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PROPST, Senior District Judge, specially concurring:
I join the court’s opinion on petition for rehearing. I
write separately to address broader issues relating to qualified
immunity.
At a recent Eleventh Circuit Judges’ Workshop, a speaker
remarked that “Keeping up with qualified immunity law is a full-
time job.” As a trial judge, I can well see how one might reach
that conclusion. I concur in the denial of rehearing as to
federal qualified immunity asserted by the defendants in their
individual capacities. In doing so, I humbly make some
suggestions which may reduce the workload of the followers of
this still developing law. Although I, as a trial judge, granted
qualified immunity to the two individual defendants in Jenkins v.
Talladega City Board of Education,
95 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 1996)
, and later concurred in the denial of qualified immunity in this
case, I submit that there is no inconsistency.1
Our holding in this case is premised on the holding in Bell
v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979). Bell clearly holds that “under
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”
Id., 441 U.S. at 535. Having held that punishment of pretrial
1
Ironically, the majority in Jenkins partially relied upon
this case in arriving at its holding. That opinion has now been
vacated because of the granting of an en banc rehearing by the
court.
1
detainees violates the Due Process Clause, the Court proceeded to
determine what factors are considered in determining whether
conduct constitutes “punishment.”
The Court, after stating that factors identified in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), “[provide]
useful guideposts in determining whether particular restrictions
and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to
punishment in the constitutional sense of that word,” concluded
that, “A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for
the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of
some other legitimate governmental purpose. . . . Absent a
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials, that determination will generally turn ‘on
whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
[to it].’ Kennedy v. Mendoza
Martinez, supra, at 168-69. . . .”
(emphasis added).
Id., 441 U.S. at 538. The Court added,
Thus, if a particular condition or restriction is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to
‘punishment.’ Conversely, if a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal -- if it is arbitrary or purposeless -- a court
may infer that the purpose of the governmental action
is punishment that may not constitutionally be
2
inflicted upon detainees qua detainees (emphasis
added).
Id., 441 U.S. at 539.
Whether discussed in the context of “expressed intent” to
punish, or in the context of determining the existence of a
legitimate governmental goal, the purpose of the conduct is
significant, and the purpose may be inferred from the total
evidence. Both purpose and intent are fact related and it is
difficult for me to see how such issues can be determined as a
matter of law; particularly when the claim is that it was
necessary to place a pretrial detainee on death row in order to
protect him. Such is the issue in this case.2
On the other hand,
Jenkins, supra, is not a case involving
the Due Process Clause nor the subjective intent or purpose of
the alleged violators. The Jenkins claims are Fourth Amendment
claims which are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
“objective reasonableness” standard rather than under a
subjective due process standard. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S.
386 (1989). While the Bell Due Process Clause analysis requires,
as an essential element, proof of expressed intent or at least
circumstantial evidence of an unlawful purpose, the Fourth
2
In this case, the underlying issue is intentional or
purposeful punishment, vel non. The means of punishment, if it
occurred, would appear to be incidental. While perhaps not
raised by the plaintiff as a Fifth Amendment claim, one could
argue that the purpose of the death row placement was to induce a
confession. I will leave it to others to determine if a Fifth
Amendment inquiry is purely objective.
3
Amendment analysis does not require any inquiry into subjective
state of mind or purpose.
Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at 398.
Having noted this distinction, I further suggest that the
holding in Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ.,
28 F.3d 1146, 1150
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), that “Courts must not permit
plaintiffs to discharge their burden by referring to general
rules and to the violation of ‘abstract rights,’” is more easily
applied in cases, such as Fourth Amendment cases, where the
underlying inquiry is one of objective reasonableness. I thus
distinguish the facts and issues of this case from those in
Jenkins. In Jenkins the issue is whether reasonable officials
would know that their conduct was objectively unreasonable.3
Such inquiries require more than an abstract consideration of
Fourth Amendment law. If the inquiry in Jenkins had involved an
element of intent or purpose, the intent or purpose, not the
specific conduct, may have been the appropriate issue to focus
upon if the inappropriateness of such intent or purpose had been
3
See Foy v. Holston,
94 F.3d 1528 where the Court stated:
To prevail on a claim about family privacy, parents
need to prove that a state actor interfered with a
protected liberty interest without sufficient
justification. This constitutional tort requires no
element of intent. . . . Violations of the right to
family association are determined by a balancing of
competing interests. . . so, state officials who act
to investigate or to protect children where there are
allegations of abuse almost never act within the
contours of “clearly established law.”
The Jenkins majority would apparently require the defendants, in
the acknowledged absence of clearly established Eleventh Circuit
law, to, by inductive consideration of a factually distinct
Supreme Court case and one Associate Justice’s dicta, decide what
the Eleventh Circuit would likely hold.
4
clearly established. The Jenkins majority relied upon a Supreme
Court case which states that searches must be reasonable under
the circumstances.4 This is little more direction than the
insight that the Fourth Amendment itself provides.5 Apparently,
the Jenkins majority would hold that public officials must
determine whether a controlling appellate court will determine
that certain conduct is egregious enough to qualify as being
unreasonable even though none has specifically so held.
Perhaps no case provides a better example of the requirement
of prior concrete law in Fourth Amendment cases that does Wright
v. Whiddon,
951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1992). Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985) clearly established that the use of deadly
force to apprehend a fleeing, non-dangerous felony suspect is a
constitutionally unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.6 Garner was decided six months before the incident in
Wright. In Wright, a person who had been arrested on a charge of
armed robbery and had confessed to the crime ran from a
courthouse while awaiting a probation revocation hearing. The
escapee was admittedly unarmed, but was fatally wounded as he ran
down an alley. The court held that Garner did not clearly
establish that deadly force cannot be used against a fleeing,
4
"[w]hether there was a reasonable relationship between the
scope of the search (the measures adopted and the objectives of
the search”).
5
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable search and seizures. . . .”
6
See also Acoff v. Abston,
762 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1985).
5
previously arrested, non-dangerous felon. Thus, the police
officer who shot the fleeing felon was entitled to qualified
immunity.7
Since this case, unlike Jenkins and Wright, implicates
subjective intent or motive, the issue remains as to how such
intent claims are to be considered during the course of a
qualified immunity analysis. In Ratliff v. DeKalb County, Ga.,
62 F.3d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1995), the court stated, “We are
bound by our earlier holding that, in qualified immunity cases,
intent is a relevant inquiry if discriminatory intent is a
specific element of the constitutional tort; and, we follow that
rule here.” Compare, however, Hansen v. Solden-Wagner,
19 F.3d
573, 578 (11th Cir. 1994)(“For qualified immunity purposes, the
subjective motivation of the defendant official is immaterial
. . . Harlow’s objective standard would be rendered meaningless
if a plaintiff could overcome a summary judgment motion based on
qualified immunity by injecting the defendant’s state of mind
into the pleadings.”)8
7
Of interest as it relates to the facts of this case is the
following dictum in Wright: “At a minimum, ‘[i]t is clear . . .
that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the
use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.’ Graham [v.
Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985)], 109 S. Ct. at 1871 n. 10.” This
dictum clearly distinguishes the appropriate analysis here from
that in Jenkins.
8
This holding was made in even a First Amendment case where
an element of the Mt. Healthy analysis includes a determination
of whether the defendant’s conduct was substantially motivated by
a consideration of the plaintiff’s protected speech. See Mt.
Healthy v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1979). Compare Hansen’s holding
to that in Fikes v. City of Daphne,
79 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.
1996).
6
In the recent case of Foy v. Holston,
cited supra, the court
attempted to strike a balance in cases in which intent is an
element of the underlying claim. The court in Foy stated,
One trigger to the doctrine’s application depends upon
whether the record establishes that the defendant, in
fact, did possess a substantial lawful motive for
acting as he did act. At least when an adequate lawful
motive is present, that a discriminatory motive might
also exist does not sweep qualified immunity from the
field even at the summary judgment stage. Unless it,
as a legal matter, is plain under the specific facts
and circumstances of the case that the defendant’s
conduct--despite his having adequate lawful reasons to
support the act--was the result of his unlawful motive,
the defendant is entitled to immunity. Where the facts
assumed for summary judgment purposes in a case
involving qualified immunity show mixed motives (lawful
and unlawful motivations) and pre-existing law does not
dictate that the merits of the case must be decided in
plaintiff’s favor, the defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In note 9, the court added:
We know that matters of intent are often jury
questions. But, even at summary judgment,
“where the defendant’s justification evidence
completely overcomes any inference to be
drawn from the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff the [] court may properly
acknowledge that fact. . . .” Young v.
General Foods Corp.,
840 F.2d 825, 830 (11th
Cir. 1988)(quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals
Co.,
821 F.2d 590, 597 (11th Cir.
1987)). . . . Here the record, in fact,
shows substantial lawful intent, while not
ruling out some unlawful intent, too. Unlike
McMillian and Ratliff (which involved pointed
district court fact findings--that we did not
review--about the intent of the defendants
and in which the Mt. Healthy doctrine was not
discussed), we are deciding the qualified
immunity question based on circumstances
which include indisputable and sufficient
lawful motivations on the part of
Defendants.”.
7
Crawford, El v. Britton,
93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en
banc), proposes another solution, in cases involving the intent
or motive of public officials, to preserving the holding in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982) that requires some
protection to such officials from the costs of lawsuits that
unduly chill their exercise of discretion in the performance of
their public duties. The apparent majority of the court held that
when motive or intent is an essential element of a constitutional
tort claim, the plaintiff, in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, has to present clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant acted with an
unconstitutional motive. The court split with regard to the
amount of discovery to be allowed to plaintiffs on the intent or
motive issue before the trial court rules on such motions. While
the number of concurring opinions makes it difficult to ascertain
the holdings of the court, at least one commentator has stated
that while Judge Williams’ “opinion for the court” adopted the
clear and convincing standard, Judge Ginsburg’s opinion prevailed
as to the amount of discovery allowed. Judge Ginsburg wrote that
“a plaintiff [should be allowed] to pursue limited discovery only
upon a showing that he has a reasonable likelihood of turning up
evidence that a jury could consider clear and convincing proof of
the defendant’s unconstitutional motive. . . .” It appears that
Judge Silberman apparently stood alone in his view that there
should be only an objective inquiry into the pretext of an
8
asserted legitimate motive. Judge Silberman would apparently
hold that if a defendant articulates any reasonable motive for
his actions, he is entitled to summary judgment unless a jury
might find that such a suggested motive, whether true or false,
would be unreasonable. Apparently a jury would not be allowed to
determine the true motive. Judge Silberman’s view is close to
the holding in Foy.
In note 5 of Foy, the court remarked on the difference
between constitutional torts which require proof of intent or
motive and those that don’t. The court stated:
But, many constitutional torts do not require
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
possessed discriminatory intent in acting.
For qualified immunity in such cases, no
court doubts that Harlow’s test of objective
reasonableness applies: The subjective intent
of the government actor is unimportant to the
resolution of the qualified immunity issue.
The sole question is whether any reasonable
official (regardless of subjective motive)
could have acted as the defendant acted
without violating clearly established law.
Jenkins involves the type case discussed in note 5 in Foy. Our
instant case does implicate the subjective intent of the
defendant. An issue is whether claims involving subjective
intent are appropriate for summary judgment based upon qualified
immunity if a legitimate motive is simply posited. I find it
difficult to see how such cases can be determined at the summary
judgment stage if there is any substantial evidence of an illegal
motive in view of the established law which precludes a trial
court’s making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence,
and interfering with a jury’s drawing of legitimate inferences
9
from the evidence. See Welch v. Celotex Corp.,
951 F.2d 1235,
1237 (11th Cir. 1992).
I fully agree with the concerns expressed by various judges
about the exponential growth of such claims against public
officials.9 I am simply concerned that the rules be “clearly
established” so that neither parties nor trial courts will have
to continue to play panel roulette and can avoid unnecessary and
costly appeals. For an indication of the difficulty facing trial
courts, compare the holding in
Foy, supra, with that in
Ratliff,
supra, and the vacated Jenkins majority opinion with the opinion
in Wright. Also consider the above quoted statement in Hansen.
While our holding in this case appears to be consistent with that
in Ratliff, it may be somewhat inconsistent with that in Foy,
although Foy purports to distinguish our holding.
I suggest that the qualified immunity issues cry out for
further en banc consideration, especially as to the claims
involving intent or motive as an element vis a vis those which do
not.10
9
See Judge Silberman’s opinion in
Crawford-El, supra, for a
historical and statistical analysis.
10
Crawford-El, supra, recognizes that trial courts are
caught in a “vortex of changing standards.”
10
