United States v. Dennis Wayne Lefebvre , 132 F. App'x 251 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 18, 2005
    No. 03-15018
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 03-00005-CR-1-MMP
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DENNIS WAYNE LEFEBVRE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (May 18, 2005)
    ON REMAND FROM THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Before DUBINA, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This case is before the court for consideration in light of United States v.
    Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 
    125 S.Ct. 738
     (2005). We previously affirmed Lefebvre’s
    conviction and sentence. See United States v. Lefebvre, No. 03-15018 (11th Cir.
    April 21, 2004) (unpublished).
    The Supreme Court vacated our prior decision and remanded the case to us
    for further consideration in light of Booker. Lefebvre concedes in his
    supplemental brief that he did not raise any Blakely or Booker type issues in the
    district or appellate courts. He first raised such an issue in his petition for writ of
    certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Lefebvre also acknowledges in his
    supplemental brief that the standard of review is plain error affecting substantial
    rights.
    This court has discretion to correct an error under plain error review where
    there is (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and
    (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. United States v.Curtis, 
    400 F.3d 1334
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2005).
    In its supplemental brief, the government concedes that the district court
    erred when it sentenced Lefebvre pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. The
    2
    Booker error satisfied the first two prongs of the plain error test. See United States
    v. Rodriguez, 
    398 F.3d 1291
    , 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2005). Lefebvre bears the burden
    to establish the third prong of plain error, namely, that the Booker error affected
    his substantial rights. United States v. Duncan, 
    400 F.3d 1297
    , 1302 (11th Cir.
    2005). Where the third prong of the plain error test is met, the fourth is also met.
    United States v. Shelton, 
    400 F.3d 1325
    , 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, the third
    prong is decisive.
    Lefebvre argues that the Booker error affected his substantial rights, because
    if the sentencing guidelines had been merely advisory, he would have received a
    lower sentence. He argues that the district court’s failure to state what sentence it
    would have imposed if the guidelines were advisory is not the end of the inquiry,
    citing United States v. Curtis, 
    400 F.3d 1334
    . In Curtis, we found the Booker
    error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because the district court had
    imposed a sentence at the top of the guideline range. 400 F.3d at 1336. In Curtis
    we explained that a sentence at the top of the guidelines is inconsistent with an
    argument that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence if the court had
    considered the guidelines advisory only. Id.
    In our view, Curtis defeats Lefebvre’s argument, because he was sentenced
    in the middle of the guidelines. If the district court had any misgivings about the
    3
    reasonableness of the sentencing guideline range, it would not have imposed a
    sentence above the bottom of the range. Moreover, the district court did not state
    at sentencing that the guideline range was too harsh or that it would have imposed
    a different sentence if the sentencing guidelines were not mandatory. The district
    court expressly stated that the sentence was reasonable given the amount of drugs
    and Lefebvre’s criminal history. Accordingly, we conclude from the record that
    Lefebvre fails to prove that “there is a reasonable probability of a different result if
    the guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion.”
    Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1332 (citation omitted).
    After our reconsideration of this case and in light of Booker, we reinstate
    our previous opinion in this case and affirm Lefebvre’s convictions and sentences.
    OPINION REINSTATED IN PART; CONVICTIONS AND
    SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-15018

Citation Numbers: 132 F. App'x 251

Judges: Carnes, Dubina, Hull, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/18/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024