United States v. Jonathan Derek Niblack , 257 F. App'x 192 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    DECEMBER 3, 2007
    No. 07-11954                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 07-00035-CR-BAE-4
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JONATHAN DEREK NIBLACK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (December 3, 2007)
    Before DUBINA, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Jonathan Derek Niblack (“Niblack”) appeals his 18-month
    sentence for misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4, for which the
    underlying offenses were bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and money laundering, 18
    U.S.C. § 1956. Niblack argues that the district court erred in calculating the
    advisory sentencing guideline range and, based upon that incorrect calculation,
    imposed an unreasonable sentence. Niblack contends that the district court erred by
    imposing a two-level specific offense characteristic enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
    2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 because Niblack was
    convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 4, not § 1956.
    Our review of sentencing after United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 125 S.
    Ct. 738, 
    160 L. Ed. 2d 621
    (2005) has two components: (1) the district court’s
    calculation of the advisory guideline range; and (2) the sentence’s reasonableness.
    United States v. Williams, 
    456 F.3d 1353
    , 1360 (2006), cert. dismissed, 
    127 S. Ct. 3040
    (2007). “We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing
    guidelines de novo. Because [Niblack] preserved this issue by timely objection [to
    the PSI], if there was error we will reverse unless it was harmless.” United States
    v. Paley, 
    442 F.3d 1273
    , 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). “A Guidelines miscalculation is
    harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sentence without the
    error. If the Guidelines calculation is correct, or if the miscalculation is harmless,
    we consider whether the sentence is reasonable.” 
    Williams, 456 F.3d at 1360
    .
    2
    As an initial matter, there is a question as to whether the district court ruled
    on Niblack’s objections regarding the application of a specific offense
    characteristic enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) and, therefore, whether we can
    conduct meaningful appellate review. “[T]he [district] court must resolve all
    factual and legal disputes raised in the addendum to the presentence report . . .
    during the . . . [sentencing] hearing.” United States v. Wise, 
    881 F.2d 970
    , 972
    (11th Cir. 1989). However, failure to do so does not warrant remand where the
    record allows us to undertake meaningful appellate review. 
    Id. at 973.
    Any failure to make such a ruling does not preclude meaningful
    review—and therefore, does not require remand—because the district court applied
    the guideline calculation as determined in the Presentence Investigation Report
    (“PSI”) and sentenced Niblack within the guideline range, and the PSI properly
    calculated the guidelines.
    Section 2X4.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that the
    base offense level for misprision of a felony is nine levels lower than the offense
    level for the underlying offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2X4.1. The offense underlying
    Niblack’s misprision conviction is money laundering,1 which is covered by
    1
    To find a single base offense for the multiple underlying offenses, the probation officer
    grouped the bank fraud and money laundering offenses into a single group and applied the offense
    level for money laundering because it yielded a higher offense level than the bank fraud offense.
    3
    § 2S1.1, see U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. Section 2S1.1 includes the following specific
    offense characteristic: “If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956,
    increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). Additionally, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3
    determines the relevant conduct in applying the guidelines. This section provides:
    Unless otherwise specified, . . . specific offense characteristics . . .
    shall be determined on the basis of the following: all acts and
    omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
    induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that
    occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
    preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
    detection or responsibility for that offense[.]
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1).
    The commentary to these provisions explains the extent to which the
    guideline provisions for the underlying offense apply to calculating the guideline
    range for misprision of a felony. “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that
    interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution
    or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
    guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 
    508 U.S. 36
    , 38, 
    113 S. Ct. 1913
    , 1915, 123 L.
    Ed. 2d 598 (1993). The commentary to § 2X4.1, the guideline applicable to
    misprision of a felony, directs the court to “[a]pply the base offense level plus any
    applicable specific offense characteristics [of the underlying offense] that were
    4
    known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant.” 2 U.S.S.G.
    § 2X4.1, comment. (n.2) (referencing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.10)). The
    commentary to § 1B1.3 states: “In the case of . . . misprision, . . . the conduct for
    which the defendant is accountable includes all conduct relevant to determining the
    offense level for the underlying offense that was known, or reasonably should have
    been known, by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.10). Specifically,
    application note 6 to § 1B1.3 states: “[A]n express direction to apply a particular
    factor only if the defendant was convicted of a particular statute includes the
    determination of the offense level where the defendant was convicted of . . .
    misprision of a felony in respect to that particular statute.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3,
    comment. (n.6). Application note 6 also offers § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) as an example of a
    factor requiring conviction of a particular statute. 
    Id. After reviewing
    the record, we conclude that the PSI properly calculated the
    guideline range. The commentaries to § 2X4.1 and § 1B1.3 make clear that the
    conduct relevant to determining the offense level for misprision is the same as that
    for the underlying offense—here, money laundering—including the applicable
    specific offense characteristics. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3, comment. (n.6, 10),
    2
    Niblack does not argue that the conduct and applicable specific offense characteristics were
    not known or reasonably should have been known by him. He argues only that the specific offense
    characteristic regarding a conviction under § 1956 is inapplicable because he was convicted under
    § 4.
    5
    2X4.1, comment. (n.2). Thus, the guidelines and their commentary direct the
    probation officer and the court to determine the offense level for the underlying
    offense exactly as they would have had the defendant been convicted of that
    offense. From there, they then apply the misprision guideline provision. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2X4.1. Had Niblack committed money laundering, he would have been
    convicted under the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and therefore,
    been subject to a two-level specific offense characteristic enhancement pursuant to
    § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for conviction under § 1956. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956; U.S.S.G. §
    2S1.1(b)(2)(B). The offense level for the underlying offense of Niblack’s
    misprision conviction is, applying the guidelines and commentary, as discussed
    above, the same. Therefore, the two-level specific offense characteristic
    enhancement pursuant to § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for conviction under § 1956 applied.
    The probation officer and the district court applied the guidelines in a manner
    consistent with this analysis, and the district court sentenced Niblack within the
    resultant sentencing range. We conclude, therefore, that the guideline calculation
    did not result in an unreasonable sentence. Accordingly, we affirm Niblack’s
    sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-11954

Citation Numbers: 257 F. App'x 192

Judges: Dubina, Carnes, Barkett

Filed Date: 12/3/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024