United States v. Curtis Speight, AKA Curtis Lavar Speight , 440 F. App'x 762 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12566                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar            SEPTEMBER 8, 2011
    ________________________               JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cr-00387-VMC-TBM-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CURTIS SPEIGHT,
    a.k.a. Curtis Lavar Speight,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                              Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 8, 2011)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Curtis Speight appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five or more grams
    of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). On
    appeal, Speight argues that the district court should have granted a mistrial after a
    government witness testified about his involvement in other uncharged crimes. He
    also asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a continuance to
    secure the testimony of an additional witness who could have rebutted the
    testimony of his brother, Leonard Speight, who was a witness for the government.
    Finally, Speight argues that the district court should have directed the government
    to provide him with Jencks Act materials relevant to Leonard’s testimony. For the
    reasons stated below, we affirm.
    I.
    A grand jury charged Speight with conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
     and
    841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of
    cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). Speight’s
    brother Leonard also was charged in the indictment. Leonard pled guilty shortly
    before the trial began.
    At Speight’s trial, the government called a series of law enforcement
    2
    officers who testified to the following facts. On July 24, 2009, Detective Eddie
    Benitez of the Lakeland, Florida, Police Department received a tip that Speight
    was going to be transporting crack cocaine in a Ford F150 pickup truck. A check
    of Speight’s driving history revealed that his license had been suspended. Benitez
    and Detective Jason Perez located Speight’s truck and followed it until they
    observed it run a stop sign. The detectives radioed for a marked patrol unit to stop
    the truck.
    Officer Oscar Wesley responded to the call, pulled up behind the truck, and
    activated his lights and siren. However, the truck failed to pull over. Suddenly,
    Leonard jumped out of the passenger’s side of the vehicle and ran through an
    opening between some bushes. Wesley exited his vehicle and pursued Leonard on
    foot. He saw Leonard drop what appeared to be styrofoam plates. Wesley
    eventually took Leonard into custody. Officer Ruben Garcia later recovered the
    styrofoam plates and discovered pieces of crack cocaine in the vicinity.
    Meanwhile, Detectives Benitez and Perez were traveling down another
    street in an attempt to head off the truck. Benitez heard over the radio that a
    passenger had jumped out of the truck, so he exited the vehicle in order to catch
    the passenger if he attempted to flee in that direction. Meanwhile, Perez drove
    down Davis Street, where he saw Speight’s truck pull into a driveway of a
    3
    residence and then start to back out again. Perez positioned his vehicle to block
    the truck, and then arrested Speight for driving on a suspended license. A few
    weeks later, Detective Benitez arrested Speight on the present drug trafficking
    charges. After waiving his Miranda1 rights, Speight admitted that he had
    purchased the crack cocaine and identified his supplier.
    At one point, the prosecutor asked Detective Perez to relate what happened
    after he stopped Speight’s truck. Perez responded, “I asked him to step out of the
    vehicle, which he complied. I asked him if he had a driver’s license. He did not.
    He was placed under arrest for driving while license suspended or revoked, and a
    search incident to arrest yielded a small amount of cannabis in his pocket.”
    Defense counsel objected to that statement and moved for a mistrial. The district
    court declined to order a mistrial, but it did instruct the jury to disregard the
    testimony about the marijuana.
    Speight’s brother Leonard testified on behalf of the government. Leonard
    explained that, on the date in question, he and Speight had driven to a residence
    where Speight had purchased crack cocaine. As they were driving, a police car
    pulled up behind them and activated its lights. Leonard started to hide the drugs in
    the glove compartment, but Speight told him that he had to do better than that.
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L.Ed.2d 694
     (1966).
    4
    Leonard then took the crack cocaine, jumped out of the truck, and ran through the
    hedges. Eventually, Officer Wesley caught Leonard and placed him under arrest.
    Leonard confirmed that Speight was planning to sell the crack cocaine.
    Following Leonard’s testimony, the government rested its case. Defense
    counsel briefly recalled Detective Benitez, and then informed the court that he did
    not have any further witnesses. The district court then inquired whether Speight
    intended to testify in his own defense. Defense counsel stated that he was not
    planning to call Speight as a witness. Counsel then started to argue that, under the
    Jencks Act, the government should have turned over all of the recorded telephone
    calls that Leonard had made while in custody. Counsel acknowledged that the
    government probably was not in possession of those recordings, but he asserted
    that they were nonetheless subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act. The district
    court responded, “At the present moment, Mr. Hovsepian, I wish to proceed with
    what we started out to discuss.” The court then engaged in a colloquy with
    Speight to confirm that he did not wish to testify. Defense counsel did not renew
    his Jencks Act argument and the district court never ruled on that issue.
    Defense counsel later moved for a continuance to secure the testimony of a
    rebuttal witness who would be able to impeach Leonard’s testimony. Counsel
    explained that Speight had just told him about a witness in the Pinellas County Jail
    5
    who would have some information regarding Leonard’s testimony. The district
    court denied the motion for a continuance. The jury convicted Speight with
    respect to both counts of the indictment, and the district court sentenced him to
    concurrent terms of 235 months’ imprisonment.
    II.
    In the proceedings below, Speight objected to Detective Perez’s testimony
    about the marijuana found on his person, but not the testimony that he was driving
    on a suspended license. Therefore, we are reviewing Speight’s arguments
    regarding the marijuana for an abuse of discretion, and his arguments concerning
    the suspended license for plain error. See United States v. Emmanuel, 
    565 F.3d 1324
    , 1334 (11th Cir. 2009) (a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion); United States v. Edouard, 
    485 F.3d 1324
    ,
    1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpreserved evidentiary objections are reviewed for plain
    error). Under the plain error standard, a defendant must establish: (1) error; (2)
    that is plain; and (3) that affects his substantial rights. Id. at n.7. An error affects
    a defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability that it altered
    the outcome of the case. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    398 F.3d 1291
    , 1299 (11th
    Cir. 2005). If the first three elements of plain error review are met, this Court has
    discretion to correct an error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
    6
    reputation of judicial proceedings.” Edouard, 
    485 F.3d at
    1343 n.7 (quotation
    omitted).
    A district court should grant a mistrial based on improper testimony only if
    there is a reasonable probability that the testimony altered the outcome of the case.
    Emmanuel, 
    565 F.3d at 1334
    . The stronger the government’s case, the less likely
    it is that the inadmissible evidence had an effect on the verdict. United States v.
    Rouco, 
    765 F.2d 983
    , 992 (11th Cir. 1985). If the district court issued a curative
    instruction, this Court will reverse only if “the evidence is so highly prejudicial as
    to be incurable by the trial court's admonition.” United States v. Slocum, 
    708 F.2d 587
    , 598 (11th Cir. 1983).
    Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
    admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
    therewith,” but can be admitted for other purposes. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule
    404(b) only applies to evidence that is extrinsic to the charged offenses. Edouard,
    
    485 F.3d at 1344
    . Evidence is not extrinsic, and therefore falls outside the scope
    of Rule 404(b), if it is: “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same
    transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to
    complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence
    regarding the charged offense.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    7
    In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
    Speight’s motion for a mistrial after Detective Perez testified that he found a small
    amount of marijuana on Speight’s person. The government introduced substantial
    evidence of Speight’s guilt, including the testimony of the law enforcement
    officers, Speight’s own confession, and the testimony of his brother Leonard. In
    light of that overwhelming evidence, it is unlikely that Detective Perez’s brief
    statement about the marijuana had a significant impact on the jury’s verdict. The
    court’s instruction to the jury to disregard that testimony was sufficient to cure any
    prejudice that the detective’s remark might have caused. See Slocum, 
    708 F.2d at 598
    .
    In addition, the district court did not commit plain error by failing to sua
    sponte exclude the evidence that Speight had been driving on a suspended license.
    That testimony was not extrinsic under Rule 404(b) because it was necessary to
    complete the story of Speight’s arrest. See Edouard, 
    485 F.3d at 1344
    . Also, that
    testimony was not particularly prejudicial, so it likely did not have any impact on
    the jury’s verdict. Speight has not established that the admission of that testimony
    affected his substantial rights. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299.
    III.
    We review the denial of a motion for a continuance for an abuse of
    8
    discretion. United States v. Douglas, 
    489 F.3d 1117
    , 1128 (11th Cir. 2007). We
    examine the district court’s decision “in light of the circumstances presented,
    focusing upon the reasons for the continuance offered to the trial court when the
    request was denied.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). Relevant factors include:
    (1) the diligence of the defense in interviewing the witness and
    procuring his testimony; (2) the probability of obtaining the testimony
    within a reasonable time; (3) the specificity with which the defense
    was able to describe the witness’s expected knowledge or testimony;
    and (4) the degree to which such testimony was expected to be
    favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the
    testimony.
    
    Id.
     The defendant must show that the denial of a continuance caused him
    “specific substantial prejudice.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). To establish specific
    prejudice, the defendant “must identify relevant, non-cumulative evidence that
    would have been presented if his request for a continuance had been granted.”
    United States v. Saget, 
    991 F.2d 702
    , 708 (11th Cir. 1993).
    This Court reviews constitutional issues de novo. Douglas, 
    489 F.3d at 1126
    . The Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant’s right to confront the
    witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The principal protection derived
    from the confrontation right is the right to effective cross-examination of the
    [government’s] witnesses.” Childers v. Floyd, 
    642 F.3d 953
    , 972 (11th Cir. 2011)
    (en banc), pet. for cert. filed, (U.S. July 6, 2011) (No. 11-42).
    9
    In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
    Speight’s motion for a continuance. Speight informed the district court that his
    new witness would rebut Leonard’s testimony, but he did not provide any
    additional information about the witness. He did not describe the witness’s
    expected knowledge or testimony with specificity, nor did he explain how the
    witness’s testimony would be non-cumulative and favorable to his defense. See
    Douglas, 
    489 F.3d at 1128
    . Therefore, it was reasonable for the district court to
    deny the motion for a continuance.
    Moreover, the denial of a continuance did not violate Speight’s right to
    confrontation. Although Speight contends that the right to confrontation also
    includes the right to call rebuttal witnesses, he does not cite to any precedent to
    support that argument. Speight was given a full and fair opportunity to
    cross-examine Leonard, which is all that the Confrontation Clause requires. See
    Childers, 642 F.3d at 972.
    IV.
    A district court’s enforcement of the Jencks Act’s disclosure requirements is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Schier, 
    438 F.3d 1104
    , 1107
    (11th Cir. 2006). The Jencks Act requires the government to “produce any
    statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to
    10
    the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3500
    (b).
    “A statement is ‘in the possession of the United States’ for Jencks Act purposes if
    it is in the possession of a federal prosecutorial agency.” United States v.
    Cagnina, 
    697 F.2d 915
    , 922 (11th Cir. 1983).
    In this case, Speight has not established that the government violated the
    Jencks Act. Speight argues that the prosecution should have turned over
    recordings of Leonard’s telephone calls from the Pinellas County Jail, but there is
    nothing in the record to suggest that the government actually possessed those
    recordings. In fact, defense counsel acknowledged below that the government
    probably did not have the recordings. Moreover, Speight has not established that
    the recorded calls were related to the subject matter of Leonard’s testimony. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3500
    (b). Because Speight has not identified any specific materials
    relevant to Leonard’s testimony that the government had in its possession but
    failed to disclose, he has failed to establish a violation of the Jencks Act. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3500
    (b); Cagnina, 
    697 F.2d at 922
    . In light of the foregoing, it is
    unnecessary for us to address the government’s alternative argument that this issue
    is unreviewable because Speight failed to obtain a ruling from the district court.
    Accordingly, after review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
    Speight’s convictions.
    11
    AFFIRMED.
    12