Powell v. State of Florida , 132 F.3d 677 ( 1998 )

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 96-5119
_____________
D. C. Docket No. 95-6233-Civ-WJZ
JAMES E. POWELL, on behalf of
himself and all others present
and former employees similarly
situated, RUSSELL R. SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA, LAWTON CHILES,
Governor, WILLIAM LINDER, Secretary,
Secretary of the Department of
Management Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
____________
(January 9, 1998)
Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff, James E. Powell, attempting to bring a class action, sued the
State of Florida for back wages for overtime work and for injunctive enforcement
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). He alleges that
he and his alleged class members were misclassified as “excluded” employees for
the purpose of not paying overtime wages for overtime hours that they worked.
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The district court properly dismissed the claim for unpaid overtime wages
based on the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). See Quillin v.
Oregon, Nos. 96-35790, 96-35777, 1997 WL 644043 at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 1997);
Close v. New York, No. 1248, Docket 96-9252, 1997 WL 540848 at *4 (2d Cir. Sept.
4, 1997); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1997); Aaron v. Kansas, 115
F.3d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 1997); Raper v. Iowa;, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir.
1997); Balgowan v. New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1997); Moad v.
Arkansas State Police Dep’t, 111 F.3d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v.
Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1996), reh’g denied and amended by 107 F.3d
358 (6th Cir. 1997). Compare Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833,
838-40 (6th Cir. 1997) (no Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under
the Equal Pay Act because that Act could have been passed pursuant to Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment powers).
The district court properly held that the right to bring an action for
injunctive relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act rests exclusively with the
United States Secretary of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a), 216(b) (1994); Reorg.
Plan No. 6 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3174, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1469 (1994).
Although this Court has not yet addressed the issue, we follow the decisions of
the other circuits which have held that the plain language of the Act provides
that the Secretary of Labor has the exclusive right to bring an action for
injunctive relief. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 750 F.2d 47,
51 (1984 ) (“only the Secretary is vested with the authority to seek an
injunction”); Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 688 (6th Cir. 1976), rev’d on
other grounds, 435 U.S. 911 (1978) (“[I]ndividuals are limited to seeking legal
remedies and are precluded from obtaining injunctive relief.”); Powell v.
Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (“In so far as
plaintiff’s prayer relates to action by the Secretary to restrain violations, the
answer is that the appeal is to his discretion.”); Roberg v. Phipps Estate, 156
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F.2d 958, 963 (2d Cir. 1946) (“[T]he Administrator has exclusive authority to
bring such an [injunction] action.”); Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37,
39 (3d Cir. 1943) (“We think it is plain from this language that the right of the
administrator to bring an action for injunctive relief is an exclusive right.”).
With this decision, it is apparent that the argument that alleged class
members should have been given opt-in notification is moot.
AFFIRMED.
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