Cedric Lamar Jackson v. United States , 463 F. App'x 833 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-14484 MARCH 8, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:10-cv-00754-JTC, 1:05-cr-00479-JTC-AJB-3
CEDRIC LAMAR JACKSON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 8, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cedric Lamar Jackson, a counseled federal prisoner, appeals the district
court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and
sentence for conspiracy to commit several sex trafficking offenses. We granted a
certificate of appealability on the issue of “[w]hether the district court erred by
denying the claim that Jackson’s plea was not knowing and voluntary as counsel
was ineffective for failing to advise him that he would have to register as a sex
offender if he pled guilty.” Upon careful review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we vacate and remand for additional fact-finding.1
To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984). The Strickland standard applies to a claim that a plea was not
knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart,
106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). Accordingly, where a defendant enters a plea based
on the advice of counsel, “the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.” Id. at 369 (quotations omitted). Moreover, a defendant who pled
1
We review de novo a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is a mixed question
of law and fact. Payne v. United States, 566 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009).
2
guilty satisfies the prejudice standard of Strickland by establishing “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 370.
Jackson contends, under the reasoning of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (2010), and Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010), his
counsel’s erroneous advice that he would not have to register as a sex offender if
he pled guilty to the conspiracy charge constituted constitutionally deficient
performance. However, the district court did not reach the factual determination
of whether Jackson’s counsel misadvised him regarding the sex offender
registration consequences of pleading guilty. Moreover, although Jackson claims
he would not have pled guilty but for counsel’s alleged misadvice, the district
court did not reach the factual determination of whether rejecting the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485(“[A] petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.”).
If Jackson cannot establish both that counsel misadvised him and that a
decision not to plead guilty would have been rational, his claim that his guilty plea
was not knowing and voluntary due to counsel’s ineffectiveness will fail.
Additional fact-finding by the district court is therefore required. See Aron v.
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United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714–15 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that, if a § 2255
movant alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, the district court
should order an evidentiary hearing and rule on the merits of his claim). If
Jackson can meet his burden on these factual issues, the court should then examine
whether Padilla is retroactively applicable here, and, if so, determine how Padilla
and Bauder apply to the facts as established.2
VACATED and REMANDED.3
2
We pass no judgment on whether the district court should believe or disbelieve Jackson’s
assertions that he would not have pled guilty had counsel advised him that he would be required to
register as a sex offender.
3
The Government’s motion to supplement the record is DENIED.
4