United States v. Obes Jeanty ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 2, 2012
No. 11-15148 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20360-PAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OBES JEANTY,
a.k.a. John Doe,
a.k.a. D.V.,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 2, 2012)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Obes Jeanty appeals his convictions for making a false statement in a
passport application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542, and aggravated identity
theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Jeanty argues that the district court
erred by accepting his guilty plea and by participating in plea discussions. After
careful review, we affirm.
Jeanty argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary both in the
“constitutional sense,” United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 476 (11th Cir. 1997)
(noting that due process requires a plea to be “voluntary”), and under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)–(2) (requiring districts
courts to ensure that defendants are aware of “the nature of each charge,” among
other things). However, Jeanty never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise brought to the district court’s attention any concerns about the alleged
deficiencies in the plea colloquy. Thus, his claims of error are subject to plain
error review. See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018–19 & n.2 (11th
Cir. 2005).
Under that standard, a defendant who seeks to obtain the reversal of his
conviction must show a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiencies in the
plea colloquy, he would not have entered the plea. See United States v. Brown,
586 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
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542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004)); cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (requiring same showing for a claim seeking to set
aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel). Here, even if one
were to assume that the plea colloquy was deficient, Jeanty has not suggested that
he might not have pleaded guilty. He therefore has failed to make the necessary
showing to obtain the reversal of his convictions.
Jeanty also argues that the district court impermissibly participated in plea
discussions, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).
According to Jeanty, the district court intruded on plea discussions when it stated:
“Compared to some of the defendants I have had I don’t know that Mr. Jeanty
deserved the pile of bricks.” This argument also fails. The district court made that
statement in the middle of the plea colloquy. Thus, the plea negotiations had
already taken place. The district court’s comment simply cannot be viewed as an
attempt to urge the parties to engage in such discussions or as an indication of the
court’s approval of its outcome. Cf., e.g., United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173,
1176 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding as impermissible the court’s suggestion that the
defendant “talk to his lawyer some and see if [not pleading guilty] is really what he
wants to do”).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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AFFIRMED.
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