Teresa Olivia Brown v. John Deere Product, Inc. , 460 F. App'x 908 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 16, 2012
No. 10-15339
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00107-JRH-WLB
TERESA OLIVIA BROWN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN DEERE PRODUCT, INC.,
JOYE SEILBE,
Industrial Relations Representative, John Deere Products,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 16, 2012)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Teresa Olivia Brown appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), of her pro se complaint. In her
complaint she alleges employment discrimination based upon gender. On appeal,
Brown argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to appoint counsel
because she had demonstrated her lack of finances and was unable to obtain an
attorney on her own. Brown also asserts that she is entitled to equitable tolling
because several days before the deadline for filing her complaint she experienced a
traumatic incident in which several individuals broke into her house and searched
for valuables and drugs.
I
We review a district court’s decision not to appoint counsel for abuse of
discretion. Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam). “A plaintiff in a civil case has no constitutional right to
counsel.” Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court has the discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent
plaintiff, but counsel should be appointed only in exceptional circumstances.
Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320. Exceptional circumstances generally exist “where the
facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a
trained practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990).
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The facts and legal issues in this case are neither novel nor complex, and
Brown’s filings evidence an ability to communicate with the court. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for
appointment of counsel.
II
A district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to satisfy the
statute of limitations is subject to de novo review. Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d
1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007). We review de novo the question of whether a
plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. Id. Pro se briefs and pleadings are to be
construed liberally. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
After exhausting administrative remedies, an individual with a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may initiate a civil lawsuit. Upon
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), a plaintiff has ninety days to file a complaint. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1). This time limit is non-jurisdictional and is therefore subject to
equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 102 S.
Ct. 1127, 1135 (1982). Nevertheless, we have held that “traditional equitable
tolling principles require a claimant to justify her untimely filing by a showing of
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extraordinary circumstances.” Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353. We have stated that
extraordinary circumstances may include “fraud, misinformation, or deliberate
concealment.” Id. at 1355. Equitable tolling may be warranted if a person has an
extreme mental illness that deprives a person of the ability to timely file. Hunter
v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308–10 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Brown concedes that her complaint was filed more than ninety days after
she received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Thus, unless Brown is able to
show extraordinary circumstances entitling her to equitable tolling, her complaint
was untimely. See Jackson, 506 F.3d at 1353.
Although Brown alleges that the district court clerk’s office should have
informed her that she could file for an extension of time by alleging extraordinary
circumstances, she has not identified any legal requirement in support of her
argument. Moreover, the inaction of the clerk’s office does not amount to
extraordinary circumstances because Brown has not alleged any misfeasance on
the part of the clerk’s office that would support tolling. See Id. at 1355. Nor did
the alleged home invasion, which took place two days before the ninety-day
deadline, amount to an extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitable
tolling. The facts alleged do not indicate that the experience deprived Brown of
the ability to timely file. Even after invasion, she had the ability to file her
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complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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