United States v. Yunier Perez Cruz ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 3, 2012
No. 11-12326
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20613-KMM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
YUNIER PEREZ CRUZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 3, 2012)
Before HULL, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yunier Perez Cruz appeals his concurrent 192-month sentences, imposed
after he pleaded guilty to eight counts of conspiracy to import, importation, and
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), and 963. The Guidelines range for his offenses
was 188 to 235 months. Cruz asserts that his sentences are substantively
unreasonable because the district court did not vary downward from the guidelines
range. Cruz argues that such a downward variance would have been appropriate
because (1) Cruz’s co-defendants received lower sentences than he, even though
they were more culpable for the conspiracy, and (2) Cruz’s criminal history was
over-represented. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591
(2007). “Ordinarily, a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure is
unreviewable on appeal. Such refusals are reviewable, however, if the district
court refused a downward departure because of an erroneous belief that it lacked
the authority to grant one.” United States v. Ortega, 358 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the
sentence was procedurally reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. If
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the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we inquire whether the sentence is
substantively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, including
whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support the sentence in question. United
States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Generally, we do not second guess the weight the district court gave a certain
factor. United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011). Ordinarily, we expect a sentence within the Guidelines
range to be reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam).
Cruz argues first that his sentences are substantively unreasonable because
they are higher than his co-conspirators, including those with leadership roles in
the scheme. The district court acknowledged this disparity, but found that Cruz’s
higher sentences were merited due to his criminal history. Cruz next argues that
although his criminal history is technically correct, it was over-represented
because two of his convictions relating to domestic abuse were closely related,
involving the same victim (his wife) and occurring within a two-month period.
Cruz asserts that the district court should thus have granted a downward departure.
The district court rejected Cruz’s request for a downward departure at sentencing,
explaining that the fact that there were two offenses, both of which occurred after
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Cruz’s wife had obtained a restraining order against him, demonstrated that Cruz
“just didn’t seem to get the message.” The district court concluded that
“considerations of respect for the law and deterrence” justified Cruz’s sentence.
Because Cruz makes no assertion that the district court erroneously believed
that it lacked the ability to grant a downward departure, we decline to review the
district court’s decision to deny the requested downward departure. Regarding the
substantive reasonableness of his sentences,1 Cruz has not adduced any facts that
establish that the court failed to properly consider the § 3553(a) factors. Upon
review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court in
imposing Cruz’s 192-month sentences, which were near the bottom of the
guidelines range for his offense.
AFFIRMED.
1
Cruz makes no argument that his sentences were procedurally unreasonable.
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