Hong Huang v. Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-14487 APRIL 6, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-22580-MGC
HONG HUANG,
a.k.a. Linda Huang,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY US DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
DIRECTOR OF THE US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 6, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hong Huang appeals the dismissal of her action seeking review of the
denial of her naturalization application under INA § 310(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c),
and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. On appeal, she argues that the
district court did have jurisdiction under § 1421(c), even though she has not yet
had an immigration hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Huang’s action and denial of her motion for reconsideration.
I.
Huang, a native of China, has been residing in the United States since 1998.
She became a permanent resident in 2004, and she filed an N-400 Application for
Naturalization in 2009. In 2010, the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) denied Huang’s naturalization application and simultaneously
initiated removal proceedings. Huang has since appealed the denial of her
naturalization application, but the USCIS has yet to rule on that appeal.
Huang then filed a complaint in the district court against Janet Napolitano,
in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security,
and Michael Aytes, in his official capacity as the Acting Director of the USCIS.1
She asserted that she had exhausted her administrative remedies because, pursuant
to INA § 318, 8 U.S.C. § 1429, the USCIS could not review the denial of her
1
Napolitano and Aytes are hereinafter referred to as “the government.”
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naturalization application. Huang asked the court to conduct a de novo review of
the denial of her naturalization application. She sought a declaration that she was
eligible for naturalization, asserted that the government violated the
Administrative Procedure Act, and sought a preliminary injunction to stay the
removal proceedings while her case was pending before the district court.
The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
First, the government argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because § 1421(c) restricted judicial review of the denial of a naturalization
application to applicants who had had an immigration hearing. Thus, Huang was
required in this manner to exhaust her administrative remedies, even though
Huang argued that exhaustion was futile because the USCIS did not have the
authority to consider her administrative appeal while her removal proceedings
were pending. The government argued that the exhaustion requirement was
statutory rather than judicial and as such could not be waived for discretionary
reasons. Second, the government argued that, even if the court had subject matter
jurisdiction, Huang failed to state a claim because, under § 1429, a district court
could not consider a naturalization application while removal proceedings were
pending. Finally, under § 1429, neither the court nor the USCIS could grant
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Huang’s naturalization application while she was in removal proceedings.
In response, Huang argued that the district court did have subject matter
jurisdiction under § 1421(c). That section implied that an immigration hearing
would be available and that, if a hearing was unavailable, exhaustion was not
required. No immigration hearing was available to Huang because the USCIS
initiated removal proceedings the same day it denied her application for
naturalization. The government replied that the court could not create exceptions
to a statutory exhaustion requirement.
The district court first determined that, under § 1421(c), it lacked
jurisdiction over Huang’s case because she had not yet attended an immigration
hearing to review the denial of her naturalization application. Thus, she had not
exhausted her administrative remedies. Even if, under § 1429, it would be futile
for Huang to attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies, the court could not
ignore § 1421(c)’s exhaustion requirement. The court then found that it did not
have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act or the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The court declined to consider whether Huang had stated a claim,
granted the motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case.
Huang filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the court applied the wrong
law in granting the motion to dismiss and that she was not required to exhaust her
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administrative remedies. In response, the government reiterated its argument that
the court could not create an exception to the exhaustion requirement contained in
§ 1421(c). Huang, in reply, reiterated her argument that she should not be
required to exhaust her administrative remedies because it would be futile. The
court denied the motion to reconsider, noting that Huang had not asserted any new
arguments or brought to the court’s attention any new legal authority regarding
exhaustion.
II.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2009). “We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion.” Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.
2010).
An individual whose naturalization application has been denied may seek
review of that denial in a United States district court “after a hearing before an
immigration officer under [INA § 336(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a)].” INA § 310(c), 8
U.S.C. § 1421(c). Courts are not to read “futility or other exceptions into statutory
exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.” Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1825 n.6, 149 L.Ed.2d 9585
(2001) (interpreting Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
The district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over
Huang’s case.2 Congress explicitly allows district court review of the denial of a
naturalization application only where the applicant has received an immigration
hearing under § 1447(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). This restriction is a statutory
exhaustion requirement, and the district court was not authorized to read an
exception, including one based on futility or the USCIS’s actions, into that
requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. at 1825 n.6. Because
Huang has not yet received an immigration hearing under § 1447(a), the district
court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of her naturalization application.
Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion
for reconsideration because the court correctly determined in the first instance that
it lacked jurisdiction under § 1421(c). Because the court correctly determined that
it lacked jurisdiction under § 1421(c), we do not consider whether Huang stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Huang’s action and denial of her motion for reconsideration.
2
Huang has abandoned any argument as to the district court’s rulings regarding the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act because she does not address
those rulings on appeal. See Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1145 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Generally, when an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is deemed
abandoned.”).
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AFFIRMED.
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