Denise Martinec v. Party Line Cruise Company , 350 F. App'x 406 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-12115 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 28, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-80098-CV-KLR
DENISE MARTINEC,
PATRICIA WILSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
PARTY LINE CRUISE COMPANY,
a foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 28, 2009)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BLACK and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises out of an attorneys’ fee award ordered by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in a Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”) case. After conducting a hearing on the appellants’ motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs, the district court found that appellants’ counsels’ billing
rates were reasonable, but that the number of hours spent on the litigation was
unreasonable. In making this finding, the district court considered the numerous
requests by appellants for extensions of time to respond to discovery, the
appellants’ filing of unnecessary/frivolous motions, appellants’ failure to file a
motion for summary judgment for which they sought fees, and the lack of complex
legal issues presented. Accordingly, the district court found that the number of
hours spent on the litigation should be reduced.
“The determination of a reasonable fee pursuant to § 216(b) of the [FLSA]
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside absent a
clear abuse of discretion.” Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541,
1543 (11th Cir. 1985).
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in its order awarding attorneys’ fees. Moreover, we conclude that
appellants have failed to establish that the district court erred in denying
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appellants’ supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees. The district court’s denial of
the supplemental motion was supported by detailed findings of fact and applicable
principles of law. We do conclude from the record, however, that the district court
made one error. The district court abused its discretion by failing to award post-
judgment interest and in failing to include explicit execution language in its order.
It is appropriate to impose post-judgment interest on awards of attorneys’ fees and
costs in an FLSA case. See Saglimbene v. Venture Indus. Corp., 739 F. Supp.
1100, 1102 (E. D. Mich. 1990). Further, we conclude that the district court erred
in failing to include language in its order which would permit execution on the
judgment. See DuBreuil v. Regnvall, 527 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
Finally, we conclude appellants’ claim of bias is meritless.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order in part, vacate
it in part, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
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