United States v. David Henry Wysocki, II , 463 F. App'x 814 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________               FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 11-12759            ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar        FEBRUARY 14, 2012
    ________________________           JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00089-EAK-EAJ-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAVID HENRY WYSOCKI, II,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 14, 2012)
    Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    David Henry Wysocki, II, pled guilty to assaulting his wife onboard an
    aircraft in violation of 
    49 U.S.C. § 46506
     and 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(4), a misdemeanor
    and petty offense, and the district court, on October 18, 2010, sentenced him to jail
    for a period of six months and a 12-months’ term of supervised release. Wysocki
    appealed his conviction and sentence but dismissed the appeal before it could be
    heard.
    Two days after beginning his term of supervised release, Wysocki was
    arrested for battering his wife and stepson. This led to his arrest for violating the
    terms of his supervised release. Prior to the hearing on whether his supervised
    release should be revoked, Wysocki moved the district court to set aside the order
    of supervised release and dismiss the violation. The term of the release was
    unlawful because the plain meaning of the sentencing statute prohibits the
    imposition of supervised release for the conviction of a petty offense.
    The Government responded with the argument that Wysocki invited the
    error by asking the court to place him on supervised release following his release
    from jail. Aside from that, the Government said, he could attack the term of
    supervised only in a motion to vacate sentence filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    The court denied Wysocki’s motion to set aside the supervised release and
    reaffirmed his sentence. Absent a successful § 2255 proceeding, the court held,
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    the sentence would stand.
    The court then held an evidentiary hearing on Wysocki’s violation of the
    conditions of his supervised release, found the violation as alleged, and sentenced
    Wysocki to 90 days in custody to be followed by six months in the residential re-
    entry program and three months of supervised release. Wysocki now appeals the
    court’s judgment.
    A district court’s revocation of supervised release is generally reviewed
    only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 
    524 F.3d 1248
    , 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). Issues of law are reviewed de novo. United States v.
    Mitsven, 
    423 F.3d 1264
    , 1265 (11th Cir. 2006). Further, we review de novo
    whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a claim. United
    States v. Diaz-Clark, 
    292 F.3d 1310
    , 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). However, we will not
    review on appeal any issue not raised in the parties’ initial briefs, finding such
    issues to be abandoned. United States v. Day, 
    405 F.3d 1293
    , 1294 n.1 (11th Cir.
    2005)
    Finally, we will not review an issue raised on appeal “if it has been waived
    through the doctrine of invited error.” United States v. Brannan, 
    562 F.3d 1300
    ,
    1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). The doctrine of invited error applies
    when a party induces or invites the district court into making an error. United
    3
    States v. Love, 
    449 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 2006). Applying this doctrine, we
    declined to review the district court’s imposition of a supervised release term
    where the defendant, prior to sentencing, repeatedly acknowledged that he was
    subject to a term of supervised release and requested that he be sentenced, in lieu
    of jail time, to time served and a term of supervised release. 
    Id.
    A district court, under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c), has jurisdiction to modify an
    imposed term of imprisonment only under specific circumstances. Diaz-Clark,
    
    292 F.3d at 1315-16
    . For example, a federal prisoner in custody and seeking relief
    from his conviction or confinement may file, pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , a
    motion to vacate or modify in the district court. Sawyer v. Holder, 
    326 F.3d 1363
    ,
    1365 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant serving a term of supervised release is “in
    custody” for purposes of Section 2255. United States v. Brown, 
    117 F.3d 471
    , 475
    (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, a defendant, facing re-incarceration upon the
    revocation of supervised release, may not sidestep § 2255 and challenge the
    validity of his original sentence during the revocation proceedings. United States
    v. Almand, 
    992 F.2d 316
    , 317 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. White,
    
    416 F.3d 1313
    , 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a prisoner may not challenge,
    “for the first time on appeal from the revocation of supervised release,” his
    underlying sentence and instead must bring a Section 2255 motion to vacate).
    4
    The assault onboard an aircraft was a Class B misdemeanor, as it carried a
    statutory maximum sentence of six months. 
    49 U.S.C. § 46506
     (here
    incorporating 
    18 U.S.C. § 113
    (a)(4)); 
    18 U.S.C. § 3581
    (b)(7). Furthermore, a
    Class B misdemeanor is considered a petty offense. 
    18 U.S.C. § 19
    .
    Pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), a sentencing court must impose a term of
    supervised release if the defendant has been convicted “for the first time of a
    domestic violence crime,” including a misdemeanor offense. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (a).
    A “domestic violence crime” includes any violent crime for which the defendant
    may be prosecuted federally that is committed against the spouse or other relative
    of the perpetrator. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3561
    (b). Section 3583 goes on, however, to
    prohibit courts, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided,” from imposing a term of
    supervised release for a conviction of a petty offense. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (b)(3).
    Here, Wysocki does not attack the district court’s denial of his motion to
    vacate and dismiss, nor does he explicitly argue on appeal that the court had
    jurisdiction to correct or modify his original sentence. He has thus abandoned this
    issue.
    Even assuming that Wysocki did not abandon this issue, the district court
    did not err in refusing to consider Wysocki’s challenge to his underlying sentence.
    Since Wysocki was challenging the facial validity of his underlying term of
    5
    supervised release, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
    consider the merits of his arguments, and Wysocki must instead file a § 2255
    motion to vacate or correct his sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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