United States v. Courtnee Nicole Brantley ( 2012 )


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  •                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-15514         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FEB 16, 2012
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00298-JSM-MAP-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COURTNEE NICOLE BRANTLEY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________________________
    (February 16, 2012)
    Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The government appeals the district court’s grant of Courtnee Brantley’s
    motion to dismiss her indictment for misprision of a felony, 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    . We
    review the district court’s dismissal of an indictment de novo.1 United States v.
    Sharpe, 
    438 F.3d 1257
    , 1258 (11th Cir. 2006). Reversible error has been shown;
    we vacate the dismissal, reverse and remand the case for additional proceedings.
    Brantley’s misprision charge arose from a traffic stop: two police officers
    were killed. Brantley was driving; and her boyfriend, a convicted felon, was
    riding in the passenger seat. When the police stopped Brantley’s car, Brantley’s
    boyfriend shot and killed both officers and then fled on foot. Brantley drove
    away, failed to report the shooting, and later refused to answer questions about the
    shooter’s identity.
    A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Brantley with
    misprision of a felony. The indictment alleged that Brantley, “having knowledge
    of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a Court of the United States,
    that is, the possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, did
    knowingly and willfully conceal and not as soon as possible make known the same
    to some judge or other person in civil authority” in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
    .
    1
    Because the government preserved its arguments for appeal, we reject Brantley’s
    assertion that our review is limited to plain error.
    2
    Pursuant to the district court’s order, the government also filed a bill of particulars
    detailing Brantley’s alleged acts of concealment.2
    Following oral argument, the district court granted Brantley’s motion to
    dismiss the indictment. In doing so, the court concluded that nothing evidenced
    that Brantley took an affirmative act of concealment, a required element of the
    offense. The court also dismissed the indictment on Fifth Amendment grounds
    because Brantley likely would have incriminated herself by reporting her
    boyfriend’s crime to the authorities.
    On appeal, the government argues that the district court, pre-trial, lacked the
    authority to dismiss Brantley’s indictment based on the sufficiency of the
    evidence. We agree. “There is no summary judgment procedure in criminal
    cases,” and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not “provide for a pre-trial
    determination of sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Critzer, 
    951 F.2d 306
    , 307 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, “‘a court may not dismiss an indictment . . . on a
    determination of facts that should have been developed at trial.’” Sharpe, 438
    2
    The bill of particulars alleged that Brantley concealed a felon in possession of a firearm
    and ammunition by performing these affirmative acts: (1) fleeing the crime scene after witnessing
    a convicted felon shoot two police officers; (2) removing evidence from the crime scene by
    relocating her car; (3) disturbing the crime scene while fleeing; (4) having telephone contact with
    her boyfriend after the shooting; (5) sending text messages to her boyfriend after the shooting in
    which they discussed concealing her car; (6) sending text message to her boyfriend confirming
    her loyalty to him; (7) sending text messages to various other people instructing them to conceal
    her involvement in the shooting and her whereabouts; and (8) refusing to identify the shooter.
    3
    F.3d at 1263 (alteration in original). The sufficiency of the government’s evidence
    in a criminal case must be contested through a Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for
    acquittal at the close of the government’s case at trial. United States v. Salman,
    
    378 F.3d 1266
    , 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
    The government also challenges the district court’s conclusion that
    Brantley’s prosecution for misprision was barred by the Fifth Amendment. In
    making that determination, the district court relied on the facts set forth in the bill
    of particulars and concluded that “notification to the authorities would compel
    Brantley to give information which might tend to show that she had committed a
    crime.” The sufficiency of a criminal indictment, however, must be determined
    from its face. Critzer, 
    951 F.2d at 307
    . Because the district court looked beyond
    the face of the indictment in making this determination, the district court erred in
    dismissing the indictment on this basis. Moreover, nothing on the face of the
    indictment commanded a conclusion that Brantley’s Fifth Amendment rights were
    implicated.
    To be sufficient, an indictment must be specific enough “to inform the
    defendant of the charge against him and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in
    any future prosecution for the same offense.” 
    Id.
     These requirements are satisfied
    if the indictment tracks the language of the statute and sets forth the essential
    4
    elements of the offense. 
    Id. at 307-08
    . The essential elements of a misprision of a
    felony are “knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or
    participation.” Itani v. Ashcroft, 
    298 F.3d 1213
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Brantley’s indictment tracked the language of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4
     and charged her
    with both essential elements of misprision. As a result, the indictment was
    sufficient and should not have been dismissed. The sufficiency of the indictment
    was also not undermined by the filing of a more detailed bill of particulars. See
    United States v. Haas, 
    583 F.2d 216
    , 221 (5th Cir. 1978) (concluding that bare
    allegations in an indictment are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even
    when a bill of particulars is needed for the defendant to prepare a defense).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-15514

Judges: Tjoflat, Edmondson, Carnes

Filed Date: 2/16/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024