19
maritime claim.” F ailure to id entify a claim as an adm iralty or m aritime claim in
these circu mstance s means that it is not o ne. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h), advisory
committee notes (noting that the unification of admiralty and civil actions
necessitate d a proc edural m echanism to preser ve the “po wer of the plead er to
determin e wheth er these h istorically m aritime pr ocedur es shall be applicab le to his
claim or not; the pleader must be afforded some means of designating his claim”);
Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
515 F.2d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting
that the plaintiff “could have obtained a jury trial on all claims simply by omitting
or withdrawing the 9(h) designation in his complaint and bringing his entire suit as
a civil action ”); Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co.,
467 F.2d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1972)
(noting that “this action began at law, because it was filed without a statement
identifyin g the claim as an adm iralty claim, a s provid ed by R ule 9(h) ”). The
Ashma ns did not inc lude a statemen t in their pleading in voking the district court’s
admiralty jurisdiction. Therefore, their maritime tort claim was brought as a civil
action under the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Once the district court
granted summary judgment on Florida Keys’ contribution claim it had the
discretion to dism iss the Ashm ans’ counter claim. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). There
was no abuse o f discretio n.
AFFIRMED.
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