Toni Lynn Bell v. Kerzner International Limited , 503 F. App'x 669 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-13441 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 23, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-23755-PAS
TONI LYNN BELL, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Paul Neil Bell, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KERZNER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED,
a Bahamian company,
ISLAND HOTEL COMPANY LIMITED,
a Bahamian company,
PARADISE ISLAND LIMITED,
a Bahamian company,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 23, 2012)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Toni Lynn Bell (“Bell”), as Personal Representative of the Estate of her
husband Paul Neil Bell, filed suit in the district court for the Southern District of
Florida against Kerzner International Limited, Island Hotel Company Limited, and
Paradise Island Limited (collectively the “Kerzner Defendants”). The complaint
alleges that the Kerzner Defendants own and operate the Atlantis Resort (the
“Resort”) located on Paradise Island, Bahamas. Bell seeks relief for the Kerzner
Defendants’ negligent response to a medical emergency Paul Bell experienced at the
Resort.
The Bells traveled from their home in California to the Resort for the 2009
Miss Universe Pageant. Paul Bell was hired to work on the pageant’s production
team. When the Bells checked into the Resort they signed an agreement on the back
of a guest registration form that contained a clause selecting the Supreme Court of the
Bahamas as the exclusive venue for certain claims that might arise against the
Kerzner Defendants.
After Bell filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, the Kerzner Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the forum selection clause in the
guest registration form. In the alternative, the motion to dismiss argued that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens warranted dismissal of the complaint so that the
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case could be tried in the Bahamas. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
on both of these grounds. Bell appeals, challenging this order.
Bell raises two issues on appeal: whether the court erred by dismissing the
action based on (1) the forum selection clause or (2) forum non conveniens. We
decide that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action on
grounds of forum non conveniens. Because this provides an adequate basis for the
court’s dismissal, we need not address whether the court erred in its forum selection
clause analysis.
“This Court ‘may only reverse a district court’s dismissal based on forum non
conveniens if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.’” Wilson v. Island Seas Invs.,
Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009)). When applying this
standard, we must affirm unless we find “that the district court has made a clear error
of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. at 1269 (quoting Aldana,
590 F.3d at 1288). “Where the court has considered all relevant public and private
interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision
deserves substantial deference.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102
S. Ct. 252, 266 (1981) (citations omitted).
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The familiar forum non conveniens analysis requires that the trial court
consider: (1) whether an adequate alternative forum exists;1 (2) whether the private
interest factors favor the alternative forum, “weighing in the balance a strong
presumption against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial forum choice”; (3) if the balance of
private interests is at or near equipoise, whether the public interest factors tip the
balance in favor of the alternative forum; and (4) whether “plaintiffs can reinstate
their suit in the alternate forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Aldana,
578 F.3d at 1289-90 (citations omitted). Bell primarily argues that the district court
erred by failing to afford her choice of forum substantial deference.
Bell is correct that “this Circuit [has] long mandated that district courts ‘require
positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances, and should be thoroughly
convinced that material injustice is manifest before exercising any such discretion as
may exist to deny a United States citizen access to the courts of this country.’” SME
Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 1101 (11th
Cir. 2004) (quoting La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1983)). However, Bell’s assertion that the district court failed to apply that
standard in this case is incorrect. At the beginning of the district court’s discussion
of the private interest factors, it recognized there was a “strong presumption” in favor
1
Bell has agreed that this factor is not at issue.
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of the plaintiff’s choice of forum. (Dkt. 55 at 9.) Then, in its balance of the private
interest factors, the court concluded that retaining the case in the plaintiff’s chosen
forum would “create manifest injustice.” (Id. at 21.) In fact, the court found that the
majority of the private interest factors favored a Bahamian forum and it was only the
strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s forum that brought the balance of these
factors to equipoise.
As evidence of the district court’s application of the wrong legal standard, Bell
cites the following sentence from the court’s order: “However, the presumption that
a plaintiff’s chosen forum is appropriate is diminished somewhat when a plaintiff
chooses to sue in a forum in which she does not reside.” (Id. at 9.) Bell argues this
statement contravenes our precedent in Wilson v. Island Seas Investments, Ltd. In
Wilson, however, we said that a district court considering contacts between a
domestic forum and a foreign forum errs if it only considers the contacts the case has
with a single judicial district. Wilson, 590 F.3d at 1271. The court held that the
district court should analyze the contacts with the United States as a whole.2 Id.Wilson does not address the error Bell is claiming here. Despite the statement Bell
disagrees with, the district court continued to apply and repeatedly reaffirmed the
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The district court also adhered to the dictates of our decision in Wilson. For example, in
the court’s discussion of the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, it considered
witnesses’ contacts with the Bahamas or the United States as whole. (Dkt. 55 at 11-12.)
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strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum. It did not deviate from
the dictates of our precedent and applied the correct legal standard.
Bell also asserts that the district court improperly placed the burden on her to
demonstrate that she would be prejudiced if the case were tried in the Bahamas. This
argument misrepresents the district court’s order. The court found that the defendants
would be prejudiced if the case continued in the plaintiff’s choice of forum. This
finding was based on the Kerzner Defendants’ evidence that they would be unable to
implead third-party tortfeasors and that the court would be unable to compel the
testimony of essential non-party witnesses. Of course, the court also decided that Bell
would not suffer undue prejudice if she refiled the action in the Bahamas. But, the
forum non conveniens analysis mandated that the court reach this conclusion. See
Aldana, 578 F.3d at 1290 (citations omitted). The court never shifted the burden to
Bell to support her choice of forum.
Bell’s other assertions of error essentially ask this court to reweigh the relevant
factors to reach a different result than the district court. But, our standard of review
requires that we not “substitute[] [our] judgment for that of the District Court.” Piper
Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S. Ct. at 267. The district court considered the
relevant public and private interest factors, and reasonably balanced those factors in
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a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion. It did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Bell’s case.
AFFIRMED.
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