Branch v. Federal Deposit Insurance ( 2012 )

Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13805
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:11-cv-00044-HL
JAY GREGORY BRANCH, SR.,
TERRI ROBERTS BRANCH,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as receiver for Tifton Banking Company,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 11-13806
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 7:11-cv-00045-HL
TIMOTHY V. BRANCH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 2 of 3
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as receiver for Tifton Banking Company,
Interested Party-Appellant.
___________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
____________________________
(July 25, 2012)
Before JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges, and EDENFIELD,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
On November 12, 2010, the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance
closed Tifton Banking Company and appointed the FDIC as receiver of the bank.
Two months after Tifton closed, on January 13, 2011, the plaintiffs filed suit against
Tifton in Georgia state court. On March 28, 2011, the FDIC filed a motion to
substitute itself as a party for Tifton in the state court action. The FDIC attached to
its motion copies of the documents appointing it as Tifton’s receiver. Before the state
court could rule on the motion, the FDIC filed a notice of removal in the United
*
Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
2
Case: 11-13805 Date Filed: 07/25/2012 Page: 3 of 3
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court, arguing that the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the state court
had not entered an order substituting the FDIC as a party. The district court granted
the plaintiffs’ motion. It determined that since the FDIC had not been substituted in
the manner required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), it was not a party for
the purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B), the FDIC removal provision. The FDIC
appeals the district court’s remand order.
We recently addressed the issues raised in this appeal in FDIC v. North
Savannah Properties, LLC, — F.3d—, 2012 WL 2849488 (11th Cir. July 12, 2012).
We held that the FDIC becomes a party for the purposes of removal under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution; the
state court does have to enter an order of substitution for subject-matter jurisdiction
to exist. In light of our decision in North Savannah Properties, we vacate the district
court’s remand order. And because we conclude that the district court had subject-
matter jurisdiction over this case, we also vacate the district court’s order vacating its
prior order of substitution of the FDIC.
VACATED.
3