United States v. Francisco Joseph Arcila Ramirez ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • USCA11 Case: 20-10564     Date Filed: 11/01/2021   Page: 1 of 25
    [PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-10564
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FRANCISCO JOSEPH ARCILA RAMIREZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20036-JEM-1
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564        Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 2 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                         2
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    HULL, Circuit Judge:
    After pleading guilty, Francisco Arcila Ramirez (“Arcila
    Ramirez”) appeals his 240-month sentence for providing material
    support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 2339B(a)(1). Arcila Ramirez challenges the district court’s
    imposition of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4.
    After review and oral argument, we conclude that the district court
    failed to make the required fact findings for the terrorism
    enhancement; thus, we vacate Arcila Ramirez’s sentence and
    remand.
    I. BACKGROUND FACTS
    A. Offense Conduct
    Colombian law enforcement were investigating how illicit
    firearms and ammunition were smuggled into Colombia and
    distributed to guerrilla paramilitary groups. A Colombian
    weapons trafficker began cooperating as a confidential source
    (“CI”).
    The CI met Arcila Ramirez, a Colombian national who was
    a legal resident of the United States. Arcila Ramirez and the CI
    discussed the demand for AK-47 style weapons in Colombia.
    Residing in Southern Florida, Arcila Ramirez enlisted “straw”
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564            Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 3 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                               3
    purchasers to buy those types of firearms, which he would smuggle
    into Colombia. 1
    From December 2017 to August 2018, Arcila Ramirez
    obtained approximately 45 firearms using straw purchasers in
    Florida and sold them throughout Colombia. Arcila Ramirez
    knowingly sold six of those firearms to the National Liberation
    Army (“ELN”), a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group that the U.S.
    State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization.
    The ELN historically focused on attacking economic
    infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons.
    While the Colombian government has successfully engaged in
    peace negotiations with other guerrilla groups, the ELN has
    remained opposed to any ceasefire and has increased its guerrilla
    attacks, including bombings of police stations. The ELN also
    engages in narcotics trafficking, extortion of companies, and
    kidnappings for ransom to fund its operations.
    In September 2018, U.S. law enforcement detected a pattern
    of repetitive firearms purchases by two of Arcila Ramirez’s straw
    purchasers. The ensuing investigation revealed that between April
    and August of 2018, Arcila Ramirez had paid the straw purchasers
    to buy firearms from multiple federal firearm licensees under false
    1While Arcila Ramirez was a legal permanent resident of the United States,
    he was born and raised in Colombia, lived there until 2004, and remains a
    Colombian citizen. Some of his family still live in Colombia, and he frequently
    visited Colombia for business and personal reasons.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021    Page: 4 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                       4
    pretenses and Arcila Ramirez then exported those firearms to
    Colombia for resale.
    On August 16, 2018, one straw purchaser bought six AK-
    style pistols for Arcila Ramirez in Southern Florida. On August 24,
    2018, Arcila Ramirez spoke with the CI in a recorded telephone
    call. Speaking in code, the CI told Arcila Ramirez that the ELN was
    “restless,” and Arcila Ramirez responded that he had “already
    made the purchase” and had also bought 100 magazines of
    ammunition. The CI said the ELN had him “flustered” for the
    ammunition magazines, to which Arcila Ramirez replied, “I’ll help
    you out, I’ll help you out.” Later, Arcila Ramirez concealed the six
    firearms in air compressors and shipped them and 100 magazines
    of AK-47 ammunition to Barranquilla, Colombia.
    On August 31, 2018, Arcila Ramirez flew to Colombia to
    broker the weapons shipment with the CI and a known weapons
    broker for the ELN. On September 5, 2018, Arcila Ramirez and the
    CI met with the ELN weapons broker and discussed the sale of the
    six AK-style pistols, which were the weapon of choice for high-
    ranking ELN personnel. The ELN weapons broker paid for the six
    pistols and told Arcila Ramirez that he wanted to buy all weapons
    and components Arcila Ramirez could bring to Colombia.
    On September 7, 2018, while under surveillance, Arcila
    Ramirez and the CI met at a storage location in Barranquilla,
    loaded the air compressors onto a truck, and took them to a
    location where they were cut open to retrieve the six pistols, the
    100 ammunition magazines, and 32 AR-15 semi-automatic
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 5 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                        5
    “uppers.” Unbeknownst to Arcila Ramirez, two of the AK-style
    pistols contained hidden GPS trackers.
    On September 10, 2018, again under surveillance, the pistols
    were driven to a rendezvous location with the ELN weapons
    broker in an area controlled by the ELN. The ELN weapons broker
    directed that the pistols be taken to a farmhouse in a rural area.
    The next day, the pistols were delivered to the ELN at the
    farmhouse. That same day, Arcila Ramirez flew back to Miami
    with $26,567, which he declared at the airport as attributable to his
    selling cars in Colombia.
    After returning to Florida, Arcila Ramirez focused on
    obtaining larger quantities of firearm components, such as triggers
    and rifle barrels, to bring to Colombia for assembly because parts
    were cheaper to buy, easier to smuggle, and did not require straw
    purchasers. In a recorded telephone call on September 16, 2018,
    the CI told Arcila Ramirez that the ELN had told him “everything
    is fine” and to assist Arcila Ramirez. They discussed weapons parts
    and what Arcila Ramirez had already purchased. The CI told Arcila
    Ramirez the ELN wanted the parts “as soon as possible.”
    After purchasing more air compressors, Arcila Ramirez flew
    to Cartagena, Colombia on October 17, 2018 and met with the CI.
    Arcila Ramirez took money from the CI and paid the fee to release
    the shipping container with the air compressors. The shipment
    was then split up between Arcila Ramirez’s brother and a friend.
    Two weeks later, Colombian National Police arrested the brother
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564           Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 6 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                              6
    and the friend and seized numerous firearm parts, ammunition
    magazines, and the air compressors.
    B. Arrest
    On January 11, 2019, Arcila Ramirez was arrested in the
    United States. Arcila Ramirez waived his Miranda rights and
    admitted to using straw purchasers to buy firearms on his behalf,
    deliberately concealing those firearms in the air compressors, and
    smuggling the firearms into Colombia for resale. Arcila Ramirez
    admitted that the firearms had “to be for guerillas or delinquents,”
    noting that the “ELN is over there.” Arcila Ramirez explained that
    it was better for the guerillas to get firearm parts because they were
    cheaper. Arcila Ramirez admitted that he was participating in
    sending weapons to Colombia, but said he was not part of or
    involved with a group. 2
    2 During his post-arrest interview, Arcila Ramirez admitted that he was aware
    that some of the firearms and firearm parts he sent to the Colombian weapons
    broker would go to “groups,” including “criminals, guerillas, para-military or
    whatever else is in Colombia” but he did not know which groups. Arcila
    Ramirez was adamant he was not “part of that world” and had “never seen a
    guerrilla in [his] life.” When an agent pressed Arcila Ramirez to admit that,
    even though he did not “know in whose hands that will end up,” he was
    “participating in this” by sending firearms and parts to Colombia, Arcila
    Ramirez agreed, stating, “Yes, I am participating in that. I know that. Okay,
    I am participating in that but I am not—not part of a group. I am not involved
    in a group, I mean, I am not part of a group.”
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 7 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                        7
    C. Indictment and Guilty Plea
    A superseding indictment charged Arcila Ramirez with:
    (1) conspiring to illegally deal firearms in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (a)(1)(A), and transport them to foreign customers in
    Colombia, all in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     (Count One); (2) four
    counts of making false statements in connection with the
    acquisition of firearms, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(6) and 2
    (Counts Two through Five); (3) dealing in firearms without a
    license, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (a)(1)(A) and 2 (Count Six);
    (4) conspiring to provide material support to the ELN, a foreign
    terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)
    (Count Seven); and (5) knowingly providing material support to
    the ELN, a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    §§ 2339B(a)(1) and 2 (Count Eight).
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Arcila Ramirez pled guilty to
    Count Eight, the substantive material support offense. Count
    Eight alleged that from August 2018 to January 2019, Arcila
    Ramirez knowingly provided material support, including property,
    weapons, firearm parts and components, and services, to the ELN,
    while knowing that the ELN was a designated foreign terrorist
    organization and that the ELN engages in and had engaged in
    terrorist activity and terrorism.
    In exchange for the plea, the government agreed to dismiss
    the remaining seven counts and to recommend a three-level
    reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1(a)-(b). The plea agreement advised that the government
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564            Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 8 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                               8
    planned to seek a terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4
    and that Arcila Ramirez was free to challenge the terrorism
    enhancement.3
    Arcila Ramirez agreed to the government’s factual proffer,
    which stipulated, inter alia, that: (1) from August 2018 to January
    2019, Arcila Ramirez knowingly provided material support to the
    ELN, knowing that the ELN engaged in, or engages in, terrorist
    activity or terrorism; (2) on August 31, 2018, Arcila Ramirez flew
    to Colombia to negotiate the sale of six AK-style firearms with a
    conspirator he knew at that time “was a weapons broker for the
    ELN and other criminal and paramilitary groups”; and (3) at their
    September 5, 2018 meeting, Arcila Ramirez agreed to sell the six
    firearms to the conspirator “for the ELN” and to selling him
    additional firearms in the future.
    D. Sentencing
    A presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended an
    adjusted offense level of 39, using: (1) a base offense level of 26
    under U.S.S.G. § 2M5.3(a); (2) a two-level increase under
    § 2M5.3(b)(1)(A)-(B) because the offense involved the provision of
    firearms; (3) a two-level increase under § 3B1.1(c) because Arcila
    3 Arcila Ramirez also agreed to the entry of a stipulated judicial order of
    removal pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
     because he was removable pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(4)(B), which deems deportable an alien who has engaged in a
    terrorist activity or who the Secretary of State determines has associated with
    a terrorist organization. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(4)(B) (cross-referencing 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(3)(B) & (F)).
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021    Page: 9 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                       9
    Ramirez was an organizer or leader; (4) a 12-level increase under
    § 3A1.4(a) because his offense “involved,” or “was intended to
    promote,” a “federal crime of terrorism”; and (5) a three-level
    decrease under § 3E1.1(a)-(b) for acceptance of responsibility. The
    § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement increased Arcila Ramirez’s
    criminal history category from I to VI. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a)-(b).
    His total offense level of 39 and criminal history category of
    VI yielded an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life
    imprisonment. The statutory maximum for Arcila Ramirez’s
    § 2339B(a)(1) conviction was 20 years. Thus, his guidelines prison
    term became 240 months under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).
    Arcila Ramirez objected to the PSI’s recommendation that
    he receive the § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement. For purposes of
    that guideline, the term “federal crime of terrorism” is defined by
    18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), which requires that the offense: (1) “is
    calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
    intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
    conduct”; and (2) “is a violation of” an enumerated statute.
    U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1.
    At sentencing, the district court asked whether Arcila
    Ramirez was arguing that the ELN “wasn’t a terrorist organization
    or that he didn’t know it was a terrorist organization or what?”
    Arcila Ramirez responded that he was not making either of those
    arguments.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564        Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 10 of 25
    20-10564                Opinion of the Court                        10
    Instead, Arcila Ramirez argued U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 required
    that the government prove not only his material support to the
    ELN, a known terrorist organization, but also that his offense
    conduct was “calculated” to influence, affect, or retaliate against
    the Colombian government. In addition to terrorism, the ELN
    engages in general criminal activity, such as drug trafficking and
    kidnapping. Defense counsel argued that, even if a jury found
    Arcila Ramirez guilty of the § 2339B(a)(1) material support offense,
    the district court would still have to find that Arcila Ramirez had
    the specific intent required for the enhancement, i.e., that his
    offense was “calculated” to influence or affect government
    conduct. Defense counsel emphasized that the terrorism
    enhancement was concerned about what Arcila Ramirez intended,
    not what the terrorist organization did. Arcila Ramirez claimed his
    motive was to profit financially, not to retaliate against the
    Colombian government.
    After extensive colloquy with the parties’ counsel, the
    district court overruled Arcila Ramirez’s objection to the terrorism
    enhancement. The district court’s comments at sentencing suggest
    it believed that the mere fact that Arcila Ramirez pled guilty to
    knowingly providing material support to a known terrorist
    organization per se satisfied § 3A1.4’s “calculated” or specific intent
    requirement. In any event, the district court made no fact findings
    as to the § 3A1.4 enhancement.
    After denying Arcila Ramirez’s requests for either a
    downward departure or a variance, the district court heard Arcila
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564         Date Filed: 11/01/2021       Page: 11 of 25
    20-10564                 Opinion of the Court                           11
    Ramirez’s allocution. Arcila Ramirez maintained that he had no
    nexus to terrorism, was not opposed to any government politically,
    and was not a religious extremist. Ultimately, the district court
    sentenced Arcila Ramirez to 240 months’ imprisonment. Arcila
    Ramirez timely appealed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Arcila Ramirez challenges the district court’s application of
    the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a). 4
    A. Section 3A1.4(a)
    Section 3A1.4(a) provides that the terrorism enhancement
    applies if the defendant’s “offense is a felony that involved, or was
    intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” U.S.S.G.
    § 3A1.4(a). The structure of § 3A1.4 establishes two separate bases
    for applying the enhancement: (1) when the defendant’s offense
    “involved” a federal terrorism crime; or alternatively, (2) when his
    offense was “intended to promote” a federal terrorism crime.
    On appeal, the government relies on only the “involved”
    prong of § 3A1.4(a) and not its “intended to promote” prong. Our
    inquiry thus becomes whether Arcila Ramirez’s offense “involved
    . . . a federal crime of terrorism.” For this case, the key terms are
    “involved” and “a federal crime of terrorism.”
    4 We review “the district court’s interpretation and application of the
    Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual findings for clear
    error.” United States v. Jayyousi, 
    657 F.3d 1085
    , 1114 (11th Cir. 2011).
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564           Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 12 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                              12
    B. “Involved”
    This Court already has concluded that the term “involved”
    in this guideline “means to ‘include.’” United States v. Mandhai,
    
    375 F.3d 1243
    , 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
    Graham, 
    275 F.3d 490
    , 516 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also United States
    v. Arnaout, 
    431 F.3d 994
    , 1001 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The ordinary and
    plain meaning of ‘involved’ means ‘to include.’”) (citing Random
    House Webster’s College Dictionary 1042 (2d ed. 1997)). As the
    Fifth Circuit explained, an offense “involved” a federal crime of
    terrorism if the crime of conviction itself is a federal crime of
    terrorism or if the relevant conduct includes such a crime. United
    States v. Fidse, 
    862 F.3d 516
    , 522 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Similarly, the Second Circuit concluded that “a defendant’s
    offense ‘involves’ a federal crime of terrorism when his offense
    includes such a crime, i.e., the defendant committed, attempted, or
    conspired to commit a federal crime of terrorism . . . or his relevant
    conduct includes such a crime.” United States v. Awan, 
    607 F.3d 306
    , 313-14 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Wright, 
    747 F.3d 399
    , 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating “the terrorism enhancement can be
    applied to inchoate offenses, such as attempt and conspiracy”);
    Graham, 
    275 F.3d at 516
     (same). 5
    5In addition to the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh
    Circuits have also concluded that the “involved” prong of § 3A1.4 requires that
    the defendant’s offense of conviction or relevant conduct “include” a federal
    crime of terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). See United States v.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564          Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 13 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                            13
    C. “Federal Crime of Terrorism” Defined in § 2332b(g)(5)
    As to the other key term, the application notes to § 3A1.4(a)
    state that “[f]or purposes of this guideline, ‘federal crime of
    terrorism’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C.
    § 2332b(g)(5).” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1. In turn, the § 2332b(g)(5)
    statute provides that a “[f]ederal crime of terrorism” means “an
    offense that”:
    (1) “is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
    government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
    government conduct,” and
    (2) “is a violation of” one of the criminal statutes listed in
    § 2332b(g)(5)(B).
    18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)-(B). This definition is written in the
    conjunctive, and both prongs must be satisfied. Fidse, 862 F.3d at
    524 & n.6; Graham, 
    275 F.3d at 514
    .
    Arcila Ramirez’s statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, is
    one of the listed statutes. So, under the “involved” prong of
    U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, the issue becomes whether Arcila Ramirez’s
    offense or relevant conduct was “calculated” to influence, affect, or
    retaliate against government conduct.
    Kobito, 
    994 F.3d 696
    , 702 (4th Cir. 2021); Arnaout, 431 F.3d at 1001; Graham,
    
    275 F.3d at 516
    .
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564           Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 14 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                              14
    D. Eleventh Circuit Precedent
    Our Court has affirmed U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a) terrorism
    enhancements in two decisions that we now outline. See United
    States v. Mandhai, 
    375 F.3d 1243
     (11th Cir. 2004); United States v.
    Jayyousi, 
    657 F.3d 1085
     (11th Cir. 2011).
    1. Mandhai in 2004
    In Mandhai, the defendant met two individuals who
    expressed a desire to “wage jihad in Florida.” 
    375 F.3d at 1245-46
    .
    Both men secretly were cooperating with the FBI. 
    Id.
     The
    defendant asked the FBI informants for financial support and help
    with his plot to bomb electrical transformers in Florida “in
    retaliation for the U.S. government’s support of Israel and other
    countries that oppress Muslims.” 
    Id. at 1246
    . The defendant spoke
    at a meeting to recruit men for “jihad training,” and asked one FBI
    informant to obtain bombs so he could complete his plan. 
    Id.
     After
    arrest, the defendant confessed that he was planning to blow up
    electrical sites and demand the release of Muslim prisoners and
    changes in the United States’ policy in the Middle East. 
    Id.
    The defendant pled guilty to conspiring to destroy buildings
    affecting interstate commerce by means of fire and explosives, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (n). 6 
    Id. at 1245, 1247
    . The sentencing
    court applied § 3A1.4’s terrorism enhancement. Id. at 1247.
    6 Section 844(i) makes it a crime to “maliciously damage[] or destroy[], or
    attempt[] to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building,
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564           Date Filed: 11/01/2021         Page: 15 of 25
    20-10564                   Opinion of the Court                              15
    On appeal, the defendant contended that his conspiracy
    offense did not constitute a “federal crime of terrorism” as defined
    by 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). Id. The defendant argued that the
    object of his conspiracy—destroying buildings by fire or explosives
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (i)—was a listed “federal crime of terrorism”
    in § 2332b(g)(5)(B), but conspiracy to do so under § 844(n) was not
    listed. Id. Rejecting that argument, this Court pointed out that
    “[h]ad the Guideline drafters intended that § 3A1.4 apply only
    where the defendant is convicted of a crime listed in 18 U.S.C.
    § 2332b(g)(5)(B), they would have included such limiting
    language.” Id. Instead, the § 3A1.4 guideline “cast a broader net
    by applying the enhancement to any offense that ‘involved’ or was
    ‘intended to promote’ a terrorism crime.” Id.
    Under Mandhai, a defendant need not be convicted of a
    federal crime listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B). See id. It is sufficient if the
    defendant’s offense conduct “involved” or “intended to promote”
    a federal crime of terrorism listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B). Id. And
    “intended to promote” means that “a goal or purpose was to bring
    or help [others] bring into being a crime listed in 18 U.S.C.
    § 2332b(g)(5)(B).” Id. at 1248 (citing Graham, 
    275 F.3d at 516-18
    ). 7
    vehicle, or other real or personal property . . . .” 
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (i). Section
    844(n) makes it a crime to conspire to commit a § 844(i) offense. Id. § 844(n).
    7 The Second Circuit also has concluded that the “intended to promote” prong
    applies to defendants who “clearly ‘intend to promote’ federal crimes of
    terrorism committed by other persons.” Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 315
    . Thus, “even
    if [the defendant’s] crimes of conviction and relevant conduct did not satisfy
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564          Date Filed: 11/01/2021        Page: 16 of 25
    20-10564                  Opinion of the Court                            16
    The Mandhai Court also discussed the first prong of the
    definition of a “federal crime of terrorism,” which is an offense
    “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
    intimidation or coercion or to retaliate against government
    conduct.” 
    Id.
     Our Court concluded there was substantial evidence
    supporting the district court’s fact finding that the object of
    Mandhai’s crime—destroying buildings by fire or explosives—was
    to influence or affect government conduct, or to retaliate against
    past government action. 
    Id.
     We emphasized that “the terrorism
    enhancement does not hinge upon a defendant’s ability to carry out
    specific terrorist crimes or the degree of separation from their
    actual implementation.” 
    Id.
     Rather, the terrorism enhancement
    applied “even though the record reflects that Mandhai lacked both
    the means and the ability to carry out” the planned bombing
    without help “that was not present.” Id.
    2. Jayyousi in 2011
    In Jayyousi, the defendants were convicted of: (1) conspiring
    in the United States to murder, kidnap, or maim persons overseas,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 956
    (a)(1); (2) conspiring to provide
    material support, knowing or intending that they would be used in
    carrying out a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim overseas, in
    the calculation requirement for a federal crime of terrorism,” the
    enhancement will still apply if the government can prove that the defendant’s
    crimes or relevant conduct “were intended to promote a federal crime of
    terrorism committed or to be committed by other individuals.” 
    Id.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 17 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                        17
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
     and 2339A; and (3) a substantive 18
    U.S.C. § 2339A offense. 
    657 F.3d at 1091-92
    . The trial evidence
    showed that the defendants, while ostensibly engaged in charitable
    fundraising in a Muslim community in Florida, were, in fact,
    operating a “support cell” that sent funds, recruits, and equipment
    overseas to terrorist groups seeking to create Islamic states through
    violent jihad against secular governments. 
    Id. at 1092-1101
    .
    On appeal, two defendants challenged the district court’s
    application of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4’s terrorism enhancement. Id. at
    1114. The district court examined both prongs of § 2332b(g)(5)’s
    definition of a “federal crime of terrorism.” Id. at 1114-15. It
    determined that the defendants’ crimes were listed in
    § 2332b(g)(5)(B). Id. at 1115.
    The district court then explicitly found that “the defendants’
    activities were calculated to influence, affect, or retaliate against
    government conduct.” Id. at 1114. As to this fact finding, ample
    trial evidence established that the defendants “wished to impose
    Sharia throughout the Middle East and remove government in the
    process.” Id. at 1115. The district court reasoned (1) that the
    indictment charged that the object of the conspiracy was to
    advance violent jihad and to commit acts of murder and maiming
    for the purpose of opposing existing governments, and (2) thus
    there was (within the jury’s verdict) “a finding that the defendants’
    actions were intended to bring about the downfall of governments
    that were not Islamic or not Islamic enough.” Id. at 1114-15.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564      Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 18 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                      18
    On appeal, the defendants argued that “their benign motive”
    was to “assist[] the oppressed Muslims” in other countries with
    humanitarian aid and therefore their conduct “was not calculated
    to influence or affect the conduct of any [foreign] government.” Id.
    at 1114.
    This Court affirmed the terrorism enhancement. Id. at 1115.
    As to § 2332b(g)(5)(A)’s requirement that the defendants’ offenses
    be “calculated” to influence or affect government conduct, “[t]he
    record demonstrate[d] that the defendants’ support activities were
    intended to displace ‘infidel’ governments that opposed radical
    Islamist goals.” Id. The trial evidence included the defendants’
    statements “about their desire to impose Sharia, toppling existing
    governments in the process.” Id. This Court emphasized that
    “what the [defendants’] activity was calculated to accomplish” was
    relevant, not “the defendants’ claimed motivation behind it . . . .”
    Id. The defendants’ personal motive “is simply not relevant.” Id.
    (quoting Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 317
    ).
    E. Meaning of “Calculated,” a Statutory Term
    With this background, we examine whether Arcila
    Ramirez’s 18 U.S.C. § 2339B material support offense is a “federal
    crime of terrorism” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). As noted
    earlier, his § 2339B offense is a listed crime. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). The only issue is whether Arcila Ramirez’s
    offense was “calculated” to influence, affect, or retaliate against
    government conduct.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564      Date Filed: 11/01/2021    Page: 19 of 25
    20-10564              Opinion of the Court                      19
    We begin with the statutory term “calculated.” See 18
    U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). The ordinary and plain meaning of
    “calculated” is planned to accomplish a purpose or intended. See
    Calculated, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://
    merriam-webster.com/dictionary/calculated (last visited Oct. 21,
    2021) (“Planned or contrived to accomplish a purpose; Deliberate,
    intended.”); Calculated, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
    (“Planned so as to achieve a specific purpose; deliberate.”);
    Calculate, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“To plan or
    devise with forethought; to think out; to frame.”). “[C]alculated”
    means “planned—for whatever reason or motive—to achieve the
    stated object.” Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 317
    . “‘Calculation’ is concerned
    with the object that the [defendant] seeks to achieve through
    planning or contrivance.” 
    Id.
     (citing Calculated, Webster’s Third
    New International Dictionary Unabridged 315 (1986)).
    Other circuits have read the phrase “calculated to” as
    creating something akin to, or closely resembling, “a specific
    intent” requirement. See United States v. Alhaggagi, 
    978 F.3d 693
    ,
    699-700 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ansberry, 
    976 F.3d 1108
    ,
    1127-28 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mohamed, 
    757 F.3d 757
    ,
    759-60 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright, 
    747 F.3d 399
    , 408-
    09 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hassan, 
    742 F.3d 104
    , 148 (4th
    Cir. 2014); Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 317
    .
    The Second Circuit’s Awan decision discussed at length the
    “calculated” term and is instructive.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021    Page: 20 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                       20
    Defendant Awan was convicted of, inter alia, conspiring to
    provide, and providing, material support (funds) to the KCF, a Sikh
    terrorist organization in India, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
    Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 309-10
    . The district court found that there was
    insufficient evidence that the defendant’s conduct was “calculated”
    to influence or affect the conduct of government or to retaliate
    against government conduct under § 2332b(g)(5)(A). Id. at 312,
    316. The district court reasoned that it would be “speculative to
    conclude that the defendant . . . was motivated by a desire to
    influence the policies of the Indian government or retaliate for
    some unspecified wrong.” Id. at 316. Instead, the district court
    made a fact finding that the defendant’s motive in providing the
    funds to the KCF was “the prestige or potential influence he
    obtained by associating with [the KCF’s leader] and with the
    Pakistani intelligence services.” Id.
    In vacating the denial of the terrorism enhancement, the
    Second Circuit held, inter alia, that § 2332b(g)(5) does not require
    the government to prove the defendant’s motive for committing
    the crime of conviction. Id. at 313. The Second Circuit explained
    that the word “‘[c]alculation’ is concerned with the object the actor
    seeks to achieve through planning and contrivance,” rather than
    with the actor’s particular motive. Id. at 317. The proper focus of
    the “calculation element” of § 2332b(g)(5)(A) is not “on the
    defendant but on his ‘offense,’ asking whether it was ‘calculated,’
    i.e., planned—for whatever reason or motive—to achieve the
    stated object.” Id. The Second Circuit explained that “a person
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564        Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 21 of 25
    20-10564                Opinion of the Court                        21
    may intend and may commit an offense that is so calculated even
    if influencing or retaliating against government is not his personal
    motivation.” Id.
    As to Awan’s offense, the Second Circuit observed that
    “there [was] little doubt that Awan (1) knew that the objective of
    [the KCF’s leader] and the KCF was to influence the Indian
    government through violence, and (2) knew that the money he
    provided to the KCF would be used toward that end.” Id. The
    Second Circuit acknowledged that Awan “may have been
    motivated, as the district court found, by a desire for . . . prestige
    and potential influence.” Id. It concluded, however, that “the
    government could still prove that Awan’s offenses themselves
    were calculated to influence . . . the conduct of government . . .
    even if [Awan] lacked a specific political motive for committing
    them.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
    Without deciding the issue, the Second Circuit indicated
    that “if the evidence showed that Awan engaged in criminal
    conduct with knowledge that confederates solicited his actions to
    effectuate politically motivated bombings in India, or homicidal
    attacks on the country’s security forces or its political leaders, such
    proof could demonstrate that Awan’s crimes were calculated to
    influence the conduct of government even if he was not personally
    motivated by that object.” Id. at 317-18. The Second Circuit
    remanded for the district court to reconsider whether the evidence
    supported the terrorism enhancement. Id. at 318. With this
    background, we turn to Arcila Ramirez’s case.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564        Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 22 of 25
    20-10564                Opinion of the Court                        22
    We agree with Awan and our other sister circuits that
    “calculated” imposes an intent requirement. For U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4
    to apply, the government must satisfy the “calculated” prong of
    § 2332b(g)(5)(A). To do that, the government must show that the
    defendant’s offense was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate
    against government conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s
    personal motive.
    F. Analysis of Arcila Ramirez’s Terrorism Enhancement
    As noted earlier, the district court here made no fact findings
    as to the § 3A1.4 enhancement. Rather, the district court appeared
    to believe the mere fact that Arcila Ramirez had pled guilty to
    knowingly providing material support to a known foreign terrorist
    organization per se triggered the terrorism enhancement.
    It bears repeating that Arcila Ramirez’s § 2339B(a)(1)
    offense—providing material support to a foreign terrorist
    organization—requires that he know that the ELN is a designated
    foreign terrorist organization and that the ELN has engaged in or
    engages in terrorism or terrorist activity. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 2339B(a)(1). But § 2339B(a)(1) does not contain the additional
    requirement found in § 2332b(g)(5)(A) that the defendant’s offense
    be “calculated” (i.e., planned or intended) to influence, affect, or
    retaliate against government conduct. Rather, it is only the
    definition of a “federal crime of terrorism” in § 2332b(g)(5)(A) that
    requires the defendant’s offense be so “calculated.”
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564       Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 23 of 25
    20-10564               Opinion of the Court                        23
    To assume an offense listed in § 2332b(g)(5)(B) is per se a
    “federal crime of terrorism” without a separate finding as to
    “calculated” would render the “calculated” requirement in
    § 2332b(g)(5)(A) superfluous. Fidse, 862 F.3d at 524; United States
    v. Chandia, 
    514 F.3d 365
    , 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (vacating and
    remanding because the district court “did not make any factual
    findings related to the intent [i.e., calculation] element.”).
    To be sure, whether a defendant’s offense is calculated (i.e.,
    intended) to influence, affect, or retaliate against government
    conduct is a highly fact specific inquiry that requires examining the
    record as a whole. Sometimes, as in Jayyousi and Mandhai, the
    record will contain statements by the defendant expressing an
    intent to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct.
    See Jayyousi, 
    657 F.3d at 1115
    ; Mandhai, 
    375 F.3d at 1246
    .
    However, because a defendant often will not admit his full
    knowledge or intentions, the district court may find the requisite
    calculation or intent existed based on circumstantial evidence and
    reasonable inferences drawn from the facts. As the Second Circuit
    emphasized, a defendant’s knowledge that a terrorist organization
    solicited his actions to attack the government could demonstrate
    that a defendant’s crimes were calculated to influence government
    conduct, even if the defendant was not personally motivated by the
    organization’s object. See Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 317-18
    . Personal
    motive is not relevant. Jayyousi, 
    657 F.3d at 1115
    ; Awan, 
    607 F.3d at 317
    .
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564            Date Filed: 11/01/2021         Page: 24 of 25
    20-10564                   Opinion of the Court                               24
    Here though, with no “calculated” or specific intent finding
    at all, the district court erred in applying § 3A1.4’s terrorism
    enhancement.8 We express no opinion as to whether the factual
    proffer and any other record evidence were sufficient for the
    district court to draw any particular inferences here. Rather, the
    error is that the district court made no fact findings at all. 9
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Arcila Ramirez’s
    sentence and remand for resentencing and fact findings. 10
    8For the first time in his reply brief, Arcila Ramirez contends the government
    must prove that the terrorism enhancement applies by clear and convincing
    evidence. However, our circuit’s settled law is that the preponderance of the
    evidence standard is sufficient to establish the predicate facts for a sentencing
    adjustment or enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 
    398 F.3d 1291
    , 1296 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Whitesell, 
    314 F.3d 1251
    , 1255
    (11th Cir. 2002).
    9In cases under the “involved” prong, sometimes the offense conduct alone
    will be sufficient evidence to support a “calculated” fact finding. Sometimes
    not, requiring additional evidence. In either event, given the terrorism
    enhancement’s large impact on both the offense level and criminal history
    category, the district court should make an express fact finding as to the
    “calculated” requirement. Because our Court had not until now clarified that
    point, we remand for a full resentencing that permits the parties to present
    additional evidence and argument.
    10 Because we vacate Arcila Ramirez’s sentence and remand for a full
    resentencing, we do not address his remaining arguments that the district
    court should have either departed downward under United States v.
    USCA11 Case: 20-10564           Date Filed: 11/01/2021     Page: 25 of 25
    20-10564                    Opinion of the Court                        25
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    Rodriguez, 
    64 F.3d 638
     (11th Cir. 1995), or varied downward based on the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.