Douglas Taron Edwards v. Katherine Fernandez-Rundell ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12938
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-20799-UU
DOUGLAS TARON EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KATHERINE FERNANDEZ-RUNDELL,
Miami-Dade County State Attorney,
DAVA TUNIS,
Miami-Dade County 11th Circuit Court Judge,
COLLEEN KAY,
Assistant State Attorney For Miami-Dade County,
J. SCOTT DUNN,
Assistant State Attorney For Miami-Dade County,
WARDEN, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 18, 2013)
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Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas Edwards appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. First, Edwards argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his preliminary injunction requesting transfer to the
custody of Miami-Dade County. Second, he argues that the district court erred in
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim because he demonstrated that
the defendants’ conduct violated the Constitution by restraining him in state prison
based on an erroneously entered judgment. Finally, he argues that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to grant him leave to amend his complaint prior
to dismissal. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2002). We liberally construe pro se pleadings. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Once a final judgment is rendered, an appeal is properly
taken from the final judgment, not the preliminary injunction. Burton v. Georgia,
953 F.2d 1266, 1272 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992).
In Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2006), we explained the
differences between a § 1983 civil rights action and a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
claim:
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The line of demarcation between a § 1983 civil rights action and a
§ 2254 habeas claim is based on the effect of the claim on the
inmate’s conviction and/or sentence. When an inmate challenges the
“circumstances of his confinement” but not the validity of his
conviction and/or sentence, then the claim is properly raised in a civil
rights action under § 1983. However, when an inmate raises any
challenge to the “lawfulness of confinement or [the] particulars
affecting its duration,” his claim falls solely within “the province of
habeas corpus” under § 2254.
Id. at 754. In addition, declaratory or injunctive relief claims that raise habeas
corpus claims are not cognizable under § 1983. Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063,
1066 (11th Cir. 1995).
We have held that even when the plaintiff did not seek leave to amend until
after final judgment, where a more carefully drafted pleading might state a claim, a
plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint prior to
dismissal. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991). With respect to
counseled defendants who failed to request leave to amend, we overruled this
holding. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel,
never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district
court.”). But pro se litigants are held to a less stringent standard, see Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), and our decision in Wagner
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did not disturb our decision in Bank with respect to a pro se litigant’s right to
amend. See Wagner, 314 F.3d at 542 n.1.
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Edwards’s complaint.
The district court rendered final judgment, and therefore, Edwards’s appeal
is properly taken from the final judgment, not the preliminary injunction. Burton,
953 F.2d at 1272 n.9. Because Edwards challenges the fact that he is being held in
the custody of the Florida State Prison system, on the basis of the underlying
judgment, his claim must be raised in a § 2254 habeas petition, not a § 1983
complaint. See Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754. If a court were to conclude that
Edwards’s commitment to the Florida State Prison system based on his conviction
was unconstitutional, this would necessarily imply that his conviction was invalid. 1
See id. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Edwards’s § 1983
complaint. Furthermore, the district court properly declined to grant Edwards
leave to amend his complaint because even a more carefully drafted complaint
could not state a claim under § 1983. See Bank, 928 F.2d at 1112.
Based on these considerations, we affirm.
1
Even if we were to accept that Edwards’s § 1983 claim is based on the place of
his confinement, Edwards’s claim would still fail to state a claim for relief. The Supreme Court
has held that “the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citing
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248
(1983).
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AFFIRMED.
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