Gray v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 11, 2011
No. 10-14359 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01882-CCH
EMMA GRAY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 11, 2011)
Before WILSON and PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Emma Jean Gray appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s July 2008 denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Specifically, Gray
disputes the ALJ’s determination that her alleged physical and mental impairments
were not sufficiently “severe” to entitle her to disability benefits. After careful
review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I.
Gray first argues that the ALJ applied a more stringent standard than the law
allows when determining whether her impairments were “severe” at Step Two of
the disability-benefits analysis.1 She argues that the ALJ misapplied the
“significantly limits” language of the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, by
requiring a higher showing of severity than that set forth by the case law.
In reviewing the denial of disability benefits, we do not presume that the
ALJ “followed the appropriate legal standards . . . or that the legal conclusions
reached were valid.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per
1
The Social Security Administration applies the following five-step sequential analysis to
determine whether an applicant is entitled to disability benefits. First, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). If not, at the second step, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment or
combination of impairments from which the claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” Id. If there is
no severe impairment, the claimant is not deemed to be disabled, and the claim is denied. Id. At
the third step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s severe impairment meets or medically
equals a listed impairment. Id. If so, the fourth step requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s
“residual functional capacity” and whether she can perform her “past relevant work.” Id. If she
cannot perform her past relevant work, then the ALJ moves to the fifth step, considering whether,
in light of the claimant’s disability, she can perform other work. Id. Gray’s appeal concerns only
the second step—whether her impairment was sufficiently “severe.”
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curiam). Instead, we conduct “an exacting examination of these factors.” Id.(internal quotations omitted). An ALJ’s “failure to apply the correct legal
standards . . . [would] mandate[] reversal.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520,
1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
To be entitled to disability payments under the Social Security Act, a
claimant must prove that she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A person is “disabled” if she is unable “to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
ALJ must determine whether an impairment is severe, that is, “whether it
significantly limits [a] claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).2 Although the claimant bears the burden of showing
severity, the burden is mild, such that she need only show that her impairment is
“not so slight and its effect is not so minimal” as to be trivial. McDaniel v. Bowen,
2
Under the regulations, “basic work activities” include physical functions, such as
walking, lifting, pushing, or reaching, and also include mental functions, such as understanding,
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; using judgment; responding appropriately to
supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work
setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1–6).
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800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986). In other words, an impairment is not severe
“if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that
it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work,
irrespective of age, education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d
914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
We conclude that the ALJ did not apply an incorrect legal standard with
regard to Step Two. The ALJ simply used the language of the regulations in
stating that Gray’s impairments did not “significantly limit” her ability to perform
basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(c) (stating that, if the applicant
does not have an impairment that “significantly limits [her] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities,” no severe impairment will be found);
§ 404.1521(a) (“An impairment . . . is not severe if it does not significantly limit
[an applicant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”). The ALJ
found that even though Gray had medically determinable impairments, none had
significantly limited or were expected to significantly limit her ability to perform
basic work-related activities. See McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th
Cir. 1986) (noting that “the ‘severity’ of a medically ascertained disability must be
measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of
deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality”).
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Although a finding that a claimant’s impairments are not “severe” is unusual, the
ALJ’s opinion is thorough and addresses the medical evidence in the record. We
have no reason to conclude that the ALJ misapplied the legal standard for
determining “severity.”
II.
Gray’s second principal argument is that substantial evidence in the record
does not support the ALJ’s findings with regard to her hypertension, anxiety, and
depression. As to hypertension, Gray contends that the ALJ erred by giving
insufficient weight to certain physician statements. Furthermore, Gray argues that
medical reports in the record prove that her anxiety and depression were more than
merely slight abnormalities.
Where the ALJ applied the correct legal standard, we review whether the
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). “Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). If
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court must affirm “[e]ven if
the evidence preponderates against the [ALJ]’s findings.” Id. at 1158–59 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Gray’s hypertension,
anxiety, and depression were not severe impairments. First, the ALJ properly gave
little weight to the opinion of Jerry L. Thomas, M.D.—Dr. Thomas did not treat or
examine Gray, and though his report mentions her hypertension, it does not
suggest that her hypertension was serious enough to impair her ability to work.
Nothing else in the record, including documents from Grady Hospital, indicate
that Gray’s hypertension caused any significant, long-term limitations in her
functioning. Second, although Gray’s medical evidence reflects a history of
anxiety and depression, the record considered as a whole does not reveal long-
term functional limitations stemming from those impairments. The ALJ did not
err by giving weight to such evidence as the report of Brenard Francis, Ph.D., a
psychologist who found after a comprehensive, nearly three-hour evaluation that
Gray had a “high probability” of malingering.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Gray’s
impairments had only a slight effect on her ability to perform basic work activities.
AFFIRMED.
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