Michael Arrington v. Thomas Kinsey , 512 F. App'x 956 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13920
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00106-SPM-GRJ
MICHAEL ARRINGTON,
Plaintiff - Counter
Defendant - Appellant,
versus
THOMAS KINSEY,
Detective, in his individual capacity,
Defendant - Appellee,
SADIE DARNELL,
In her official capacity as Sheriff of Alachua County, Florida,
Defendant - Counter
Claimant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(March 13, 2013)
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Before HULL, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case arises from the 2007 arrest of Michael Arrington. In 2011,
Arrington filed a five-count complaint in the district court against the Appellees
Detective Kinsey and Sheriff Darnell, alleging: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest
claim against Detective Kinsey; (2) a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against
Detective Kinsey; (3) a § 1983 municipal liability claim against Sheriff Darnell;
(4) a state law claim for false imprisonment against Sheriff Darnell; and (5) a state
law claim for malicious prosecution against Sheriff Darnell. Both Appellees
subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. In July 2012, the district court
granted summary judgment on all counts, holding that its finding of probable cause
foreclosed Arrington’s claims. Arrington now appeals, arguing that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment by incorrectly concluding that probable
cause existed for his arrest. Upon review of the record and consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I.
On July 10, 2007, the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office arrested and charged
Arrington with the murder of his brother and the attempted murder of his sister-in-
law—charges that were later dropped. At the time of his arrest, Arrington lived in
a trailer in rural Newbury, Florida. His trailer was situated 60 feet from the mobile
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home shared by his brother, Carl Arrington, and his sister-in-law, Dannette
Arrington. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 10, 2007, Arrington called 911. He
told the dispatcher that he had heard gunshots and had seen someone flee from his
brother’s home. Two deputies, Butscher and Elliott, arrived at the scene first,
followed shortly thereafter by Detectives Kinsey and Kelly, and Sergeant Bernel.
When the deputies arrived, they encountered Arrington outside and told him to sit
on the ground. Arrington replied, “I don’t want to go to prison or jail for this.”
The deputies then spoke with Dannette Arrington, who accused Arrington of
shooting her husband.
Dannette recounted the following: she and Carl were asleep when someone
banged on the back door of the trailer. When Carl opened the door, someone shot
him. Dannette then ran into the bedroom and sat against the door to prevent the
shooter from getting in the room. The shooter attempted to pry the door open and
managed to wedge his hand in enough to fire several shots. He then left. As the
shooter retreated, Dannette heard the distinct sound of the cane that Arrington uses
to walk. She stated that the shooter had blonde hair, and wore a long grey shirt and
blue jeans. She also informed the officers that Arrington and Carl had a
historically hostile relationship. Dannette told the deputies that she believed
Arrington was mentally unstable.
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Dannette’s description of the shooter matched Arrington’s physical
appearance. Arrington also had abrasions on his fingers consistent with someone
who had attempted to pry open a door. At the scene, Detective Kinsey noted that
Arrington was walking with two canes. Deputy Butscher observed a red spot on
Arrington’s shoe that appeared to be blood. Arrington consented to a search of his
home and agreed to have his hands swabbed for a gunshot-residue analysis.
Officers discovered marijuana, several firearms, and ammunition inside of
Arrington’s home, but none of these firearms appeared to be the weapon used to
kill Carl Arrington. While searching Arrington’s home, Detective Kelly stood in
the spot where Arrington claimed to have been standing when he saw the shooter
flee his brother’s trailer. Kelly concluded that Arrington could not have seen the
shooter flee because shrubbery blocked the view. Arrington did, however, show
Detective Kelly his phone log to support his claim that he when he heard the
gunshots, he first unsuccessfully attempted to call his brother and then called 911.
The deputies also deployed a police dog to the scene, but it did not “hit” on
Arrington.
Arrington was subsequently placed under arrest for the possession of
marijuana and the possession of firearms by a convicted felon and transported to
the Alachua County Sheriff’s office to be interviewed. Detectives Kinsey and
Kelly conducted the interview of Arrington until he requested counsel. During this
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time, Sergeant Bernal obtained the State Attorney Office’s approval for an on-view
arrest of Arrington for murder and attempted murder. Sergeant Bernal and
Detective Kelly both believed that there was probable cause to arrest Arrington for
murder and attempted murder. Although Detective Kinsey did not believe that
there was probable cause for the charges of murder and attempted murder, he was
the officer who prepared the arrest reports on all charges.
On September 7, 2007, a judge in the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida held
that there was no probable cause to hold Arrington on the charge of murder or
attempted murder and ordered his release. Arrington pleaded guilty to possession
of marijuana and possession of firearms by a convicted felon. Arrington now
appeals the district court’s grant of Appellees’ motions for summary judgment.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards that governed the district
court. Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“[W]e are required to view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts
about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d
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1130, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Arrington has the
burden of demonstrating the absence of probable cause in order to succeed on his
§ 1983 claims, while Appellees have the burden of demonstrating the existence of
probable cause as a defense to the state claims. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425,
1436 (11th Cir. 1998).
III.
“[A]n individual has a right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.” See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted). If
probable cause for arrest exists, however, then the individual has no claim for false
arrest under § 1983, see id., or Florida state law, see Lewis v. Morgan, 79 So. 3d
926, 928–29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). The existence of probable cause also
constitutes an absolute bar to claims for both federal and Florida state claims of
malicious prosecution. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2004). Finally, for a municipal liability claim to be successful against an
officer, that officer must have inflicted constitutional harm. See Case v. Eslinger,
555 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2009). If there was probable cause for arrest, then
there was no constitutional violation and no municipal liability. See id.Probable cause to arrest exists when a police officer has a reasonable belief
that a suspect has committed or was committing a crime, based upon facts and
circumstances within his knowledge. United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999,
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1002 (11th Cir. 1992). The reasonableness of this belief is objective and based on
the totality of the circumstances. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226. “This standard
is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which
he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to
believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[T]he observations and experiences of the law enforcement officers
working a case must be weighed as a part of the totality of the circumstances . . . .”
Gonzalez, 969 F.2d at 1003.
“[O]bjectively, officers should not be permitted to turn a blind eye to
exculpatory information that is available to them, and instead support their actions
on selected facts they chose to focus upon.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1228. An
officer, however, is generally entitled to give weight to the victim’s criminal
complaint and identification as support for probable cause. See Rankin, 133 F.3d
at 1440; L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684–85 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
In determining whether probable cause exists, “we deal with probabilities . . .
[which] are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435(alterations and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“If a constitutional violation occurred because the officer lacked probable
cause, we next consider whether arguable probable cause existed.” Case, 555 F.3d
at 1327. An “officer may still be shielded from liability because his actions did not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We afford
“great deference to a lower court’s determination that the totality of the
circumstances supported a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Steiger,
318 F.3d 1039, 1046 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, because the existence of probable cause would defeat all of
Arrington’s claims, we focus our analysis accordingly. As a preliminary matter,
Arrington’s claim of false arrest is baseless. “[S]ubjective reliance on an offense
for which no probable cause exists” does not make an arrest out of order where
there is probable cause to arrest for a different offense. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the
charges of possession of marijuana and possession of firearms by a convicted felon
gave Detective Kinsey probable cause to arrest Arrington. See Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155, 125 S. Ct. 588, 595 (2004).
Arrington contends that the district court failed to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to him, that there was insufficient evidence at the time of
arrest, and that the totality of the circumstances shows that there was no probable
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cause. Arrington specifically argues that the evidence at the scene contradicts
Dannette Arrington’s identification of him as the shooter and that the officers
therefore conducted an unreasonable investigation. We disagree.
Arrington first claims that because the district court improperly gave
credence to Detective Kelly’s observation that Arrington could not have seen the
shooter flee, the district court did not view the facts in the light most favorable to
him. The district court, however, correctly held that even without that information,
there was still probable cause to arrest Arrington. Moreover, this was an
observation of an officer taken as part of the totality of the circumstances, and
therefore one that the district court properly weighed it in its probable cause
analysis. See Gonzalez, 969 F.2d at 1003.
Next, Arrington argues that the guns and ammunition found in his home
were unrelated to the type used to shoot Carl Arrington, and that the deputies
should have waited for the results of the gunshot-residue analysis to come back
before charging him. While it is true that an officer “should not be permitted to
turn a blind eye to exculpatory information that is available to them,” Kingsland,
382 F.3d at 1228, there is no requirement that officers await the results of a residue
test. Specifically, because the officers conducted a reasonable investigation and
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, it was not
necessary to delay the arrest for the results of a test that were not readily attainable.
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Arrington further contends that his statement about “not wanting to go to
prison or jail for this” is exculpatory, rather than an admission of wrongdoing.
Arrington maintains that because of his visible physical condition, he was clearly
unable to commit the crime. He also argues that the district court incorrectly stated
that there was a previous altercation between the two men where Dannette
Arrington called the police because Appellant was going to “beat up” Carl
Arrington. He claims that Carl Arrington had in fact threatened him. Finally,
Arrington contends that Dannette’s statement to the officers was unreliable and
impossible.
Dropped charges provide an occasion to puncture, through retrospection, the
onerous on-scene judgments of an officer. The ultimate release of charges,
however, is of no significance in the probable cause analysis. See Marx v.
Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990). Officers are not expected to be
legal technicians. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435. An officer “need not take every
conceivable step . . . at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person.” Id. at 1436 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
This was a murder scene. Upon arrival, Arrington was outside, with a splash
of red “blood” on his shoe, abrasions on his hand consistent with what might have
been injuries from the break-in, and he immediately stated: “I don’t want to go to
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prison or jail for this.” The victim’s wife described the incident in detail and
identified Arrington as the shooter. Her description of the intruder was consistent
with Arrington’s physical appearance. Dannette also told the officers that she
believed Arrington to be mentally unstable. The victim and Arrington had a
historically volatile relationship, including a call to 911 on a previous occasion.
This earlier incident of hostility factors into the probable cause analysis, regardless
of who had previously threatened whom.
Further, Detective Kinsey relied on the deputies’ trustworthy account of
what occurred prior to his arrival at the scene and conducted his own reasonable
investigation. As the district court correctly determined, Detective Kinsey’s
subjective belief plays no role in the probable cause analysis. See id. at 1433.
Appellees were “entitled to rely to a meaningful degree” on Dannette’s statement
“in determining the existence of probable cause.” Id. at 1440. These statements
alone, however, did not constitute the only evidence suggesting that Arrington had
committed the crime. A reasonable officer could have believed that Arrington’s
arrest for murder and attempted murder was objectively reasonable based on the
totality of the circumstances. See id. at 1435. We determine that probable cause
existed and consequently defeats Arrington’s federal and state claims. And,
because we find probable cause, we need not address whether the defendants
lacked arguable probable cause. Case, 555 F.3d at 1328.
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While it is unfortunate that Arrington was arrested on charges that were later
dropped, we find no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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