Elmore v. Cooper , 427 F. App'x 831 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-12280                 MAY 27, 2011
    JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar               CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cv-00004-WTM-JEG
    ELMON MCCARROLL ELMORE, JR.,
    llllllllllllllllllll                                               lPlaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ASSISTANT WARDEN PEGGY ANN COOPER,
    Coffee Correctional Facility, individually and in
    her official capacity,
    CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
    a Tennessee Corporation,
    llllllllllllllllllll                                            lDefendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (May 27, 2011)
    Before CARNES, MARTIN, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Elmon Elmore, Jr. appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his time to
    appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).
    I.
    Elmore, a state prisoner, filed a complaint in federal court in early 2008
    against prison officials under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , claiming that he had not been
    provided with sufficient free postage from the prison on at least two occasions.
    The district court entered an order granting summary judgment against Elmore on
    September 23, 2009. That same day the court entered final judgment dismissing
    Elmore’s case. A few days later Elmore filed a timely motion to alter or amend the
    judgment. On November 6, 2009, the district court entered an order denying
    Elmore’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, but apparently did not send
    Elmore notice of that order.
    In January 2010 Elmore requested an update on the status of his motion to
    alter or amend. On January 13, 2010, the district court responded and informed
    Elmore that his motion had been denied more than two months earlier in the
    November 6 order. Elmore filed a motion for leave to file an out of time notice of
    appeal under Rule 4(a)(6) dated January 13, 2010, requesting that the district court
    reopen his time to appeal due to his lack of notice of the November 6 order.
    2
    Along with that motion Elmore filed a proposed notice of appeal, which
    indicated that Elmore desired to appeal from the final judgment and, construing
    the pro se notice liberally, the order denying his motion to alter or amend that
    judgment.1 The district court denied his motion, holding that it could “find no
    interpretation of [Rule] 4(a)(6) that would allow a district court to reopen the time
    to file a notice of appeal based on a failure to receive notice that a [motion to alter
    or amend the judgment] was denied.” Elmore moved the court to reconsider,
    which the district court also denied. Elmore then filed this appeal, essentially
    contending that the district court erred in its interpretation of Rule 4(a)(6).
    II.
    Although we review a district court’s denial of a motion to reopen the time
    to appeal under Rule 4(a)(6) only for an abuse of discretion, see McDaniel v.
    Moore, 
    292 F.3d 1304
    , 1305 (11th Cir. 2002), we review de novo a “district
    1
    We must construe Elmore’s pro se proposed notice of appeal liberally. See Bellizia v.
    Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    614 F.3d 1326
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We construe pro se filings . . .
    liberally.”); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 
    465 F.3d 1256
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In
    this circuit, it is well settled that an appeal is not lost if a mistake is made in designating the
    judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal.”).
    Elmore’s proposed notice explicitly referenced the order denying his motion to alter or amend the
    final judgment in addition to referencing the final judgment itself, and thus evinced an intent to
    appeal from both the final judgment and the order denying Elmore’s motion to alter or amend.
    3
    court’s interpretation of federal procedural rules,” Vencor Hosps., Inc. v. Standard
    Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
    279 F.3d 1306
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2002).
    If a party fails to file a notice of appeal within the 30-day period required by
    Rule 4(a)(1), Rule 4(a)(6) provides that:
    The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of
    14 days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if
    all the following conditions are satisfied:
    (A) the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice . . . of
    the entry of the judgment or order sought to be appealed within 21
    days after entry;
    (B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is
    entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives notice . . . of
    the entry, whichever is earlier; and
    (C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.
    Fed. R App. P. 4(a)(6).
    The district court denied Elmore’s motions to reopen his time to appeal
    without reaching the merits of his motion because it interpreted Rule 4(a)(6) not to
    allow a court to reopen an order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment.
    That interpretation was incorrect. The language of Rule 4(a)(6) does not restrict
    its application to the entry of a final judgment. Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(6) (“The
    district court may reopen the time to file an appeal . . . but only if . . . the court
    finds that the moving party did not receive notice . . . of the entry of the judgment
    4
    or order sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry [and] the motion is filed
    within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered . . . .” (emphasis added)).
    Because Elmore alleged that he did not receive the order denying his motion to
    alter or amend within 21 days of its entry and the motion to reopen was filed
    within 180 days after that order was entered, the district court should have
    considered the merits of his motion to reopen his time to appeal under Rule
    4(a)(6).
    Accordingly, we vacate and remand to allow the district court to consider
    the merits of Elmore’s motion to reopen his time to appeal. We express no
    opinion on whether Elmore has satisfied the requirements of Rule 4(a)(6) that
    must be met in order to give the district court discretion to reopen the time to
    appeal from the order denying his motion to alter or amend that judgment.
    Additionally, we express no opinion on whether any failure to receive notice of an
    order denying a motion to alter or amend the judgment gives the district court
    discretion under Rule 4(a)(6) to allow Elmore to reopen the time to appeal from
    the final judgment.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-12280

Citation Numbers: 427 F. App'x 831

Judges: Carnes, Martin, Kravitch

Filed Date: 5/27/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024