Lindley v. Cisneros , 74 F.3d 1076 ( 1996 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-2257
D. C. Docket No. 89-195-CIV-T-15B
GERTRUDE LINDLEY, JULIA DOLCE, F. J. BURR,
BERNADEEN L. BURR, EVE MONTALDO, MARY RIEDEL,
PAUL RIEDEL, LORENCE TIERNEY, WILLIAM TIERNEY,
EVA HARM, MARGUERITTE MITCHELL MANN, LASSIE
MAYHUE MEYER, RALPH MEYER, EUBERT F. TAFFERT,
IRENE ELBERT, GERALD PURDY, DORIS PURDY,
JUNE KNISTOFT, EDWARD KNISTOFT, MSGR. ROBICHAUD,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Dora
Wade; JANICE OLESON, Personal Representative
of the estate of Edna Bromhed; GEORGE OLMSTED,
Personal Representative of the estate of Thelma
Olmsted,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
HENRY CISNEROS and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
(January 25, 1996)
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DYER and GARTH*, Senior Circuit
Judges.
*Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the
Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants are former tenants in a multi-story apartment
building known as the Mandalay Shores Apartments located in
Clearwater, Florida. At the time appellants were tenants, the
apartment building was owned by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"); each appellant occupied
his or her apartment under a lease with HUD. In this action
appellants seek to recover money damages under both Florida
landlord-tenant law and their leases for HUD's failure, despite
their pleas, properly to maintain the apartment building and
their respective units.
Tenants of the same apartment complex similarly brought suit
in Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1986), also seeking
to recover damages under Florida landlord-tenant law and their
leases. They claimed that, while HUD was their landlord, the
apartment building was "infested with a wide array of vermin and
that the ceiling tiles were crumbling and spewing asbestos
whenever the roof leaked or the air conditioning was operated.
[In addition, they claimed that] HUD failed to make reasonable
provisions for running water and failed to maintain the project's
elevators, plumbing, roof and common areas. [They sought]
redress, including equitable restitution of rent paid while HUD
. . . maintained the project in substandard conditions." Id. at
1554.
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While Mann was pending in the district court, the Mandalay
Shores Cooperative Housing Association (the "Association"), which
had been a tenant in the building, brought suit to obtain the
same relief as the Mann plaintiffs. Its case and Mann were
consolidated. Thereafter, in an effort to obtain in a single
adjudication relief for all of the building's former tenants, the
plaintiffs in the consolidated cases sought class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The district judge
presiding over the cases refused to certify a class, however,
because the causes of action of the individual plaintiffs were
not identical; the plaintiffs had separate leases and the facts
underpinning their claims were not likely to be common.
Moreover, HUD and the Secretary opposed the idea of a mass
adjudication of the tenants' claims.
In an effort to have the claims of all of the former tenants
resolved in the consolidated cases, the Association obtained
assignments from the tenants, the appellants here, and then moved
the court for leave to amend its complaint to bring the assigned
claims. HUD and the Secretary opposed the motion, claiming that
the assignments were invalid, and that consequently the
Association could not represent the assignors. The court denied
the Association's motion, concluding that allowing the
Association to proceed as the tenants' representative would not
promote the economic and speedy disposition of the controversy.
The adjudication of appellants' claims would be left to another
day. While the consolidated suit (of the Association and the
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Mann plaintiffs) was pending, appellants brought the instant
suit.
HUD and the Secretary prevailed in the consolidated case and
then moved for summary judgment in the instant case, contending
that the doctrine of res judicata foreclosed appellants' causes
of action. Appellants opposed the motion. They argued that the
defendants, having urged the court to reject the Association's
effort to litigate appellants' claims in the consolidated cases
and to defer consideration of these claims to another day, should
stand by their word. Common decency, if not fundamental due
process, they claimed, required that they be given their day in
court.
The district court, while acknowledging the merits of
appellants' fairness argument, rejected their plea and granted
the defendants summary judgment. We reverse, and direct the
court to reinstate appellants' claims.
Res judicata does not bar a claim unless the parties to both
actions--here, appellants and either the Mann plaintiffs or the
Association (or both)--are identical or are in privity with one
another. See Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d
1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 1991). The parties are not identical; nor
are they in privity with one another. HUD and the Secretary
argue that appellants were virtually represented in the prior
litigation by the Association. For a number of years, they point
out, the tenants, including appellants, had voluntarily aligned
themselves with and supported the goals of the Association. That
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may well be so, but such an alignment does not alter the fact
that appellants' claims are based on their individual leases,
that they assert discrete breaches on HUD's part, and that they
assert separate injuries. After all, this is why HUD and the
Secretary opposed class certification in Mann, and this is why
the district court denied class certification.
As the district court stated when it rejected the
Association's attempt to litigate appellants' claims as
appellants' assignee: appellants will have their day in court--
later. That time is now. The judgment of the district court is
accordingly VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
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