United States v. Larry Haynes , 455 F. App'x 918 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 19, 2012
No. 11-13898
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cr-60079-WJZ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LARRY HAYNES,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 19, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Haynes appeals his 41-month total sentence of imprisonment,
imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry of a deported alien, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2), and impersonating a citizen of the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911. After a review of the record, we affirm.
Haynes, a citizen of Jamaica, had been deported after his conviction for a
drug-related offense, later reentered the United States without permission, and was
arrested after he used a false birth certificate to obtain an Arizona driver’s license
under an assumed name. When he was arrested, he presented this driver’s license
and falsely claimed to be a U.S. citizen.
The district court determined the applicable guidelines range to be 41 to 51
months’ imprisonment. Haynes’s criminal history included a prior drug
conviction and also cited his previous deportation, other drug-related charges,
presenting false identification, and a firearms charge. Haynes urged the court to
consider his difficult childhood in Jamaica, the threats he faced in Jamaica based
on his father’s political activities, and his cooperation with authorities. The
government noted that Haynes had multiple children by numerous women, lacked
steady employment, and had distributed drugs during a previous stay in the United
States. The district court considered Haynes’s request to sentence him below the
advisory guideline range and the government’s argument that Haynes was a likely
recidivist before denying Haynes’s request for a downward variance. After
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listening to the parties’ arguments and considering the statutory factors, the court
stated that it found no reason to depart or vary from a guideline sentence and thus
sentenced Haynes to 41 months’ imprisonment.1
On appeal, Haynes argues that the court failed to explain the sentence
adequately and failed to give proper weight to his cooperation with authorities.
We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness. United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2007).
The reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first look
to whether the district court committed procedural error, and then we look to
whether the sentence was substantively reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 51. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
showing that it was unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 674 (2010).
Procedural unreasonableness includes “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
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Haynes’s sentence consisted of 41 months for his illegal reentry count and 36 months for
impersonating a U.S. citizen, to run concurrently. The statutory maximum for the illegal reentry was
20 years’ imprisonment; for impersonating a U.S. citizen, the statutory maximum sentence was 3
years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 911.
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consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. The § 3553(a) factors include the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter
criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal
conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The court need not “state on the record that it has
explicitly considered each of the section 3553(a) factors or [] discuss each of the
section 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted). Rather, it is sufficient for the district court to have
considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors in light of all the
facts and circumstances, as indicated in the sentencing hearing record. See id.
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the district court committed a “clear error of judgment” in
weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
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1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813
(2011). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
A clear error of judgment occurs when the district court’s decision is outside of the
“range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. Within that
range, however, the “weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams,
526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Although we do not
presume that a sentence falling within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range
is reasonable, we do ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, we conclude that Haynes’s sentence was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The court requested testimony and argument relating to
the § 3553(a) factors, stated on the record that it considered the statutory factors as
well as Haynes’s arguments, and subsequently stated in open court that it found no
reason to vary from the applicable guideline range. The sentence was also
substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. The 41-
month sentence was at the low end of the applicable guideline range and well
below the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1326(b)(2). We generally leave the weighing of the § 3553(a) factors to the
district court, and will only reverse if the court commits a clear error of judgment.
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. Haynes has failed to show that the sentence imposed was
outside the range of reasonable sentences based on the facts of this case or that the
court failed to consider his cooperation as a factor.
AFFIRMED.
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