Michael Kostelac v. Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG ( 2013 )


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  •             Case: 12-13718    Date Filed: 04/17/2013   Page: 1 of 13
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-13718
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-14342-DLG
    MICHAEL KOSTELAC,
    TRACIE KOSTELAC,
    as assignees of Remos Aircraft, GmbH
    and Remos Aircraft, Inc.,
    REMOS AIRCRAFT, GMBH,
    REMOS AIRCRAFT, INC.,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    versus
    ALLIANZ GLOBAL CORPORATE & SPECIALTY AG,
    HOWARD A. TESCHER,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 17, 2013)
    Case: 12-13718     Date Filed: 04/17/2013   Page: 2 of 13
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    I.
    This is a breach of contract action brought by Michael and Tracie Kostelac,
    citizens of Virginia, against Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG (“Allianz
    Global”), a German insurance company.
    Remos Aircraft GmbH (“Remos Germany”) is a manufacturer of sport
    aircraft. Remos Aircraft, Inc. (“Remos USA”) is the United States distributor for
    Remos Germany. Together they manufacture and distribute the Remos GX
    aircraft. On January 25, 2009, a Remos GX crashed in Florida and seriously
    injured Michael Kostelac. The Kostelacs sued Remos Germany and Remos USA
    for damages sustained from the accident in the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Florida, No. 10-14062 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
    Remos Germany and Remos USA (collectively, “Remos”) are co-insureds
    under an Aviation Product Liability insurance policy issued by Allianz Global.
    The insurance policy was formed in Germany and is in German. After Remos
    gave Allianz Global notice of the Kostelacs’ suit and demanded that it provide for
    Remos’s defense, Allianz Global denied coverage under the insurance policy.
    Because Allianz Global refused to cover Remos, the Kostelacs and Remos
    settled the underlying action and entered into a consent judgment in which Remos
    2
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    admitted liability to the claims brought in the suit and agreed that the value of the
    damages sustained by the Kostelacs was $2,950,000. Remos also assigned all
    rights and interest under its insurance policy to the Kostelacs. In exchange, the
    Kostelacs agreed not to enforce their damages award against Remos. 1
    The Kostelacs, as Remos’s assignees, filed suit against Allianz Global for
    breach of contract based on its denial of coverage for the crash in Florida state
    court. Allianz Global removed the suit based on diversity of citizenship to the
    United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, where it filed a
    timely motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) on two
    grounds: (1) for improper venue based on a forum-selection clause in the insurance
    policy; and (2) under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
    The District Court did not address Allianz Global’s forum-selection clause
    ground. Instead, it weighed the public and private interests in the litigation,
    determined that Germany was a more appropriate forum for the suit, and then
    dismissed the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
    1
    This type of settlement agreement is known as a Coblentz agreement. Where an insurer
    has wrongfully refused to defend its insured and there is coverage under the policy, the insurer
    may be bound by the terms of a negotiated final consent judgment entered against its insured.
    See Coblentz v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 
    416 F.2d 1059
    , 1063 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[W]here a person is
    responsible over to another, either by operation of law or express contract, and he is duly notified
    of the pendency of the suit against the person to whom he is liable over, and full opportunity is
    afforded him to defend the action, the judgment, if obtained without fraud or collusion, will be
    conclusive against him, whether he appeared or not.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    3
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    The Kostelacs appeal the dismissal. We affirm the dismissal but on different
    grounds.
    II.
    We review the dismissal of a complaint based on forum non conveniens for
    abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Island Seas Invs., Ltd., 
    590 F.3d 1264
    , 1268 (11th
    Cir. 2009). A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal
    standard. Id. at 1269.
    Dismissal based on forum non conveniens is appropriate where, inter alia,
    “the trial court finds that all relevant factors of private interest favor the alternate
    forum, weighing in the balance a strong presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’
    initial forum choice.” 2 Id. Though the strong presumption in favor of the
    plaintiff’s choice of forum is not dispositive to the analysis, the plaintiff’s choice is
    entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen his home forum. Piper
    Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
    454 U.S. 235
    , 255 (1981). When a United States citizen
    sues in a United States District Court, he is suing in his home forum. See Wilson,
    590 F.3d at 1269 (“[T]here is a presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of
    forum, particularly where the plaintiffs are citizens of the United States.”); SME
    2
    In granting a forum non conveniens dismissal, the Distrct Court must also determine: (1)
    whether “an adequate alternate forum exists which possesses jurisdiction over the whole case,
    including all of the parties;” (2) whether “factors of public interest tip the balance in favor of trial
    in the alternate forum;” and (3) whether “plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the alternate forum
    without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Id.
    4
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    Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 
    382 F.3d 1097
    , 1101
    (11th Cir. 2004) (“This presumption in favor of plaintiffs’ initial forum choice in
    balancing the private interests is at its strongest when the plaintiffs are citizens,
    residents, or corporations of this country.”).
    In balancing the private interest factors, 3 the District Court summarily
    concluded that the Kostelacs’ choice of forum was entitled to less deference
    because, as citizens of Virginia, they were suing outside of their home forum by
    bringing their suit in Florida. The District Court erred when it concluded that the
    Kostelac’s choice of forum as a matter of law was owed less deference simply
    because they filed suit in a state in which they were not residents. This court and
    the District Court are bound by precedent to apply a strong presumption to the
    plaintiffs’ choice of forum when the plaintiffs are American citizens who seek
    redress in American courts. Because the District Court did not apply that
    presumption when weighing the private interest factors, it abused its discretion.
    III.
    3
    These private interest factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to evidence in the
    competing fora; (2) availability of witnesses and compulsory process over them; (3) the cost of
    obtaining evidence; and (4) the enforceability of a judgment. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
    Produce N.A., Inc., 
    578 F.3d 1283
    , 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).
    5
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    Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal under the insurance policy’s forum-
    selection clause for improper venue.4 Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
    
    148 F.3d 1285
    , 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a motion to dismiss upon the
    basis of a forum-selection clause is properly brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(3) as a motion to dismiss for improper venue). The forum-selection clause
    reads as follows:
    If the policy holder has his usual place of residency or a temporary
    place of residence in Germany, and if, during the period of the
    insurance contract, an insurable claim happens abroad[,] complaints in
    this matter can only be heard before a German court.
    Because this is a removal case premised on diversity of citizenship, we look
    to the Erie5 doctrine to determine whether state or federal law governs the
    enforcement of the forum-selection clause. Under the Erie doctrine, we first
    “determine whether state and federal law conflict with respect to the disputed issue
    before the district court. If no conflict exists, then the analysis need proceed no
    further, for the court can apply state and federal law harmoniously to the issue at
    hand.” Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 
    289 F.3d 1300
    , 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2002).
    4
    See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 
    257 F.3d 1249
    , 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e may
    affirm [the District Court’s] judgment on any ground that finds support in the record.”) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). The parties fully briefed the validity of this ground for dismissal.
    5
    Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
     (1938).
    6
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    There is no conflict between Florida and federal law regarding the validity
    of a forum-selection clause. In this context, 6 this circuit applies the test established
    in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1(1972), when reviewing a
    forum-selection clause. See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1292 (applying Bremen to
    international forum-selection clause). Florida law applies the same test. See
    6
    When a forum-selection clause calls for a suit to be brought in another federal court, 28
    U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs the court’s decision whether to enforce the clause. See Stewart Org.,
    Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 
    487 U.S. 22
    , 32 (1988) (noting that, as between conflicting state and federal
    law over a matter of procedure, the instructions of Congress are supreme); see also 28 U.S.C. §
    1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
    may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
    brought.”). When the forum-selection clause requires litigation in another country, federal
    statutory provisions governing the transfer of cases between federal district courts, such as 28
    U.S.C. § 1404(a), do not apply. See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1290 n.3.
    The Kostelacs claim that venue in a removed case is governed solely by the federal
    removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
    Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
    States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the
    United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”).
    Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kerobo v. Southwestern Clean Fuels, Corp., 
    285 F.3d 531
    , 535–36 (6th Cir. 2002), the Kostelacs argue that once the case was removed pursuant to §
    1441(a), this rendered venue proper as a matter of statutory law and therefore precludes a finding
    of improper venue based on a forum-selection clause under Rule 12(b)(3).
    We are not persuaded. The removal of an action from state to federal court does not
    waive any Rule 12(b) defenses, including seeking a Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal based on a forum-
    selection clause. 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1395 (3d ed.
    2007). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “apply to a civil action after it is removed from a
    state court,” without exception. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1). As the Supreme Court has indicated,
    “Congress has directed the District Court after a case has been removed to proceed therein as if
    the suit had been originally commenced in said district court.” Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 
    319 U.S. 448
    , 454 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, parties are free to raise timely
    12(b)(3) motions after removal and under Lipcon, can properly seek dismissal for improper
    venue under this rule based on an international forum selection clause. Despite the Kostelacs’
    contentions, this is not inconsistent with the dictum in Hollis v. Florida State University, 
    259 F.3d 1295
    , 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is unnecessary (and, we think, confusing) to say, as
    have some courts and commentators, that a defendant who removes a case to federal court
    ‘waives’ any venue challenges.”).
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    Manrique v. Fabbri, 
    493 So. 2d 437
    , 440 (Fla. 1986) (adopting the Bremen test).
    Finding no conflict between state and federal law in this matter, we apply Bremen.
    A.
    According to Bremen, a forum-selection clause is “prima facie valid and
    should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
    unreasonable under the circumstances.” 407 U.S. at 10 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Forum-selection clauses will be enforced unless the plaintiff makes a
    “strong showing” that “(1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching;
    (2) the plaintiff effectively would be deprived of its day in court because of the
    inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of
    the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the
    provisions would contravene a strong public policy.” Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1292.
    As assignees, the Kostelacs stand in the shoes of Remos. Houk v. Comm’r
    of Internal Revenue, 
    173 F.2d 821
    , 825 (5th Cir. 1949)7 (“[A]n assignee . . . stands
    in the same position as its assignor had stood.”); accord Einstein’s Sons v. Shouse,
    
    5 So. 380
    , 384 (Fla. 1888) (“[A]n assignee is bound where his assignor would be
    bound.”). The Kostelacs do not possess any rights greater than what Remos
    formerly possessed under the agreement. Crossman v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp.,
    7
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
    Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to
    the close of business on September 30, 1981.
    8
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    273 F.2d 720
    , 725 (5th Cir. 1959) (“An assignee has no greater rights than his
    assignor.”); Hulet v. Denison, 
    1 So. 2d 467
    , 469 (Fla. 1941) (same). Because the
    Kostelacs function as Remos’s stand-in under the insurance policy, the relevant
    inquiry is to apply the Bremen factors to the actual parties of the contract—Remos
    and Allianz Global. See 407 U.S. at 12–14 & n.14 (examining whether the forum-
    selection clause was the product of fraud and overreaching at the time the contract
    was formed). As assignees, the Kostelacs cannot shift the Bremen inquiry to
    themselves in relation to the insurance contract. To the extent that the Kostelacs
    advance arguments along these lines, they are misguided.
    When examining Bremen’s first prong, whether a forum-selection clause is
    invalid due to overreaching or fraud, we first look to see if the clause was
    negotiated. See Liles v. Ginn-La West End, Ltd., 
    631 F.3d 1242
    , 1246 (11th Cir.
    2011) (employing a “reasonable-communicativeness” test where a forum-selection
    clause was non-negotiated). Because the Kostelacs were assignees to the Remos
    insurance contract, we do not review whether the Kostelacs had an opportunity to
    negotiate the forum-selection clause. Instead, we must determine whether the
    clause was negotiated at the time the contract was drafted between the original
    parties.
    The Kostelacs have not shown that the terms of the forum-selection clause
    were not negotiated between Remos and Allianz Global. Moreover, the Kostelacs
    9
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    do not allege that the clause was the product of fraud or overreach. Bremen’s first
    prong therefore does not support non-enforcement of the forum-selection clause.
    As to the second prong, the Kostelacs do not argue that it would be
    inconvenient or unfair to require Remos to bring suit in Germany. They do not
    contend that there were unforeseeable burdens at the time of contracting for Remos
    to bring suit in Germany or that any foreseeable burdens are so weighty that they
    would deprive Remos of its day in court. See Rucker v. Oasis Legal Finance,
    L.L.C., 
    632 F.3d 1231
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that where the burden was
    foreseeable “a plaintiff must show that litigating in the contractual forum will be so
    gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be
    deprived of his day in court”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whatever
    burden the Kostelacs might bear in bringing the case in Germany is immaterial to
    our analysis of their position as Remos’s assignees under Bremen. 8 Because the
    Kostelacs have not demonstrated that it would be inconvenient and unfair for
    Remos to litigate in Germany, the second prong does not render the forum-
    selection clause unenforceable.
    8
    The Kostelacs assert that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to review the
    insurance contract because it had not been translated from its original German into English until
    this litigation. This does not alter their status as assignees of Remos’s claims against Allianz
    Global, and it does not bear on Remos’s position regarding the enforcement of the forum-
    selection clause. Absent fraud, coercion, or the like, we will not disrupt the terms of a contract to
    which the assignees freely agreed to be bound because they failed to read its terms.
    10
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    Under the third prong, a forum-selection clause will not be enforced if “the
    chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy.” Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1292.
    The insurance contract included a choice-of-law clause stating that “this contract
    and any attachments are subject to German law.” The Kostelacs have not
    contested the application of this clause. Whether this case is litigated in Germany
    or in Florida, the court will apply German law to the suit. Accordingly, “the
    remedy will be determined under the same set of rules no matter where this case is
    heard.” Rucker, 632 F.3d at 1237. For this reason, the third prong does not render
    the forum-selection clause unenforceable.
    Under the fourth prong, a forum-selection clause will not be enforced if it
    contravenes public policy. The Kostelacs raised no argument under this prong.
    Given that the Kostelacs have not made a “strong showing” under Bremen to the
    contrary, we conclude that the forum-selection clause is enforceable. 9
    B.
    Finally, the Kostelacs claim that ambiguity in the forum-selection clause
    renders it inapplicable to their suit. They argue that, because the forum-selection
    clause applies only when “an insurable claim” occurs, Allianz Global cannot assert
    9
    The Kostelacs also argue that the forum-selection clause is fundamentally unfair. “All
    forum-selection clauses are evaluated for fundamental fairness. . . . In the context of negotiated
    forum-selection clauses, this analysis is confined to application of the Bremen test.” Liles, 631
    F.3d at 1254 n.19.
    11
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    there is an insurable claim for the purpose of the forum-selection clause while
    asserting that the claim is not covered.
    In Florida, as in this circuit, contractual language is ambiguous only if it is
    susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co.,
    
    29 So. 3d 1000
    , 1005 (Fla. 2010); accord Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 
    760 F.2d 1231
    , 1232 (11th Cir. 1985). We reject the Kostelacs’ interpretation that the
    forum-selection clause is limited to only those situations where Allianz Global
    recognizes that the claim is covered by the policy. As virtually all litigation under
    insurance contracts turns on whether or not a claim is covered, the Kostelacs’
    reading of the clause would render the contract self-defeating. See United States v.
    DBB, Inc., 
    180 F.3d 1277
    , 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a reading of a
    contractual provision that would lead to absurd results); Javier v. Gulf Life Ins.
    Co., 
    66 So. 2d 62
    , 63 (Fla. 1953) (“[A] construction leading to an absurd result
    should be avoided.”). We hold that the only reasonable reading of “an insurable
    claim” is a claim that may fall under the policy. Accordingly, the clause applies to
    this suit.
    IV.
    The Kostelacs have not made a sufficient showing to overcome the
    presumptively valid and enforceable forum-selection clause they inherited as
    assignees of Remos’s claim against Allianz Global. The Kostelacs “must honor
    12
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    their bargains” and seek redress in a German court. See Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1299.
    (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Accordingly, the judgment of
    the District Court is
    AFFIRMED.
    13