Stevens v. Colt ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
    U.S.
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    APR 20, 2011
    No. 10-14387               JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar            CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00487-HLA-TEM
    CHARLES THOMAS STEVENS,
    in propria persona,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    KEN COLT,
    official capacity as an employee/Revenue Officer,
    a.k.a. K. Colt,
    JOHN HOOPES,
    official capacity as an employee/Revenue Officer,
    JOHN 1-10 DOES,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                          Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 20, 2011)
    Before HULL, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles Thomas Stevens, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his mandamus petition, which sought to compel Internal Revenue
    Service (IRS) Agents Ken Colt and John Hoopes to provide documents supporting
    the Agents’ authority to file liens and levies on Stevens’ assets. On appeal,
    Stevens contends the district court’s dismissal of his petition was improper
    because the district court had mandamus jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1361
    .
    Further, Stevens claims the district court erred in finding that the prohibitions in
    the Anti-Injunction Act and federal tax exception in the Declaratory Judgment Act
    barred his suit because his petition did not seek injunctive or declaratory relief.
    After review, we affirm the district court’s order.1
    To invoke mandamus jurisdiction, “(1) the plaintiff must have a clear right
    to the relief, (2) the defendant must have a clear duty to act, and (3) no other
    adequate remedy must be available.” Jones v. Alexander, 
    609 F.2d 778
    , 781 (5th
    Cir. 1980). Further, the Anti-Injunction Act, 
    26 U.S.C. § 7421
    (a), provides that
    “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall
    be maintained in any court by any person.” Section 7421 bars not only suits that
    1
    Mandamus jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Lifestar Ambulance
    Serv., Inc. v. United States, 
    365 F.3d 1293
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).
    2
    directly seek to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes, but also suits that
    seek to restrain IRS actions “which are intended to or may culminate in the
    assessment or collection of taxes.” Kemlon Prods. and Dev. Co. v. United States,
    
    638 F.2d 1315
    , 1320 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 
    646 F.2d 223
     (5th Cir.
    1981) (quotation omitted). A complementary provision is found in the
    Declaratory Judgment Act, which does not permit declaratory judgments in suits
    “with respect to Federal taxes.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    (a). Because the federal tax
    exception in the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the Anti-
    Injunction Act, a determination that the Anti-Injunction Act applies also forecloses
    declaratory relief. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 
    353 F.3d 1357
    ,
    1362 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003).
    Stevens failed to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief sufficient to
    sustain mandamus jurisdiction.2 Specifically, he failed to identify a clear, non-
    discretionary duty owed by Colt and Hoopes to provide Stevens with documents
    supporting the notices of lien and levy. See Jones, 
    609 F.2d at 781
    . Moreover,
    2
    We note that the district court erred by initially concluding Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(b) prohibited
    mandamus relief. Although Rule 81(b) abolished the writ of mandamus, the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    , provides that federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
    their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Further, it is well-
    established that 
    28 U.S.C. § 1361
     confers original jurisdiction over claims for mandamus relief and
    waives sovereign immunity for this type of action. Sheehan v. Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 
    619 F.2d 1132
    , 1140 (5th Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 
    456 U.S. 728
     (1982).
    3
    the Freedom of Information Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    (a)(4)(B), provided an alternative
    avenue of relief, as it authorizes judicial review of an agency decision to withhold
    agency records. Lastly, the Anti-Injunction Act barred Stevens’ suit because his
    petition contests the validity of the notices of tax lien and levy, which are IRS
    actions that will culminate in the collection of taxes. See Kemlon Prods. and Dev.
    Co., 638 F.2d at 1320. Declaratory relief is similarly foreclosed. See Mobile
    Republican Assembly, 
    353 F.3d at
    1362 n.6. Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court’s dismissal of Stevens’ mandamus petition.
    AFFIRMED.
    4