Jeremy Bowman v. Ronald Coddington , 517 F. App'x 683 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-14798 Date Filed: 04/18/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14798
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-01416-SCB-TBM
JEREMY BOWMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RONALD CODDINGTON,
Individual,
FLORIDA PIPELINING SOLUTIONS, LLC,
a Florida limited liability company,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 18, 2013)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-14798 Date Filed: 04/18/2013 Page: 2 of 4
Jeremy Bowman appeals the dismissal of his suit for declaratory relief
against Ronald Coddington and Florida Pipelining Solutions, LLC, (“FPS”). The
basis for the dismissal was the district court’s conclusion that Bowman improperly
split his causes of action by seeking declaratory relief in federal court while
maintaining suit in Florida state court against the same defendants based on the
same underlying facts and issues. Bowman contends that the Florida rule against
splitting causes of action should not preclude his federal suit because he seeks a
different form of relief and his suit in federal court is really against a different
party. Because we find that the rule against splitting causes of action precludes
Bowman’s suit, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.
Bowman, a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Coddington, a citizen of Florida,
were business partners, each with fifty percent ownership of a company called US
Sewer & Drain Florida, LLC (“USSD”). Following a dispute between the two
owners, Bowman sued Coddington in Florida state court on various state law
grounds relating to Coddington’s alleged inappropriate management of the
business and misuse of funds. A month after Bowman filed suit in state court,
Coddington incorporated a new company, FPS, which he now operates out of the
same location from which he operated USSD, and uses the same employees,
equipment, telephone numbers, and website that he used when operating USSD.
2
Case: 12-14798 Date Filed: 04/18/2013 Page: 3 of 4
Bowman then filed this suit seeking a declaration that FPS is a mere continuation
or alter ego of USSD, and that Bowman is a fifty percent owner of FPS. The
district court granted Coddington and FPS’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the suit was precluded by the Florida rule that “[a]ll damages sustained or accruing
to one as a result of a single wrongful act must be claimed or recovered in one
action or not at all.” Mims v. Reid, 98 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1957) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Whether a case was properly dismissed is a question of law which we review
de novo. Nolen v. Jackson, 102 F.3d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1997). “The rule
against splitting causes of actions is designed to prevent a multiplicity of suits.”
Brody Constr., Inc. v. Fabri-Built Structures, Inc., 322 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th DCA
1972). “The law presumes that a single cause of action can be tried and
determined in one suit, and will not permit the plaintiff to maintain more than one
action against the same party for the same cause,” and “if the first suit is effective
and available, and affords ample remedy to the plaintiff, the second suit is
unnecessary . . . .” Mims, 98 So. 2d at 501.
Here, the two suits plainly arise out of the same “wrongful acts.” In the
State Court action Bowman alleged he was a 50% owner of USSD. Bowman
sought to dissolve USSD and sought damages from USSD and Coddington for
3
Case: 12-14798 Date Filed: 04/18/2013 Page: 4 of 4
actions involving the management of USSD. In the federal suit, Bowman seeks to
impose successor corporate liability on FPS by claiming FPS was a continuation of
or alter ego of USSD. Bowman specifically asserted that FPS was USSD. Despite
Bowman’s claim to the contrary, Coddington’s additional action in incorporating a
new company, taken since the filing of the state suit, does not render this a new
dispute for the purposes of the rule against splitting causes of action. Similarly,
although FSP and USSD are different party defendants in name, it is Bowman
himself who urges that, in fact, FSP and USSD are the same entity. At most,
Bowman seeks a different remedy in each court, however, he has not explained
why he cannot obtain the declaratory relief he seeks in federal court in the
previously filed state court action. Furthermore, should Bowman ultimately prove
successful in his state court suit against USSD, nothing would preclude him from
then asserting his claim that FSP is the alter ego of USSD in post judgment
proceedings. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Fla., Inc.,
832 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“Under the mere continuation theory, liability
is imposed when the successor corporation is merely a continuation or
reincarnation of the predecessor under a different name.”).
For the forgoing reasons, the district court’s dismissal of Bowman’s suit is
AFFIRMED.
4