Southern Card v Lawson Mardon Label , 138 F.3d 869 ( 1998 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________________
No. 96-3682
________________________________
D.C. Docket No. 95-130-CIV-ORL-22
SOUTHERN CARD & NOVELTY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LAWSON MARDON LABEL, INC. d.b.a.
Lawson Mardon Post Card, and
DANIEL J. SAUNDERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________________________________________________
(April 7, 1998)
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
HATCHETT, Chief Judge:
The appellant, Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. (Southern Card), a postcard
distributor, challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the appellees,
Lawson Mardon Label, Inc. (Lawson), a manufacturer of postcards and related products,
and Daniel Saunders, the vice-president in charge of Lawson’s postcard business, on its
federal and state antitrust tying claims. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Lawson manufactures postcards and sells them to distributors throughout North
America.1 Those distributors then sell the postcards to retail outlets, which in turn sell
them to consumers. Over a decade ago, Lawson’s predecessor-in-interest, H.S. Crocker
Company, Inc. (H.S. Crocker), secured a license agreement with the Walt Disney
Company (Disney Company) that permits Lawson to manufacture postcards bearing the
copyrighted images of Disney characters such as Mickey Mouse. Although the license
agreement is “non-exclusive,” the Disney Company has not granted similar rights to any
other postcard manufacturer. Thus, Lawson is the sole producer of postcards bearing
Disney images. Lawson also makes “local view” postcards, i.e., postcards depicting non-
licensed local images. In Florida, these postcards might present, for example, pictures of
beaches, palm trees or alligators. Local view postcards comprise over ninety percent of
Lawson’s total postcard production and accounted for over sixty percent of its sales in
Florida in 1995. The parties do not dispute that at least six other postcard manufacturers
produce postcards specific to areas in Florida.
1
Lawson has about an eleven percent market share of the North American
postcard business.
Southern Card, located in Daytona Beach, distributes postcards to retailers --
primarily “chain stores” -- situated in central and northern Florida. Southern Card
purchases its postcards from large commercial printers such as Lawson, and acts as a rack
jobber in the stores it services.2 From 1986 -- the year Southern Card commenced
business dealings with H.S. Crocker -- to 1991, Southern Card retained complete control
over the quantity and types of postcards that it purchased from the manufacturer.3 During
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Southern Card bought a percentage of its local view
postcard stock from Lawson’s competitors, finding their products superior in terms of
price and quality.4
2
Southern Card asserts that “[t]here are approximately eight main line independent
postcard distributors in the state of Florida.”
3
It may well be that in the mid-to-late 1980s, Southern Card and Lawson entered
into an informal arrangement whereby Southern Card acted as Lawson’s exclusive vendor
to chain stores in exchange for Lawson’s promise not to sell Disney postcards to Southern
Card’s competitors. On November 22, 1989, John Nyberg, Southern Card’s president,
wrote to the chairman of the board of H.S. Crocker, detailing the “history of the
relationship” between the two companies. Nyberg wrote that he had “wanted exclusivity
on all H.S. Crocker postcard products, including all Walt Disney World items within
[Southern Card’s] territorial area,” and that “[w]ith the understanding that H.S. Crocker
would not manufacture for, or sell to any other distributor in the territory serviced by
Southern Card & Novelty, our companies began to do business.” Nyberg also
acknowledged the existence of this arrangement when deposed on April 18, 1996, stating,
“So de facto, I became -- Southern Card & Novelty became the exclusive vendor to the
chain stores. Although there was never any such agreement made between myself and
Lawson Mardon, it had indeed evolved that way.” However, in an affidavit dated July
30, 1996, Nyberg averred that while the parties had entered into an exclusivity agreement
concerning retailers in Daytona Beach, they “had no territorial exclusive agreement for
Orlando.” For purposes of this appeal, we accept this assertion as true.
4
About seventy percent of Southern Card’s revenue is attributable to its sale of
local view postcards.
3
In late 1991, Lawson introduced a “Disney Product Plan” in Florida. In a letter
dated December 12, 1991, Saunders put forth the terms of the agreement he hoped to
reach with Southern Card pursuant to this plan:
d) Distributor will purchase Local View and General Florida post cards and
allied products from [Lawson] equal to his purchases from [Lawson] of
Disney products. [For example,] if distributor purchases $100,000 in 1992
of Disney product from [Lawson], distributor agrees to purchase a
minimum of $100,000 in 1992 of Local View or General Florida product
from [Lawson].
e) Failure to meet the minimum requirement agreed to in d) above, may
result in [Lawson’s] decision to not sell any product to distributor in
following year.
Because Southern Card feared losing its lone source of Disney postcards, it began buying
Lawson’s local view postcards in amounts equal to its purchases of Disney postcards.
In October 1993, Saunders wrote to Nyberg expressing his concern that Southern
Card continued to buy a significant quantity of postcards from Lawson’s competitors.
The next month, Saunders wrote to Nyberg asking that Southern Card commit to having
Lawson postcards comprise one hundred percent of Southern Card’s business in the
Orlando area. Southern Card refused, asserting that Lawson already received about
seventy-five to eighty percent of its total business, and that it never committed to
purchasing one hundred percent of its requirements from Lawson.
A few months later, in February 1994, Lawson began recruiting Southern Card’s
competitors to sell Lawson postcards to chain stores. The next month, Lawson limited
Southern Card’s purchases of Disney postcards to those that Southern Card had bought in
4
1993.5 In the meantime, Lawson sold a number of Disney postcards that had been
developed in 1994 to those distributors that bought only Lawson local view postcards.
The district court found, and Southern Card does not dispute, that as a result of these
developments, Southern Card “has faced new competition” in retail stores in the Orlando
area.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Southern Card instituted this lawsuit in February 1995, and its amended complaint
asserted federal and state claims of (1) illegal tying pursuant to section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and Florida Statutes
section 542.18; and (2) monopolization and attempted monopolization under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and Florida Statutes section 542.19. In outlining its
tying claims, Southern Card stated that (1) Disney postcards constituted the “tying”
product, and local view postcards were the “tied” product; (2) the “greater Orlando area”
constituted the relevant geographic market or sub-market; and (3) the sale of local view
postcards to distributors comprised the relevant product market. The crux of the tying
claims was that Lawson “illegally compelled and coerced Southern Card and others to
agree to purchase [local view postcards] from Lawson . . . as a condition of obtaining and
retaining access to Disney Cards.” Southern Card sought treble damages, injunctive relief
Since 1994, Southern Card has continued to purchase these Disney postcards
5
from Lawson but has acquired its entire local view stock from other manufacturers.
5
and attorneys’ fees.6
After the parties conducted extensive discovery, Lawson filed a motion for
summary judgment that Southern Card vigorously opposed. In November 1996, the
district court granted Lawson’s motion. As to Southern Card’s federal tying claims, the
court first considered whether to deem Lawson’s practices unlawful per se or subject to
evaluation under the rule of reason. The court found that Lawson’s practices were
“unlike traditional tying arrangements” “because Southern Card does not allege that the
ultimate consumer must buy the tied product (a local view postcard) to buy the tying
product (a Disney postcard).” The court thus considered the challenged conduct to
represent “‘full’ or ‘representative’ line forcing,” that is, a vertical nonprice restraint
“undeserving of per se treatment.” Applying the rule of reason, the court held that
Southern Card failed to demonstrate that Lawson had unreasonably restrained
competition in the local view postcard market.
Notwithstanding its conclusion regarding the applicability of the rule of reason, the
district court also went on to hold that even if it “were to use a per se analysis, Southern
Card’s tying claims would fail” because “the alleged ‘Disney’ and non-Disney
6
Southern Card’s expert witness, Dr. Bruce Seaman, subsequently opined that
Southern Card had suffered two types of injuries. According to Dr. Seaman, Southern
Card “suffered economic damages linked to the overcharge on the tied non-Disney post
cards.” Also, Lawson’s “refusal to allow Southern Card access to a full Disney array of
post card products and other types of products has affected and will continue to affect
Southern’s profits on existing chain store accounts as well as the likelihood that chain
store clients will continue to be lost due to the resulting weakening of Southern’s relative
competitive position.”
6
classifications are not separate products such that there can be a ‘tie-in’ between them . . .
. Rather, all of Lawson Mardon’s postcards are sufficiently unitary to be considered a
single product.” Next, the court rejected Southern Card’s federal monopolization and
attempted monopolization claims on the grounds that Southern Card “failed to produce
any admissible evidence that creates triable issues of fact with respect to the existence of
a cognizable market or Lawson Mardon’s monopoly power in such a market.” Finally,
the court turned away Southern Card’s state claims, recognizing that “Florida antitrust
law mirrors federal law as applied to the tying, monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims in the instant case.” On appeal, Southern Card challenges the
district court’s grant of summary judgment only as to its federal and state tying claims.
III. DISCUSSION
We review the granting of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standards that bound the district court. Uniforce Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. National
Council on Compensation Ins., Inc., 87 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 1996). “There is no
genuine issue for trial unless the non-moving party establishes, through the record
presented to the court, that it is able to prove evidence sufficient for a jury to return a
verdict in its favor.” Cohen v. United Am. Bank of Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th
Cir. 1996).
A.
“A tying arrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
7
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’” Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)). Such arrangements can run afoul of the Sherman
Act’s prohibition against agreements “in restraint of trade,” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997),
and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 (West 1997). See Spartan Grain &
Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The Clayton Act, passed as a
response to what Congress considered grudging constructions of the Sherman Act by the
courts, specifically bans tying arrangements.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979). As our
predecessor court made clear, the two statutory theories of liability are substantively
synonymous. Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th
Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); see also IX Phillip E. Areeda,
Antitrust Law ¶ 1719b, at 254 (1991) (“Although their words differ, the two statutes
apply a single substantive standard.”).7
Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement
“in restraint of trade,” this Court has long recognized that Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints. As a consequence, most
antitrust claims are analyzed under a “rule of reason,” according to which
the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s
7
Because Southern Card does not discuss its state tying claim independently and
fails to cite any Florida case law, we assume that federal antitrust doctrine controls that
claim as well. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.32 (West 1997); see also Parts Depot Co. v.
Florida Auto Supply, Inc., 669 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) (“[T]he
Legislature has directed courts to rely on comparable federal antitrust statutes in
construing [Florida Statutes section 542.18].”).
8
history, nature, and effect.
Some types of restraints, however, have such predictable and
pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for
procompetitive benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se. Per se
treatment is appropriate once experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it. Thus, we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with
regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where
the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997) (internal quotation marks, citations and
brackets omitted). See also Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538,
1549 (11th Cir.) (“The presumption in cases brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act
is that the rule-of-reason standard applies. We apply the per se rule only when history
and analysis have shown that in sufficiently similar circumstances the rule of reason
unequivocally results in a finding of liability, i.e., when the conduct involved always or
almost always tends to restrict competition and decrease output.”) (internal quotation
marks, citations and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996).
“[C]ertain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition
and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 9 (1984). “It is clear, however, that not every refusal to sell two products
separately can be said to restrain competition.” Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11. “Thus,
in a sense the question whether this case involves ‘tying’ is beside the point. The legality
of [Lawson’s] conduct depends on its competitive consequences, not whether it can be
labeled ‘tying.’” Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.34.
9
We believe that the terms that Lawson imposed on Southern Card pursuant to its
“Disney Product Plan” -- that Southern Card purchase local view postcards in amounts
equal to its purchases of Disney postcards -- are indicative of a manufacturer’s “line
force” upon a distributor.8 “Line forcing, be it full or representative, is a vertical nonprice
restraint -- an agreement between entities at different levels of distribution that does not
purport to affect prices charged for the goods.” Smith Machinery, 878 F.2d at 1295.9 As
the Supreme Court has made clear, “economic analysis supports the view, and no
precedent opposes it, that a vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some
agreement on price or price levels.” Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 735-36. This is so
because such restraints have the “real potential to stimulate interbrand competition, ‘the
primary concern of antitrust law.’” Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 724 (quoting
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.19 (1977)).10
As Professor Areeda has written, “requiring dealers to purchase a tied product
8
“Full-line” or “representative-line” forcing occurs when “a manufacturer agrees
to license or franchise a dealer to sell its products, but only on condition that the dealer
sell a full or representative line of those products.” Smith Machinery Co. v. Hesston
Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990).
9
“Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been
denominated as horizontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at
different levels of distribution as vertical restraints.” Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
10
“Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same
generic product . . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the
distributors -- wholesale or retail -- of the product of a particular manufacturer.” GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.19.
10
from the defendant need not impair consumers’ purchases from his rivals who sell
directly to consumers or who continue to reach them through an ample number of other
dealers.” IX Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1725a, at 317. The Tenth Circuit has similarly
stated -- in a case involving a distributor’s claim that a manufacturer tied the sales of its
established, popular farm machinery to sales of its new, unestablished tractors -- that
[i]n a line forcing situation, where a dealer is serving as an intermediate link
in a distribution chain, if one manufacturer is foreclosed from selling to a
dealer because of the arrangement, it is likely going to find another way to
take its product to market, providing a profit potential continues to exist. In
such a case, there is no ultimate foreclosure to the consumer of a choice of
goods. In other more traditional tying arrangements there is an ultimate
foreclosure of choice to the ultimate consumer. Thus, a foreclosure of
choice to an ultimate consumer appears to be the principal key to a tie that
is illegal per se. No such foreclosure occurs or is threatened in a typical line
forcing situation such as that at bar.
Smith Machinery, 878 F.2d at 1297 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5; United States
v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 40 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 3; and
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 393 (1947)). See also Roy B.
Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Ties that
constrain only dealers . . . create relatively little danger to competition, provided
consumers may purchase the two goods separately.”) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1103 (1995); Ransomes Am. Corp. v. Spartan Distribs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 183, 185
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (“Tying arrangements that constrain only dealers are not
presumptively illegal because they pose little danger to competition, as long as consumers
may purchase the two goods separately.”); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v.
11
Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1229 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (“Because consumers are
not hurt by vertical non-price restraints between manufacturers and dealers, the type of
line-forcing/exclusive arrangement found in this case should not be subject to the same
per se treatment as traditional tying arrangements.”). Not surprisingly, then, “most courts
dealing with the full-line force have not applied the per se rule against tying but have
required proof in the particular case of a significant threat to competition.” IX Areeda,
Antitrust Law ¶ 1725c, at 323.
Southern Card has made no showing that line-forcing arrangements like the one at
issue always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. This fact,
coupled with the strength of the authorities cited above, leads us to conclude that it would
be inappropriate to deem Lawson’s line-forcing practice unlawful per se. Thus, we will
review the restraint under rule-of-reason analysis.
For the same reasons, Lawson’s (unsuccessful) attempt to compel Southern Card
to carry only Lawson-produced local view postcards does not require us to employ a
different standard.
The claimed arrangement between [Lawson] and [Southern Card]
constituted a vertical nonprice restraint between a manufacturer and a dealer
on goods that the dealer offered to customers independently. It was in
effect an exclusive-dealing arrangement in which [Lawson] required
[Southern Card] to sell [Lawson], and only [Lawson], [local view
postcards]. Such an arrangement is not the sort that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. It does not threaten
competition to the same extent as tying arrangements that bind ultimate
customers. Regardless of whether the restraint also constituted a tying
arrangement, subjecting it to per se analysis would ignore our directive
from the Court. The measure of legality of relationships between
12
manufacturers and independent distributors must not be allowed to turn on
labels.
Taylor Sales, 28 F.3d at 1384-85 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
B.
Under the rule of reason, a plaintiff must prove an anticompetitive effect of the
defendant’s conduct on the relevant market, and that the conduct has no procompetitive
benefit or justification. Levine, 72 F.3d at 1551. Southern Card argues that Lawson’s
behavior generated anticompetitive effects because it (1) foreclosed the market to
competitive manufacturers; (2) caused consumers to pay higher prices; and (3) resulted in
a dilution in product quality and service. Southern Card thus attempts to prove that
Lawson’s conduct had an actual detrimental effect on competition. Levine, 72 F.3d at
1551. We address Southern Card’s contentions in turn.
1.
Southern Card asserts that the “record clearly supports the existence of market
preclusion of competitive manufacturers of local view cards in the Orlando area.” In
support of this contention, Southern Card first argues that Lawson’s “specific attack” on
the sales base of one of its competitors, John Hinde Curteich & Co. (Hinde), evidences an
anticompetitive effect. In making this argument, Southern Card relies primarily on the
affidavit of Hinde vice-president Don Moffet.
Moffet’s affidavit, however, does little to advance Southern Card’s cause. Moffet
avers that Lawson’s practices caused Hinde to lose “some”of its share of the local view
13
postcard market to Lawson. Moffet also states, however, that as Disney postcards
increased in popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hinde’s sales of local view
postcards “began to decrease.” We agree with Lawson that Moffet’s affidavit is woefully
deficient, as it fails to (1) state with any degree of specificity just how much business
Hinde lost to Lawson; (2) describe any competitive actions Hinde took in response to
Lawson’s practices; or (3) explain away other potential reasons for Hinde’s loss of
business.
Unfortunately for Southern Card, none of the other evidence it proffers is even as
probative as Moffet’s affidavit.11 In short, Southern Card has failed to show that
Lawson’s dealings somehow either precluded other manufacturers from gaining access to
the local view postcard market or adversely impacted upon consumer choice. Thus, we
have little difficulty in turning away Southern Card’s contention here. As the Fifth
Circuit has stated, “[s]peculation about anticompetitive effects is not enough.” Taylor
Sales, 28 F.3d at 1385.
2.
Southern Card next asserts that as a result of Lawson’s practices, “the average
price of local view postcards in the Orlando area was significantly higher than in any
other part of [Florida].” In support of this assertion, Southern Card relies on a survey that
11
We reach this conclusion after carefully reviewing the record citations put forth
at pages fourteen and forty-one through forty-four of Southern Card’s initial brief, and at
pages seven through twelve of its reply brief.
14
its expert, Dr. Seaman, conducted.12 Dr. Seaman avers that “[t]he result of the survey was
that the average price of non-Disney local view cards in the Orlando area, as sold in gift
shops by Scenic Card[] [a distributor that purchased all of its local view postcards from
Lawson] is $.30, which is . . . higher than the average price of $.25 charged in retail
outlets served by Southern Card [and another distributor]. . . . The average price of local
view post cards in the non-Orlando locations is also approximately $.25 . . . .”
Southern Card’s evidence is again lacking. As the district court correctly pointed
out, the cited price differential “is of little value” because it may result from “the biased
sample of local view postcard purchases from Orlando gift and souvenir shops, rather
than from lower-cost retail outlets served by Southern Card,” or from Dr. Seaman’s
failure “to factor in differentials in the cost of living (or cost of a vacation) in the various
parts of the state.” Moreover, Southern Card has not referenced any record evidence that
enables this court to assess whether Lawson charged disproportionately higher prices for
its local view postcards as compared to other manufacturers. In sum, Dr. Seaman’s
conclusion, standing alone, would not enable reasonable jurors to conclude that Lawson’s
practices caused consumers to pay more for local view postcards in the Orlando area.
Southern Card’s purported proof regarding anticompetitive effects thus remains overly
speculative.
3.
12
Dr. Seaman surveyed postcard prices at over 200 retail stores located throughout
approximately forty different vacation areas in Florida.
15
Finally, Southern Card argues that Lawson’s practices caused a dilution in local
view postcard quality and service in the Orlando area. Southern Card, however, fails to
present any expert testimony or consumer survey evidence to support this subjective
assessment. Instead, Southern Card first refers to a number of internal memoranda from
Lawson describing various quality and service difficulties it experienced in its production
and delivery of certain postcards. These documents, however, do not address the relative
quality of Lawson’s local view postcards. Southern Card also cites to the deposition
testimony of Duncan Page, a president of both a postcard manufacturing company (i.e., a
Lawson competitor) and a postcard distribution company, who, not surprisingly, states
that he prefers to buy postcards from his own manufacturing company (even though
“[t]he pricing is exactly the same as Lawson Mardon”) because the “quality of our
postcard and our images are better.” Southern Card also references the affidavit of Joel
Mittelberg, the president of Scenic Florida Distributors, Inc., who states, after noting that
he purchases local view postcards from several manufacturers in addition to Lawson, that
Lawson’s delivery times on new work orders are “generally slower than is standard in the
post card industry.” The testimony of Page and Mittelberg, without more, certainly does
not rise to the level of an anticompetitive effect in the relevant local view postcard
market.13
IV. CONCLUSION
13
Because we conclude that Southern Card has failed to establish a violation of the
antitrust laws, we have no occasion to consider Lawson’s challenge to Southern Card’s
standing to bring this lawsuit. See Levine, 72 F.3d at 1545.
16
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court was correct (1) in
evaluating Southern Card’s claims under the rule of reason, and (2) in concluding that
Southern Card’s evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Lawson’s
sales practices generated an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
17