United States v. Eddie Lee Wooten ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 23, 2008
No. 07-12277 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00006-CR-T-30-EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDDIE LEE WOOTEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 23, 2008)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eddie Wooten appeals his sentence of 720 months of imprisonment for
possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), distribution
of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession
of three firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see id. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)
and (c)(1)(C)(i). Wooten argues that the district court erred when it enhanced
Wooten’s sentence based on facts that were not alleged in the indictment or found
by a jury and the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
Wooten first argues that the district court violated Wooten’s rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution when it enhanced Wooten’s
sentence based on facts not alleged in the indictment or found by a jury. Wooten’s
argument, which was also raised in an earlier appeal of his sentence, is barred by
the law-of-the-case doctrine. Under that doctrine “an issue decided at one stage of
a case is binding at later stages of the same case.” Schiavo ex. Rel. Schlindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Toole v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We concluded in an earlier appeal that, “because Wooten admitted the
facts used to enhance his sentence by not objecting to the PSI, no constitutional
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Booker error occurred.” United States v. Wooten, 202 Fed. Appx. 429, 434 (11th
Cir. 2006).
Wooten next argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence.
Wooten argues that the district court failed to consider the statutory sentencing
factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or acknowledge its discretion to vary from the
sentencing guidelines. These arguments also fail.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d
784, 785 (11th Cir. 2005), which is “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,”
Gall v. United States, No. 06–7949, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2007). We “must
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Gall, slip op. at 12. We then “consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Id. "[W]hen the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines
range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one." Talley, 431
F.3d at 788.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed on Wooten a
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sentence of 720 months of imprisonment. The transcript of the sentencing hearing
establishes that the district court sentenced Wooten after careful consideration of
Wooten's arguments in favor of mitigation, the advisory sentencing guidelines, and
the sentencing factors of section 3553(a). The district court also referred to the
sentencing guidelines as “advisory.” Wooten’s sentence at the low end of the
advisory guidelines range was reasonable.
Wooten’s sentence is
AFFIRMED.
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