Brian L. Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia , 288 F.3d 1277 ( 2002 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 19, 2002
No. 01-13151 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 99-0132-CV-CC-1
BRIAN L. GRECH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 19, 2002)
Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this § 1983 action, Appellant-Plaintiff Brian L. Grech (“Grech”) appeals
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant Clayton County,
Georgia (“Clayton County”). Grech’s complaint asserts that he was falsely
arrested in 1998 on an expired bench warrant from 1985 and that his false arrest
was caused by the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department’s custom and policy of
permitting invalid criminal warrants to remain on certain computer databases and
its failure to adequately train its operators in this regard.
Without addressing the merits of Grech’s constitutional claims, the district
court granted summary judgment to the defendant Clayton County, concluding that
Clayton County could not be liable under § 1983 in any event because the Clayton
County Sheriff is not a county policymaker when performing his law enforcement
duties. The parties do not dispute that the Sheriff is a final policymaker but
disagree regarding whether the Sheriff acts for the state or the county with respect
to the maintenance and recall of criminal warrants. Because our precedent has
treated § 1983 suits against Georgia sheriffs as suits against counties, we must
likewise treat the Clayton County Sheriff as representing Clayton County and thus
as a county policymaker. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to
Clayton County and remand to the district court for consideration of the merits of
Grech’s constitutional claims.
I. BACKGROUND
We first discuss Grech’s 1985 arrest that resulted in a bench warrant and
then his 1998 arrest on that warrant.
2
A. Grech’s 1985 Arrest
On March 16, 1985, law enforcement officers of Clayton County, Georgia,
arrested Grech for DUI and speeding. The following morning, he was released
from jail on bond and was given a court date of June 13, 1985, for both charges.
On June 13, 1985, Grech failed to appear in the Clayton County state court,
mistakenly believing that he could handle the charges from his residence in
Kentucky. Consequently, on June 24, 1985, the Clayton County state court issued
a bench warrant that revoked Grech’s bond and authorized law enforcement
officers to arrest Grech. That bench warrant on its face referenced the two case
numbers for the DUI and speeding charges and stated that Grech had failed to
appear in court as required on June 13, 1985.1
On June 24, 1985, the bench warrant was entered into the Criminal Justice
Information System (“CJIS”), which is an in-house computer database shared by
the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department and the courts. On July 5, 1985,
1
A defendant who fails to appear in court may be charged with failure to
appear under O.C.G.A. § 40-13-63 or bail-jumping under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-51.
The pre-printed type at the top of the bench warrant states “Bench Warrant Failure
to Appear,” but does not reference either statute. The parties dispute whether the
1985 bench warrant was sufficient under Georgia law for a separate charge of
failure to appear and whether that charge was effectively resolved when Grech pled
to the DUI and speeding charges. The district court did not address the merits of
Grech’s constitutional claims, and we need not decide these issues to resolve the §
1983 policymaker question in this appeal.
3
employees of the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department entered the bench warrant
into the Georgia Crime Information Center Network (“GCIC”). The GCIC is a
statewide criminal computer database administered by the State of Georgia through
the GBI and accessible by law enforcement agencies throughout Georgia. Both
the GCIC and the CJIS contain information on “wanted” individuals who may be
arrested by law enforcement.
In addition to issuing a bench warrant, the Clayton County state court sent
Grech a letter informing him that he had missed his court date and that his
appearance in court was necessary. Soon thereafter, Grech voluntarily returned to
Georgia for his court appearance. On July 12, 1985, Grech entered a plea of nolo
contendere on the speeding ticket and pled guilty to DUI in the Clayton County
state court. As a result, Grech was fined and sentenced to twelve months of
probation. At his court hearing, the state court judge reprimanded Grech for
missing his previous court date.
Grech alleges that he was not informed that a bench warrant had been issued
by the state court only a few weeks earlier. Grech assumed that the charges against
him were taken care of after he entered the pleas and paid his fine. Despite the
dispositions of the offenses underlying the bench warrant, the Clayton County
Sheriff’s Department failed to remove the bench warrant from the GCIC and CJIS
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systems. Instead, the bench warrant remained active for thirteen years on both the
GCIC and CJIS until July 3, 1998.2
B. The GCIC System
The Clayton County Sheriff’s Department has employees trained as
terminal operators who enter criminal warrants into the GCIC system and who are
instructed to validate the outstanding warrants in the GCIC system annually to
safeguard against invalid warrants remaining on the system. As part of the
validation process, terminal operators are supposed to contact the entity that issued
the warrant to verify that the warrant has not been recalled or withdrawn. The
State of Georgia requires that terminal operators complete the GCIC training
workbooks and certification requirements. The terminal agency coordinator is an
employee of the Sheriff’s Department who has completed advanced GCIC training
and certification requirements. The terminal agency coordinator supervises the
2
The bench warrant referencing the DUI and speeding charges was not
cleared from the CJIS until July 3, 1998. Grech’s CJIS entry, however, indicated
that on March 16, 1985, Grech pled guilty to the DUI charge and entered a nolo
contendere plea on the speeding charge. In their depositions, both Captain Glaze
and warrant officer Melba Hensel indicated that there may have been an error in
Grech’s CJIS entry because March 16, 1985, was the date on which the DUI and
speeding citations were given, rather than the date on which Grech entered his
pleas.
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training and certification of terminal operators and acts as a liaison between the
GCIC and Sheriff’s Department.
In addition, the GBI audits law enforcement agencies, such as the Clayton
County Sheriff’s Department, every two years to ensure compliance with the GCIC
rules and regulations. Auditors obtain a statistical sample of active wanted,
missing person, and stolen vehicle files from the audited agency and review its
files for compliance with the GCIC rules and regulations, including a review of the
agency’s training records and validation procedures. Grech contends that the audit
reports regarding the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department for 1996 and 19983
demonstrate that the Sheriff’s Department performed poorly in many of the areas
reviewed by auditors, particularly with respect to the training of its GCIC terminal
operators and the validation of the GCIC entries to ensure that only accurate, valid
information is maintained on the GCIC system.
C. Grech’s 1998 Arrest
On July 3, 1998, Grech was stopped by a City of Fayetteville police officer
because one of his car’s tail lights was not functioning. When the officer ran a
routine check on Grech’s driver’s license, the GCIC records revealed an
3
The Sheriff’s Department does not have records of audits conducted prior
to 1994, and the records of the 1994 audit are incomplete.
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outstanding bench warrant dating back to 1985. Grech tried to explain to the
officer that there must be some mistake if the records showed an outstanding
warrant since he had taken care of the 1985 charges. The police officer requested
advice from the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department on how to proceed. After
verifying its records, the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department responded that
Grech’s 1985 bench warrant was still active. Thereafter, the police officer arrested
Grech.
Initially transported to the Fayette County jail, Grech was later transferred to
the Clayton County jail where he was released on a bond of $1370.00. Grech spent
nine hours in jail. On August 17, 1998, a Clayton County judge returned the
posted bond of $1370.00 to Grech. The Clayton County Sheriff’s Department,
however, has never admitted that it erred in not withdrawing Grech’s 1985 bench
warrant from the GCIC and CJIS systems.4
D. Procedural History
On March 20, 1999, Grech brought a § 1983 action against Clayton County,5
alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was arrested in 1998 pursuant
4
See supra note 1.
5
Neither the Clayton County Sheriff in his official capacity nor any
individual law enforcement officer was named as a defendant in this case.
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to a 1985 bench warrant that Clayton County had failed to recall. Grech’s
complaint alleged that the false arrest was an unreasonable search and seizure
violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 1, Paragraph 13 of Georgia Constitution and a due process violation under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution. In addition, Grech claimed that
Clayton County committed numerous torts, including intentional infliction of
emotional distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
In the portion of the complaint relevant to the alleged federal constitutional
violations under § 1983, Grech stated that “Defendant’s failure to ensure adequate
training, policies, procedures, practices, and customs regarding the use of the
GCIC Computer System constituted a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference
and led directly and foreseeably to the arrest of the Plaintiff.” In addition, Grech
claimed that Clayton County had a custom and policy of permitting errors in
warrant information on the GCIC and of failing to prevent the posting and
maintenance of invalid or unconstitutional criminal warrants and warrant
information on the GCIC.
On February 3, 2000, Clayton County moved for summary judgment on the
state and federal claims. In its summary judgment motion, Clayton County
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asserted that it could not be held liable for the actions of the Clayton County
Sheriff or his deputies because the Sheriff was an agent of the state, not the county,
and, in any event, Grech had failed to produce evidence of an unconstitutional
policy or custom which was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional
violation. With respect to the state law claims, Clayton County argued they were
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.6
On August 22, 2000, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Clayton County on all claims. Relying on Fletcher v. Screven County, 92 F.
Supp.2d 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2000), the district court concluded that Clayton County
may not be liable under § 1983 for the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the
Clayton County Sheriff’s Department. The district court determined that Clayton
County is liable for the actions of its Sheriff only if the Sheriff’s actions constitute
county policy. The court recognized that the pivotal issue is whether the Sheriff
acts for the county or the state in making law enforcement policy. The court
concluded that “under Georgia law, Clayton County does not control or direct the
Clayton County Sheriff in the performance of his law enforcement duties” and that
the County particularly does not control or direct the Sheriff’s Department as to its
6
In his brief in opposition to Clayton County’s summary judgment motion,
Grech did not oppose Clayton County’s motion for summary judgment with
respect to the state law claims.
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compliance with GCIC rules and regulations or the training of its personnel in that
regard. Thus, the district court indicated that Clayton County could not be liable
because the Sheriff was not a final policymaker for Clayton County when
performing these law enforcement duties.
On May 8, 2001, the district court denied Grech’s motion for reconsideration
and motion to vacate judgment and add or substitute a necessary party defendant.
The district court’s order reiterated that “Clayton County cannot be liable under §
1983 for the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Sheriff or his employees.”
Grech timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
It is well-settled that a county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a [county’s] policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional] injury that the [county] as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.” See id. Therefore, a necessary step in
establishing a county’s § 1983 liability is identifying “‘those officials or
governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local
governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
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constitutional or statutory violation at issue.’” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520
U.S. 781, 785 (1997) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737
(1989)).
On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the Sheriff of Clayton County is a
final policymaker as to his law enforcement duties regarding the maintenance and
recall of criminal warrants. They also recognize that Clayton County may be liable
in this § 1983 action only if the Sheriff is a final policymaker acting for the county.
See Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc). However, the parties dispute what entity the Sheriff represents when
performing his law enforcement duties. Specifically, they dispute whether the
Sheriff acts for the state or the county with respect to the maintenance and recall of
criminal warrants.
This Court has never directly examined whether Georgia sheriffs are county
policymakers when performing their law enforcement duties. However, applying
the well-established rule that an official capacity suit against a governmental
officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent, this
Court in prior § 1983 cases has summarily treated official capacity suits against
Georgia sheriffs as suits against their respective counties. See Wayne v. Jarvis,
197 F.3d 1098, 1105-06 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
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against the sheriff in his official capacity stated claims against the county even
though the county itself was not sued and proceeding to address the merits of the
constitutional claims against the county); Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d
1303, 1322 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing that the plaintiffs’ suit against the
sheriff in her official capacity is the functional equivalent of suing the county, but
refraining from addressing liability under § 1983 because “Title VII provide[d] an
alternative basis for liability”).
Necessarily implicit in this Court’s treatment of § 1983 official capacity
suits against Georgia sheriffs as suits against counties is that the sheriff is acting
for the county. Although the underlying policymaker question was not analyzed
in these earlier § 1983 decisions, we are bound by the holding of the first panel of
this Court to address an issue of law, unless and until that holding is overruled en
banc or by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
1300 n.8, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001); Turner v. Beneficial Corp., 236 F.3d 643, 648-
50 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated by 242 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United
States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). Therefore, under our prior
panel precedent rule, we must treat Georgia sheriffs as representing counties and
thus as county policymakers with respect to their law enforcement duties.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the Sheriff of
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Clayton County is not a county policymaker and that Clayton County may never be
liable in a § 1983 action for the Sheriff’s actions.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Clayton
County with respect to Grech’s § 1983 claims.7 Because the district court did not
consider the merits of Grech’s constitutional claims, we remand to the district court
for consideration of Grech’s claims.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
7
As to the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to
Grech’s state law claims, Grech does not challenge this portion of the district
court’s order on appeal. Thus, we address only Grech’s § 1983 claims.
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HULL, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion in full and follow our precedent, but I
question that precedent for the reasons stated in Manders v. Lee, No. 01-13606,
___ F.3d ___(11th Cir. March 14, 2002).
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